the volume consists of 100 tables that trace the growth, nature, pay, qualifications, and functions of public employees as well as the number of people primarily dependent on government incomes in each of these nations. In large measure, the text is simply a running commentary on these tables.

In statistical terms, the book is a prodigious accomplishment. The data have been gathered carefully so as to be comparable across nations. Country specialists have canvassed a wide variety of sources for each chapter. The material is well presented, and this volume is bound to become an indispensable reference work for anyone interested in the development of the public sector. In this regard, the Italian chapter is especially impressive. Moreover, there are some starling pieces of information to be found here: in virtually every European nation, the primary income of over half the population comes from the government, and since 1951 rising public employment has accounted for almost all the net growth in employment on that continent. These facts alone are sufficient testimony to the importance of this volume.

The analytic contribution of the volume, however, rests on the categories into which the authors have decided to group public employees and their products. In line with what they term a “programme approach” to public employment, Richard Rose and his collaborators divide the activities of public employees according to whether they contribute to social programs, economic programs, or the defining concerns of government (primarily tax collection, defense, and policing or judicial functions). Their results are then said to be either “collective goods,” “marketed goods,” or potentially marketable goods that are “given away.” Perhaps unintentionally, the effect of this system of categorization is to impress on us the extent to which contemporary governments have moved away from their “defining” functions by virtue of a great increase in the number of potentially marketable goods that are “given away.” A large increase in the number of educators and health care providers over the past three decades accounts for much of this trend because they are defined as public employees in almost all of these nations.

The relative increase in health and educational personnel is a striking finding and these categories have much to be said for them, but a few quibbles might be in order. Should doctors and other health workers paid indirectly through health insurance schemes of the sort found in France and Germany, for instance, be labelled “public employees”? Most of the funds that pay them are channelled through the state, but I suspect that many European physicians might be surprised to see themselves described this way. In this volume the term public employee includes people who stand in such a wide variety of relationships to the central state that it loses some of its meaning along the way. Similarly, there are those who might be inclined to consider education to be as much a “defining concern” of the modern state as defense; and there are those who (stressing its social benefits) might see education as a collective good rather than as a potentially marketable good now given away. After all, as some U.S. communities have demonstrated, even many policing functions can effectively be marketed. In short, there is room to argue with some of the broad categories into which this volume divides public programs.

Nevertheless, country specialists as well as comparativists will find a wealth of information in the chapters on Britain (by Richard Parry), France (by Edward Page), Germany (by Klaus-Dieter Schmidt and Richard Rose), Italy (by Andrea Cendali Pignatelli), and Sweden and the United States (by B. Guy Peters) as well as stimulation in the thought-provoking introduction by Richard Rose. This is an especially powerful salvo in the intensifying debate on the growth of contemporary governments.

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The Muda River valley in the northeastern state of Kedah is the largest rice-producing area in Malaysia. In the mid-1960s, the government built a large irrigation system that per-
mitted double cropping. Combined with the new green revolution technologies, this project more than doubled rice yields within a few years. While most of the farmers were small owner-operators, a significant minority were tenants or landless workers and a few owned substantial holdings. In this familiar Asian scenario, the latter constituted a local power elite because of their wealth, their control of employment, and their links with government and the dominant Malay political party.

At first the tenants and landless workers shared in the green revolution bonanza because double cropping expanded the demand for labor. But in a few years the larger landowners introduced combine harvesters and new methods of seeding, both of which substantially reduced labor requirements with devastating effects on the livelihoods of tenants and landless workers. The specific context of Scott’s study is how the marginalized peasants responded to the imposition of new technologies and the commercialization of the rural economy, which threatened both their livelihoods and their status as productive members of the village community. The larger issue is a replay of the dilemma that has confronted Marxist social scientists—Scott employs the main class-based concepts of academic Marxism—why the victims of exploitation so seldom develop a revolutionary class consciousness and why they so seldom undertake revolutionary activity.

To examine these problems from the peasants’ perspective, Scott employed the methods of the participant observer. Living and working for two years in a Malay village, he faithfully recorded daily interviews and encounters with members of all classes, kinship groups, and political factions in this village society. The result is a body of authentic data about peasant responses to material opportunities, threats, and deprivations, as well as the economic and social strategies they employed to defend their interests and rationalize their behavior—stripped of the deductive inferences so common in academic treatment of the world view and motivations of disadvantaged peoples. It is not only the sensitive reporting of this rich array of data but also their sophisticated interpretation by a scholar who has mastered the literature on peasant protest and resistance that makes this book a remarkable intellectual achievement.

Among Scott’s major findings are these six:

First, a continuous class struggle between owners of the means of production and those who provide only labor is waged over relative contributions to and shares in the production process, including wages, terms of tenancy, and even charitable obligations.

Second, this everyday struggle occurs simultaneously at two levels: the economic, in which the terms of material exchanges are worked out and the symbolic or ideological, where members of each class attempt to rationalize and legitimate their particular interests in terms of the social and religious norms that bind the community.

Third, while superior economic and political power confer overwhelming advantages on those who own land and capital, tenants and workers employ unremittingly the “weapons of the weak” to maximize their limited resources and bargaining power. These weapons range from slowdowns and informal labor boycotts to pilfering of rice and animals, careless threshing (so that more rice will be available for gleaners), and maligning by gossip the reputation of stingy and callous landlords. Occasionally, the resistance spills over to acts of violence, including the sabotage of machinery. With few exceptions, however, these tactics are carried out without formal organization and they avoid direct confrontation; indeed, on the surface they remain polite and deferential.

Fourth, contrary to the views of Gramsci and his numerous academic disciples, the rural poor do not suffer from “false consciousness” and are not “mystified” by the hegemonic ideologies promoted by the dominant class and its intellectual and political agents. The peasants are perfectly aware of what is happening to them, but they also recognize the limits of their ability to resist openly without jeopardizing the precarious livelihoods that are available to them and without inviting the repressive powers of local elites and the state. These peasants behave quite rationally in terms of their limited political, economic, and symbolic resources and opportunities.

Fifth, though sanctioned by religion and custom—in this case the Malay version of Islam—the solidarities of village life expressed in patron-client networks and in the obligations of the rich to ensure the subsistence of the poor were products primarily of economic
interdependency. Landed farmers needed an assured supply of reliable tenants and workers. The new technologies substantially reduce the demand for labor. As the poor become redundant and expendable in the processes of rural production, the moral economy of village life changes. Landowners abandon—and find ways to rationalize the abandonment of—their traditional obligations to tenants and workers.

Sixth, the state increasingly penetrates the rural economy, but the services it provides disproportionately benefit the rural elites directly and by preemption. Moreover, its instruments of repression unfailingly protect the status quo and deter organized protest by the disadvantaged. In Malaysia the state has become the main provider of valuable public goods but has not succeeded in replacing the rural elites as patron at the village level. Many of the material benefits distributed by the state are mediated by the official party machine, which is controlled locally by landowning families.

Like most contemporary academic Marxists, Scott is explicitly pessimistic about the future of the marginalized peasantry under collectivized as well as capitalist regimes. In states that call themselves socialist, the peasants remain exploited and powerless. The class struggle over the remuneration of labor and shares of the harvest continues. Peasants resist the exactions of the socialist state by many of the same weapons that Scott identifies among their counterparts in the Muda River valley. In capitalist economies such as Malaysia, technology in the hands of a landowning class and their new commercial allies continues relentlessly to displace and marginalize tenants and laborers. At the village level they are fighting rear-guard actions with the ineflectual weapons of the weak while the growing power of the state inhibits and where necessary crushes any revolutionary responses. Contemporary academic Marxism provides increasingly sophisticated critiques of the "contradictions" of advanced capitalism but few plausible prescriptions on how to emerge from these dilemmas. The prevailing pessimism of the non-Leninist Left, as exemplified by Scott, offers even less hope for the victims of unrestrained capitalist expansion than the reformist formulas and the standard prescriptions for capitalist growth that Marxists continue to denigrate. Ironically, academic Marxism has achieved the peak of its influence among social scientists at the very time that its confidence in revolutionary action and in practical socialist alternatives has virtually collapsed.

The great strength of this study is its rich village-centered perspective on the unequal struggle over shares, material and social, in the wake of capitalist development. Its treatment of the state and its impact on local society, however, is fragmentary and incomplete. Though committed to capitalist development, the Malaysian state has implemented a growth-oriented economic strategy from which the majority of Malays, including many from modest village backgrounds, have benefitted in a relatively short period of time. It has retained enough democratic practices that it must be sensitive to its Malay constituency on whose votes the present ruling coalition depends (there is an active populist Malay opposition party whose role in Kedah's village life is described at some length in this study).

To legitimize its rule, the present regime has taken a number of steps to improve the quality of rural life. These include the rapid expansion of such public goods as educational and health facilities, water supply and electricity. Rapid economic growth has provided alternative opportunities for livelihoods outside agriculture. The regime has guaranteed the political and cultural hegemony of the Malays, a not inconsiderable achievement of which village Malays are clearly aware. Though its machine-style rule is often heavy-handed and though benefits have been distributed unequally along class lines, the majority of rural Malays, and not only the most affluent among them, have benefitted, as Scott's data indicate. This is not to deny that the state could and should have done more—as reform-minded observers have urged—to mitigate the pace and the social costs of this rapid structural transformation.

The ability of a relatively successful capitalist state, through economic growth and the provision of public services, to distribute benefits and the prospects of benefits rather widely may help to explain the stamina of this pattern of political economy even in the face of destabilizing technological changes that produce a substantial number of losers and victims. Apart from its repressive apparatus, the relative stability of the Malaysian capitalist state to date can be explained at least in part by the material and symbolic benefits that it ha:
generated for the majority of its core Malay constituents. This is the dimension of empirical reality and especially of theory that Scott underplays in this otherwise excellent study.

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This book describes the development experience of smaller European countries to see what light they throw on development policy throughout the world today. Countries are divided between those that are "autocentric" and those that are "peripheralized," following the Braudel-Wallerstein vocabulary, but blaming "peripheralization" on the policies of the countries affected rather than on hegemonic countries at the center. Small countries that are "associative" in the sense of producing raw materials and food for the world market are likely to find themselves in an economic backwater, although England, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands developed in that fashion, and an associative posture is satisfactory for large states. "Disassociative" development based on the dynamics of the domestic market has worked for France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, for such state-capitalist economies as czarist Russia and Japan, and state-socialist economies as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Socialist countries face the same choice as others as to whether to associate with or dissociate from other socialist countries.

What Senghaas holds to be the desirable model for developing countries is a combination of association and disassociation—export-led growth in specialized niches while keeping certain domestic markets protected, as exemplified in his judgement by Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. He regards free trade as a special case and views his position as neo-Listian, derived from Friederich List's prescription for a national economy.

Senghaas's recommendations go beyond association and disassociation with the world economy. He favors especially improving productivity in agriculture through defeudalization before setting out to build industry, wants a sharing of income and wealth as a basis for ensuring that increases in productivity spill over into consumption of domestically produced goods for the masses, not just conspicuous consumption that turns to luxury imports. He calls on developing countries to invest and innovate their own technologies and to build broadly effective infrastructures. The developing countries should stay self-reliant and decoupled as far as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world is concerned but associate collectively among their kind within regions and subregionally. These precepts, it is noted, do not apply to the successful newly industrializing countries (NICs) of the Pacific basin, but Senghaas is not discussing that experience.

The heart of the book is a historical account of the development experience of Scandinavia and the dominions (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), the last presumably honorary parts of Europe. Denmark is compared with Uruguay on the (dubious) assumption that the resources of the two countries are similar, and some attention is given to the familiar Argentine-Australian comparison. On the other hand, too little attention is paid to France and Germany in Europe, the experience of which runs counter to his generalizations about an agricultural revolution and redistribution of income and wealth, or to the "semi-peripheries"—Italy and Spain. The European country that gets the most attention is Finland, stimulated in growth through paying reparations in industrial goods to the Soviet Union. Senghaas argues that the case is not exceptional but representative. The Norwegian legislation of 1905–10 limiting foreign ownership of natural resources is given critical significance as a disassociative act. Disassociative measures are called "clever" (p. 61) and "well-planned" (p. 100), with, however, little in the way of supportive evidence. I am inclined to argue that Scandinavia is not representative of European experience, with its initially weak feudalism and widespread Protestant education, plus the adventitious British repeal of the Corn Laws, the timber duties, and the navigation acts. While the Sandberg thesis of Sweden as an "impoverished sophisticate" is mentioned, no attention is paid to the financial institutions that constituted the core of Sandberg's thesis.