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Still the Century of Corporatism?

Philippe C. Schmitter

The twentieth century will be the century of corporatism just as the nineteenth was the century of liberalism...

Mihaïl Manoïlesco

Until recently, Manoïlesco's confident prediction could easily be dismissed as yet another example of the ideological bias, wishful thinking and overinflated rhetoric of the thirties, an événementielle response to a peculiar environment and period. With the subsequent defeat of fascism and National Socialism, the spectre of corporatism no longer seemed to haunt the European scene so fatally. For a while, the concept itself was virtually retired from the active lexicon of politics, although it was left on behavioral exhibit, so to speak, in such museums of atavistic political practice as Portugal and Spain.

Lately, however, the spectre is back amongst us—verbally at least—haunting the concerns of contemporary social scientists with increasing frequency and in multiple guises. Almost forty years to the day when Manoïlesco declared that "the ineluctable course of fate involves the transformation of all the social and political institutions of our times in a corporatist direction," perhaps we should again take his prediction seriously and inquire whether we might still be in the century of corporatism—but only just becoming aware of it.

The purposes of this essay are to explore various usages of the concept of corporatism, to suggest an operational definition of it as a distinctive, modern system of interest representation, to discuss the utility of distinguishing subtypes of corporatist development and practice and, finally, to set forth some general hypotheses "explaining" the probable context of its emergence and persistence.

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2 Ibid., p. 7.
The first step, I propose, is to rescue the concept of corporatism from various usages of it which have crept into the literature and which seem (to me) to do more to dissipate or to disguise than to enhance its utility. On the one hand, it has become such a vaguely bounded phenomenon that, like clientelism, it can be found everywhere and, hence, is nowhere very distinctive; on the other hand, it has been so narrowly attached to a single political culture, regime-type or macrosocietal configuration that it becomes, at best, uniquely descriptive rather than comparatively analytic.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult task is to strip the concept of its pejorative tone and implication. This is made all the more difficult by the fact that—unlike the thirties—there are very few regimes today who overtly and proudly advertise themselves as corporatist. It, therefore, becomes a tempting game to unveil and denounce as corporatist practices which regimes are condoning or promoting under other labels, such as “participation,” “collaborative planning,” “mixed representation,” and “permanent consultation.” On the other hand, if corporatism is left to mean simply “interest-group behavior or systems I do not like” and/or used synonymously with such epithets as “fascist” and “repressive,” then it can become of little or no utility for purposes of systematic comparison. This is not to say that those who use the concept must somehow be enjoined from uttering evaluative statements or even from expressing strong normative reactions to its role or consequences. I have now studied several corporatist systems and come openly to quite firm personal judgments about each of them. But, I hope that those who disagree on its desirability can at least arrive at some common prior agreement as to the empirical referents which identify its basic structure and behavior. They then can dispute the costs and benefits and the intrinsic “goods” and “bads” it produces.

In my work I have found it useful to consider corporatism as a system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state. As such it is one of several possible modern configurations of interest representation, of which pluralism is perhaps the best-known and most frequently acknowledged alternative—but more about that below.
Restricting the concept, so to speak, to refer only to a specific concrete set of institutional practices or structures involving the representation (or misrepresentation) of empirically observable group interests has a number of important implications. These sharply differentiate my preferred usage from those of several others who have recently employed the same conceptual label.

First, by defining corporatism in terms of its praxis, the concept is liberated from its employment in any particular ideology or system of ideas. While, as will become manifest in later sections of this essay, I am quite interested in the arguments put forth by particular proponents of modern or neocorporatism, my reading of its use in the recent history of ideas suggests that an extraordinary variety of theorists, ideologues and activists have advocated it for widely divergent motives, interests and reasons.

These range from such romantic, organic theorists of the state as Friedrich Schlegel, Adam von Müller, G. W. Friedrich Hegel and Rudolf Kjellen; to the pre-Marxist, protosocialists Sismondi, Saint-Simon and Proudhon; to the Social Christian, ethically traditionalist thought of Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl von Vogelsang, the Marquis de la Tour de Pin, Albert de Mun and, of course, Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI; to the fascist authoritarianism of Giuseppe Bottai, Guido Bortolotto, Giuseppe Papi and Francesco Vito; to the secular modernizing nationalism of a Mihail Manoï-lesco; to the radical (in the French sense) bourgeois solidarism of Léon Duguit, Joseph-Paul Boncour, Georges Renard and Emile Durkheim; to the mystical universalism of an Ottmar Spann; to the internationalist functionalism of Giuseppe de Michels and David Mitrany; to the reactionary, pseudo-Catholic integralism of Charles Maurras, Oliveira Salazar, Marcello Caetano and Jean Brêthe de la Gressaye; to the technocratic, procapitalist reformism of Walter Rathenau, Lord Keynes and A. A. Berle, Jr.; to the anticapitalist syndicalism of Georges Sorel, Sergio Panunzio, Ugo Spirito, Edmondo Rossoni, Enrico Corradini and Gregor Strasser; to the guild socialism of G.D.H. Cole, the early Harold Laski, S. G. Hobson and Ramiro de Maeztu; to the communitarianism

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3 For an example of such a definition by ideology, see James Malloy, "Authoritarianism, Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru," elsewhere in this volume. Also Howard Wiarda, "The Portuguese Corporate System: Basic Structures and Current Functions" (Paper prepared for the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., Oct. 10-14, 1973). In both cases the authors were heavily, if not exclusively, influenced by "Social Christian" versions of corporatist thought.
or bourgeois socialism of a François Perroux or an Henri de Man—not to mention such contemporary advocates as Bernard Crick, W. H. Ferry, Pierre Mendes-France and David Apter.

All of these—and the list is by no means complete nor are the above groupings by any means sharply distinctive—have converged upon the advocacy of an institutional relationship between the systems of authoritative decision-making and interest representation which can be considered as generically corporatist by my praxiological definition (and frequently defined as such by the authors themselves), although they conceived of this arrangement as involving radically different structures of power and influence, as benefiting quite distinct social classes, and as promoting diametrically opposite public policies.

A French student of corporatism described the situation quite well when he said:

The army of corporatists is so disparate that one is led to think that the word, corporation, itself is like a label placed on a whole batch of bottles which are then distributed among diverse producers each of whom fills them with the drink of his choice. The consumer has to look carefully.

The situation is even further confused by the fact that many contemporary theorists, ideologues and activists are peddling the same drink under yet other labels.

Not only is corporatism defined as an ideology (or worse as a weltanschauung) difficult to pin down to a central set of values or beliefs and even more difficult to associate with the aspirations or interests of a specific social group, but virtually all detailed empirical inquiries of corporatist praxis have shown its performance and behavior to be at considerable variance—if not diametrically opposed—to the beliefs manifestly advanced by its verbal defenders. As another French scholar of the forties (himself an advocate of corporatism à sa manière) observed, "The reality of existing corporatisms is, without a doubt, infinitely less seductive than the doctrine." Contemporary conceptualizations of corporatism based

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4 To this article I have appended a working bibliography of some 100 titles which seem important to an understanding of the ideological and praxiological bases of corporatism up to and including the interwar period.


exclusively on the stated motives and goals of actors or their apologists tend only to obfuscate this "less than seductive" reality in praxis.

In short, I find there is simply too much normative variety and behavioral hypocrisy in the use of the corporatist *ideological* label to make it a useful operational instrument for comparative analysis.

Nor do I find it very productive to consider corporatism to be an exclusive part or a distinctive product of a particular political culture, especially one linked to some geographically circumscribed area such as the Iberian Peninsula7 or the Mediterranean.8 This approach to corporatism not only runs up against the usual (and in my view, well-founded) criticisms raised against most, if not all, political-cultural "explanations"9—especially against those based on impressionistic evidence and circular reasoning10—but also fails


10 Such reasoning has been particularly prevalent among Anglo-Saxon students of Latin America where, from the start, these area specialists seem to have drawn the following syllogism: "Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal; North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Americans are predominantly Protestant; ergo, Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans because of their Catholic-Iberian heritage!"

The few systematically comparative studies of attitudes which have included both Latin and North American samples have generally concluded that once one controls for education, class, center-periphery residence, age, etc., residual differences that could be assigned specifically to culture are statistically
completely to explain why similar configurations and behavior in interest politics have emerged and persist in a great variety of cultural settings, stretching from Northern Europe, across the Mediterranean to such exotic places as Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, to name but a few. This form of pseudoexplanation also cannot contribute much to answering the question of why, even within the presumed homeland of such an ethos, that is, the Iberian Peninsula and its “fragments,” corporatism has waxed and waned during different historical periods. Are we to believe that political culture is a sort of “spigot variable” which gets turned on every once in a while to produce a different system of functional representation? Also we might ask, why do societies supposedly sharing the same general ethos exhibit such wide diversity in interest-group values, practices and consequences? By all empirically available standards, Spain is more Catholic than Portugal, Colombia more so than Brazil, yet in each case it is the latter which has by far the more corporatist system. At best, then, culturalist arguments must be heavily supplemented to account for such embarrassing deviations in outcome.

Finally, since those who have advanced such an explanation also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on ideology (occasionally even accepting word for fact), we might wonder why the major ideologues of corporatism have not come from this part of the world. A quick glance at the admittedly incomplete bibliography attached to this essay will show that the intellectual origins of corporatism are predominately German, Belgian, French and Austrian and, secondarily and belatedly, English, Italian and Rumanian. Those who advocated corporatism in the Iberian and Latin American areas unabashedly and unashamedly imported their ideas from abroad. Modern, nonmedieval, corporatism was diffused to the Iberian-Mediterranean area, not created within it.\footnote{It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists of modern corporatism have not been Catholics. Many were in fact militantly secular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by “Social Christian” ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfuss, followed a much more bureaucratic, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among “Social Christians” or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by any means advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Henri Guitton, \textit{Le Catholicisme Social} (Paris, 1945).}

\footnote{It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists of modern corporatism have not been Catholics. Many were in fact militantly secular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by “Social Christian” ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfuss, followed a much more bureaucratic, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among “Social Christians” or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by any means advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Henri Guitton, \textit{Le Catholicisme Social} (Paris, 1945).}

Another tendency which has cropped up in recent discussions of corporatism is to define or, better, submerge it into some wider political configuration such as "the organic state" or "the authoritarian regime." The "organic state" concept runs up against many of the criticisms of definitional vagueness, lack of potential empirical specificity and circularity of argument leveled above at the political cultural approach. More importantly, it fails to take into account the historical fact that many "organically conceived" states were not composed of corporatist subunits, but built upon a great variety of "organs" ranging from the *curies* and *phratries* of Fustel de Coulanges's ancient city, to the "metallic" orders of moral excellence in Plato's ideal polity, to the three to five estate systems of various ancien régime, to the phalanges of Fourier, to the régions of Robert LaFont, even to the autonomous, plural communities of Percival and Paul Goodman or Gar Alperovitz. If one accepts that a special characteristic of modern corporatism (this in both ideology and practice) concerns the role of functional interest associations, then it is but one of many possible structural units, for example, familial, territorial-communitarian, moral, religious, "productionist," etc., which may go into the establishment of an "organic state." Emphasizing that macrocharacteristic does little to specify concrete relations of authority, influence and representation, except to differentiate them from equally vague notions of the "mechanical state."


In subsequent conversations with this author, Linz has advanced and defended the idea of an "organic state model" as the appropriate framework for the discussion of corporatism. See also the essay cited above (fn. 3) by James Malloy in this volume.


16 F. Charles Fourier, *Théories de l'Unité Unité Universelle* (1822) and *Le Nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire* (1829).


The relation of corporatism in interest politics to a specific global type of political regime is a much more complicated (and, in my view, interesting) issue. For reasons which will, I hope, become apparent in the course of this essay I have found it more useful to define it as a concrete, observable general system of interest representation which is "compatible" with several different regime-types, i.e., with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political mobilization, varying scopes of public policy, etc. Then I will endeavor to specify distinct subtypes of corporatist representation which seem to have at least an elective affinity for, if not to be essential defining elements of, specific regime-types during specific periods of their development.19

Yet another tendency in the revived discussion of corporatism which differs from that proposed here is that which submerges the concept, not in some wider concept of regional political culture, state form or regime-type, but in some marcosocietal characteristic such as the presence of visual stigmata,20 or the existence of religiously, ideologically or linguistically determined zuilen lager, or familles spirituelles.21 Here the problem is simply that stigmatized or pillared societies exhibit quite different degrees of corporatism in the sense used herein and that, vice versa, many heavily corporatized systems of interest representation exist in societies which have no marked visual stigmatization or pillared social and cultural structures. Sweden is no less corporatized because it lacks both


21 For example, Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley, 1968)—where in all fairness the concept of corporatism itself does not appear. In a forthcoming essay by Martin Heisler, however, these "pillared" notions are expressly linked to a corporatist model of European politics: "Patterns of European Politics: The 'European Polity' Model," in M. O. Heisler et al., Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes (New York, forthcoming).

dimensions; 22 Belgium no more so because it suffers from both. 23 These are interesting and salient dimensions of societies, in and by themselves, but they do not seem to bear any close association with the phenomenon upon which I recommend we focus our attention with the concept of corporatism.

In the present state of nominalistic anarchy prevailing in the discipline, it is absurd to pretend that scholars will somehow "rally" to a particular conceptualization, spurn alternative uses of the term, and, henceforth, agree to disagree on the basis of a common lexical definition. About all one can expect from an introductory discussion such as this may be to gain a few recruits for a more specific and bounded use of the concept of corporatism, and to warn the reader that a great deal of what has recently been written about corporatism and of what will subsequently be discussed in this essay may be of no mutual relevance at all.

II

Having rejected a series of alternative usages of the concept of corporatism and expressed a preference for a more empirically bounded specification which focuses on a set of relatively directly observable, institutionally distinctive traits involving the actual practice of interest representation, it is now incumbent upon me to produce such a conceptual specification:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representa-

22 Roland Huntford, for example, argues that is is precisely social and economic homogenization which contributes to the thoroughness of Swedish corporatism; see The New Totalitarians (New York, 1972), pp. 86-87ff. Also Olaf Ruin, "Participation, Corporativization and Politicization Trends in Present-day Sweden" (Paper presented at Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study, New York, May 5-6, 1972).

23 On the contrary, a recent analysis of Belgium's associational structure argues persuasively that multipillared conflicts in that polity serve to sustain a more pluralist (i.e., nonmonopolistic, competitive, overlapping) system of interest representation; see A. Van Den Brande, "Voluntary Associations in the Belgian Political System 1954-1968," Res Publica, no. 2 (1973), pp. 329-356.
tional monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.\textsuperscript{24}

Obviously, such an elaborate definition is an ideal-type description,\textsuperscript{25} a heuristic and logicoanalytical construct composed of a considerable variety of theoretically or hypothetically interrelated components. No empirically extant system of interest representation may perfectly reproduce all these dimensions, although two which I have studied in some detail (Brazil and Portugal) come rather close.\textsuperscript{26} While the whole gestalt or syndrome is not directly

\textsuperscript{24} At this point it is perhaps worth repeating that this constructed definition does not correspond to any of the ones advanced by specifically corporatist theorists. Moreover, it ignores a number of institutional and behavioral dimensions they tended to stress. For example, it does not specify the existence of singular associations (corporations) grouping both employers and workers. (These rarely exist and where they have been formally established—Portugal, Spain and Italy—they do not function as units.) Nor does it say anything about the presence of a higher council or parliament composed of functional or professional representatives. (Many polities which are not otherwise very corporatist, France or Weimar Germany, have such a Conseil Economique et Social or Wirtschaftsrat; many heavily corporatist countries which do have them, e.g., Portugal, do not grant them decisional authority.) Nor does the definition suggest that corporatist associations will be the only constituent units of the polity—completely displacing territorial entities, parties and movements. (In all existing corporatist systems, parties and territorial subdivisions continue to exist and various youth and religious movements may not only be tolerated but encouraged.) These institutional aspects as well as the more important behavioral issues of how and who would form the unique and hierarchical associations, what would be their degree of autonomy from state control and whether the whole scheme really could bring about class harmony and constitute a tertium genus between communism and capitalism were the subject of extensive debate and considerable fragmentation among corporatist ideologues.

The ideological definition closest to my analytical one is Mihail Manoilesco's: “The corporation is a collective and public organization composed of the totality of persons (physical or juridical) fulfilling together the same national function and having as its goal that of assuring the exercise of that function by rules of law imposed at least upon its members" (\textit{Le Siècle du Corporatisme}, p. 176).

\textsuperscript{25} Actually, the concept is more "a constructed type" than an ideal type. The former has been defined as: "a purposive, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases" (John C. McKinnes, \textit{Constructive Typology and Social Theory} [New York, 1966], p. 9).

\textsuperscript{26} See my \textit{Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil} (fn. 19) and "Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal" (Paper presented at the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., October 10-14, 1973). Also "The Portugalization of Brazil?" (fn. 19).
accessible to measurement, its postulated components can be easily assessed, if not immediately quantified. Such detailed inquiry into the extent to which a given system of representation is limited in number of component units, compulsory in membership, noncompetitive between compartmentalized sectors, hierarchically ordered in internal structure, recognized or certified in some de jure or de facto way by the state, successful in exercising a representational monopoly within functionally determined categories and subject to formal or informal controls on leadership selection and interest articulation will not only enable us to distinguish what type of interest system it belongs to, but may help us gauge the extent to which these multiple dimensions are empirically as well as logically interrelated. It is, of course, quite conceivable at this early stage in research into these matters that what I have found to be a set of interrelated institutional practices coalescing into a distinctive, highly covariant and resistant modern system of interest representation may be quite limited in its scope of applicability, for example, only to Iberian authoritarian regimes, or restricted to only one subtype of corporatism, such as ones “artificially” established from above by the state.

One purpose in developing this elaborate general model, beyond that of describing the behavior of a certain number of political systems which have interested me, is to offer to the political analyst an explicit alternative to the paradigm of interest politics which has heretofore completely dominated the discipline of the North American political science: pluralism. While a considerable number and wide variety of scholars have discovered that pluralism (and with it, the closely associated liberal democratic regime-type) may be of little utility in describing the likely structure and behavior of interest-group systems in contemporary developing polities, and while some have even gone so far as to suggest that it may no longer be of much utility when applied to the practices of advanced industrial polities, few if any of these scholars have proposed an alternative or contrasting model of modern representative association-state relations. Most of them merely mourn the passing or degeneration of pluralism and either advocate its return, its replacement with some more formalistic, authoritative (if not authoritarian) "jurid-

27 For example, Henry Kariel (ed.), Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York, 1970), and his, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, 1961); also Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York, 1966).
ical democracy,"

or its periodic bouleversement by spontaneous social movements.

Pluralism and corporatism share a number of basic assumptions, as would almost any realistic model of modern interest politics: (1) the growing importance of formal associational units of representation; (2) the persistence and expansion of functionally differentiated and potentially conflicting interests; (3) the burgeoning role of permanent administrative staffs, of specialized information, of technical expertise and, consequently, of entrenched oligarchy; (4) the decline in the importance of territorial and partisan representation; and (5) the secular trend toward expansion in the scope of public policy and interpenetration of private and public decision arenas. Nevertheless, despite this wide area of mutual agreement, pluralism differs markedly from corporatism as an ideal-typical response to these facts of modern political life.

Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.

Practitioners of corporatism and of pluralism would heartily agree with James Madison that "among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control (my emphasis) the violence of faction." They would also agree that "giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions and the same interests . . . is as impracticable as [suppressing them altogether — PCS] would be unwise." Where the two practitioners would begin to diverge is with Madison's further assertion that "it is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good." Corporatists, basing their faith either on the superior wisdom of an authoritarian leader or the enlightened foresight of technocratic planners, believe that such a public unity can be found

and kept. Their “scheme of representation,” to use Madison’s felicitous phrase, instead of extending the “number of citizens” and the “sphere of interests” would compress them into a fixed set of verticalized categories each representing the interdependent functions of an organic whole. Madison’s metaphor was more mechanistic, and more dynamic. Hence, he was less sanguine about limiting and ordering the sources of faction—whether from above by imposition or from below by elimination. Corporatists of whatever stripe express confidence that an “enlightened statesman” (or an “enlightened state”) can co-opt, control or coordinate not only those “most frivolous and fanciful distinctions [which] have been sufficient to kindle unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts,” but also that “most common and durable source of faction . . . the various and unequal distribution of property.”

In short, both pluralists and corporatists recognize, accept and attempt to cope with the growing structural differentiation and interest diversity of the modern polity, but they offer opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional form that such a modern system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and competitive interaction; the latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence. Pluralists place their faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces; corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole.

While time and space limitations prevent me from developing the idea further, I suspect that these two contrasting but not diametrically opposed syndromes do not by any means exhaust the possible alternative system-types of modern interest representation.

For example, the Soviet experience suggests the existence of a “monist” model which could be defined as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a fixed number of singular, ideologically selective, noncompetitive, functionally differentiated and hierarchically ordered categories, created, subsidized and licensed by a single party and granted a representational role within that party and vis-à-vis the state in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, articulation of demands and mobilization of support.

30 The quotations are all from The Federalist Papers, no. 10.
Much more difficult to specify in terms of the component dimensions we have been using for the other three because of its radical and utopian nature is the syndicalist alternative. Barely sketched in by a number of theorists (several of whom subsequently became corporatists), this projected model seems to reject or to seek to transform substantially many of the given characteristics of the modern political process—more or less accepted or even encouraged by the other three syndromes. Nevertheless, a brief description of its characteristics will be offered below, partly because it has emerged with increasing frequency (if not specificity) in recent discussions of participation and representation,31 and partly because it seems to round out in logical terms the combinatorial possibilities of the variables used to define the other three types.

Syndicalism could be defined as a system of interest aggregation (more than representation) in which the constituent units are an unlimited number of singular, voluntary, noncompetitive (or better hived-off) categories, not hierarchically ordered or functionally specialized, neither recognized, created nor licensed by state or party, nor controlled in their leadership selection or interest articulation by state or party, not exercising a representational monopoly but resolving their conflicts and "authoritatively allocating their values" autonomously without the interference of the state.

With this last definition-model we have moved some distance from our stated limited concern with specifying the characteristics of corporatism as a distinctive and self-sustaining system of interest representation, and not confusing it with a whole system of political domination. Nevertheless, this excursion has served to remind us that the process of capturing, organizing and articulating the demands of civil society as well as those of receiving, interpreting and even applying the "imperative coordinations" of the state is only part of the political process, and hence only intelligible in purpose and consequence when considered in relation to other political subsystems and whole regime configurations. This wider set of concerns, ironically, leads us to a consideration of possible subtypes of corporatism.

31 See especially the article by Gar Alperovitz and works cited therein (fn. 18), even though the author associates his proposals with the tradition of pluralism, rather than that of syndicalism. Also Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy (Ithaca, 1971).
III

To illustrate that the skeletal connotation of corporatism offered above accurately describes the system of interest representation of a large number of countries, including many whose global political systems differ markedly, would not be difficult—even at the existing lamentable state of our empirical knowledge. Hence, it has been argued and rather convincingly shown that Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Greece, Mexico and Yugoslavia have, by and large, singular, noncom-

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89 Schmitter, “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal” (fn. 26).

90 Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* and “The Portugalization of Brazil?” (fn. 26).


92 Julio Cotler, “Bases del corporativismo en el Peru,” *Sociedad y Politica*, I, no. 2 (October, 1972), 3-12; also James Malloy (fn. 3).


95 International Labour Office, *Workers’ Management in Yugoslavia*
petitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies and accepting (de jure or de facto) governmentally imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the scope and intensity of demands they routinely make upon the state. As a result, such associations have attained "a quasi-legal status and a prescriptive right to speak for their segments of the population. They influence the process of government directly, bypassing the [parliament]. They are agents of authority. They deputize for the state in whole sectors of public life, and they have duties delegated to them that properly belong to the civil service." The summary above applies specifically to Sweden, but it is broadly descriptive of the countries cited above—and undoubtedly of many others yet to be investigated.

Such a demonstration of broad structural identity does have the virtue of debunking, if not divesting, some of these polities of the pluralist labels they have acquired—a prestigious title usually bestowed upon them for no better reason than the mere existence of a multitude of organized interests. It may also serve to call into question the relevance of many supposed properties associated with pluralism and assumed, therefore, to apply to these polities: competitiveness within sectors and, hence, accountability to members; cross-pressures and overlap and, hence, vacillation and moderation in demands; open competitiveness between interest sectors and, hence, incremental, split-the-difference solutions; penetration and


46 In an even wider range of polities, authors have suggested that parts, if not substantial portions, of the interest group universe can be described as "corporatized": e.g., the United States: Grant McConnell (fn. 27); Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (fn. 28), pp. 59-100; Great Britain: Samuel Beer (fn. 11); Western Germany: Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (London, 1968); Canada: Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (New York, 1973); France: Suzanne Berger, "Corporative Organization: The Case of a French Rural Association" in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), Voluntary Associations (New York, 1969), pp. 263-84.

47 R. Huntford (fn. 22), p. 86.
subordination of political parties and, hence, broad aggregative party goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan ideologies; absence of stable hierarchies of organizational influence and, hence, irrelevance of class or ruling elite as political categories; low barriers of entry into the policy process and, hence, key roles assigned to “potential groups” and absence of systematic bias or exclusion; major importance attached to lobbying and, hence, concentration of attention upon parliament; assumption that policy initiatives are produced by group activity “from below” and, hence, passive roles assumed on the part of state executive and administrative bureaucracies; wide dispersion of political resources and, hence, neither omnipotent veto groups nor powerless marginal elements; and, finally, sheer multiplicity of interest and free associability ensuring spontaneous emergence of countervailing forces and, hence, a general tendency toward homeostasis or shifting equilibria. Corporatist systems may manage to acquire and sustain similar outcomes of demand moderation, negotiated solutions, leader accountability, “deideologization,” inclusive participation, countervalence of power and homeostatic balance, but they do not do so through the processes which theorists and analysts of pluralism have emphasized. For example, in the studies I have conducted of one type of corporatism, I have found that such process features as preemption of issues; co-optation of leaders; vertical or sectoral policy compartmentalization; permanent institutionalization of access; “juridization” or legalization of group conflicts through labor and administrative courts; state technocratic planning and resource allocation; extensive development of functionally specialized, para-state agencies; political culture stressing formalism, consensus and continuous bargaining; symbiotic relation with clientelist and patrimonialist practices in certain issue areas and regime levels; deliberate narrowing and encapsulation of “relevant publics”; periodic but systematic use of physical repression and anticipatory intimidation and, finally, the establishment of what Dahrendorf called a “cartel of anxiety” among restricted elites representing the apexes of the differentiated hierarchic “orders” or “corporations”49 contributed to the persistence and viability of those systems—even over protracted periods of economic and social change and when faced

48 These hypotheses about the functioning of pluralist systems are developed further and contrasted with corporatist ones in my “Inventory of Analytical Pluralist Propositions,” unpublished MS, University of Chicago, 1971.

49 See the sources cited in fns. 19 & 26.
with acute, externally induced political crises. While comparisons of institutional longevity are difficult to make, there is no evidence I can see that corporatist systems of whatever type are less stable or shorter lived than pluralist ones. There is, however, very strong evidence that they function quite differently—if often to produce generally similar outcomes.

This delineation of an equally elaborate, alternative model to pluralism may seem to some to be in and by itself sufficient justification for this exercise, but most readers must be feeling some vague sense of incompleteness if not of acute discomfort. After all, Sweden is not Portugal and Switzerland is not Greece; and yet, there they are—ignominiously grouped together under the same rubric.

The reason for this latent (or in some cases already manifest) sense of dissatisfaction lies, no doubt, in the stretch of the conceptual distinction I have made between corporatism and pluralism. While this may be an indispensable preliminary step in classifying interest systems, especially given the ubiquity and prestige of the pluralist label, it is still one which, to use Sartori’s expression, “does not travel well,” or better, “travels too far too easily.” If our research objective is not to make universalizing suprahistorical comparisons, but to explore middle-range hypotheses which are explicitly qualified as to cultural, historical and even geographical space, then we must proceed further, per genus et differentiam, in our taxonomic trip. We must, in short, develop the notion of possible subtypes of corporatist interest politics (just as, of course, we should with pluralist ones, although that will not be attempted here).  

That most original and stimulating of corporatist theorists, Mihail Manoilesco, provided the key distinction between two different subtypes. The one he called corporatisme pur, in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative “corporations.” The second in contrast he called corporatisme subordonné, in which similarly structured “corporations” were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective func-

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50 I am following here the advice (and occasionally the vocabulary) of Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review LXIV, 4 (December, 1970), esp. pp. 1034-5.
tioning on other bases. This radical distinction is one which, as we shall see, involves not only the nature of power and influence relations but also the developmental pattern by which corporatism emerges, has been reiterated, expanded upon and discussed at great length by Portuguese corporatist theorists where the two subtypes were labelled corporativismo de associação and corporativismo de Estado. For our purposes we could label the former, autonomous and penetrative, as societal corporatism; and the second, dependent and penetrated, as state corporatism.

Some clues to the structural and behavioral elements which differentiate these two subtypes of corporatism can be found in our initial global connotation, or more specifically in what was deliberately not included in that definition.

(1) *Limited number*: does not indicate whether established by processes of interassociational arrangement, by “political cartels” designed by existing participants to exclude newcomers, or by deliberate government restriction.

(2) *Singular*: does not indicate whether the outcome of spontaneous co-optation or competitive elimination is by surviving associations, or by state-imposed eradication of multiple or parallel associations.

(3) *Compulsory*: does not specify whether de facto through social pressure, contractual dues checkoff, provision of essential services and/or acquisition of private licensing capacity, or de jure through labor code or other officially decreed, exclusively conceded authority.

(4) *Noncompetitive*: does not state whether the product of internal oligarchic tendencies or external, treaty-like, voluntary agreements among associations, or of the continuous interposition of state mediation, arbitration and repression.

(5) *Hierarchically ordered*: does not indicate whether the outcome of intrinsic processes of bureaucratic extension and/or consolidation, or of state-decreed centralization and administrative dependence.

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51 *Le Siècle du Corporatisme*, p. 92. Manoilesco also noted the existence of “mixed corporatism” combining the two ideal-types.


A somewhat similar distinction, but one which placed primary emphasis on its role in furthering class collaboration by different means, is François Perroux’s between corporatisme lato sensu and corporatisme stricto sensu in *Capitalisme et Communauté de Travail* (fn. 6), pp. 7-19.
(6) *Functionally differentiated*: does not specify whether arrived at through voluntaristic agreements on respective "turfs" and nonraiding provisions, or by state-established *enquadramento* (framing) of occupational-vocational categories.

(7) *Recognition by state*: does not differentiate between recognition granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public officials and that granted from above by the state as a condition for association formation and continuous operation.

(8) *Representational monopoly*: similar to above, does not distinguish between that which is independently conquered and that which is dependently conceded.

(9) *Controls on leadership selection and interest articulation*: does not suggest whether this is the product of a reciprocal consensus on procedure and/or goals, or of an asymmetric imposition by the "organized monopolists of legitimate violence."

Through this exercise in intention—the further elaboration of properties which combine to form a global concept—we have constructed two quite distinctive subtypes. The first, involving all or most of the initial elements in the either/or dichotomies made above, corresponds ideally to what we have called societal corporatism. Empirically, it is best exemplified by the cases of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, as well as by emergent properties which have been observed by scholars in such other, supposedly pluralist, systems as Great Britain, Western Germany, France, Canada, and the United States. The second type, described by the latter elements in each either/or distinction, coalesces into a subtype we have labelled state corporatist and this conforms historically to the cases of Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Greece—as well of course to the defunct experiences of Fascist Italy, Petainist France, National Socialist Germany53 and Austria under Dollfuss.

When viewed statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealed as

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53 Actually, Nazi Germany is an ambiguous case. For an excellent analysis of the struggles involving competing conceptions of interest politics and the eventual demise of corporatist tendencies after 1936 in that polity, see Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964).
the products of very different political, social and economic processes, as the vehicles for very different power and influence relations, and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences. Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities—even with highly "layered" or "pillared" political subcultures. State corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed. Societal corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist state.

IV

Corporatism appears under two very different guises: the revolutionary and the evolutionary. It is either the product of a "new order" following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special "collective spirit"; or the outcome of a natural evolution in economic and social ideas and events. In the latter case, corporatism then emerges as an aspect of a certain idée-force progressing along with the amplification and specification of the process of associational development, generating what one calls today in several democratic countries, "the corporative mystique."54

The Swiss author of these lines, himself rather caught up in "the corporative mystique" which swept his country in the 1930's, illustrates not only that theorists who contemplated the matter comparatively were well aware of the distinction between the two subtypes we have defined above, but were also quite conscious of the need for two essentially separate theories for explaining the emergence of modern corporatism. One of these would be more likely

to emphasize long-term trends and slow, incremental change, cultural and institutional continuity, gradual intellectual awareness and passive political acceptance; the other more likely would be forged out of immediate conjuncture and impending collapse, strong leadership and repressive action, architectonic vision and inflated rhetoric. In a nutshell, the origins of societal corporatism lie in the slow, almost imperceptible decay of advanced pluralism; the origins of state corporatism lie in the rapid, highly visible demise of nascent pluralism.

The task of constructing this set of dual theories is enormous given the apparently bewildering variety of contexts in which one type or the other of corporatism has emerged, and the frustrating absence of empirical studies on the historical dynamics of whatever type of interest group system. Complicating the task even further is the natural tendency to confuse this problem with the more general and clearly interrelated one of the causes of the erosion/collapse of liberal democracy and the advent/consolidation of authoritarian rule.55 Even if we focus specifically and exclusively on those factors which hypothetically affect changes in the system of interest representation, we must admit from the start that the best we can do is to identify some probabilistically necessary but clearly insufficient conditions. We can only try post factum to strip historical cases of their idiosyncrasies of personality and culture, of their accidents of good and bad fortune, of their immediate but superficial catalysts and precipitants in order to reveal the underlying elements of structural conduciveness which led (and may lead in the future) to such similar and yet different outcomes as societal and state corporatism.56 I hardly need to emphasize the preliminary and speculative nature of the following dual theories.

Nor should I have to stress that they may not contribute much to explaining specific occurrences or nonoccurrences. For example, why did the halting and tentative experiments in state corporatism by Sidónio Pais in Portugal (1917-18), Primo de Rivera in Spain (1923-30), Pangalos in Greece (1925) and José Uriburu in Argentina (1930-31) all fail to take hold when, ten to twelve years later,

55 Although I do not have them with me in my current voluntary exile, I do not recall that any of the case studies to be published shortly under the editorship of Juan Linz on "The Breakdown of Democracy" specifically concentrates on interest associations.

56 For the theoretical model underlying these distinctions between "structural conduciveness" and "precipitating factors," see Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1963).
corporatism flourished in each case? Why did Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands adopt internal “social peace” treaties between peak associations of employers and workers in the 1930’s and then move rapidly and incrementally toward generalized societal corporatism in the 1940’s and 1950’s, while other countries such as Finland, Norway and Belgium moved more hesitantly and fitfully, and still others such as France, Great Britain, Ireland and the United States have proven consistently more resistant to the blandishments of corporatism? I doubt whether the following speculations can answer such specific questions very satisfactorily.

Whatever reservations one may have about the degree of determination exercised by the structure and mode of production upon such political variables as individual attitudes, voting choice, party systems and ideological doctrines, inquiry into the origins of corporatism of either type leads one very quickly to the constraints, opportunities and contradictions placed upon political actors by the operation of the economic system. More specifically for the cases which have interested me, it leads to a consideration of the basic institutions of capitalism and the class structure of property and power engendered by it.57 Perhaps it is the directness of the linkage between the system of interest representation and these institutions of concentration of production and inequality of distribution, but the resultant situation is particularly “naked.”

As a macrohypothesis, I suggest that the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism.

Summarizing, again in a nutshell, the decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime, due to processes of concentration of ownership, competition

57 Incompetence prevents me from even speculating about the tendencies toward corporatization which appears to exist among societies with a quite different system of economic exploitation, namely, bureaucratic-centralized socialism. For an initial treatment of these issues, see the excellent article by Janos (fn. 45) and the works discussed therein.
between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the political process.

As for the abrupt demise of incipient pluralism and its dramatic and forceful replacement by state corporatism, this seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce "social peace," not by co-opting and incorporating, but by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state.

Of course, to these general elements, one must add several other "overdeterminative" factors which combine with the former, making corporatism an increasingly likely outcome: (1) secular trends toward bureaucratization and oligarchy within interest associations; (2) prior rates of political mobilization and participation; (3) diffusion of foreign ideologies and institutional practices; (4) impact of international war and/or depression. Nevertheless, the core of my speculation about structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by delayed, dependent capitalist development and non-hegemonic class relations in the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monopoly or concentrated capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of societal corporatism.

Turning to an explication of the advanced capitalism-societal corporatism relation, I shall be brief, partly because of my lesser familiarity with this side, partly because there exists a series of evocatively presented and excellently documented studies of the subject.

The first major theorist to perceive certain emergent imperatives of capitalism and to link them explicitly with corporatism was John Maynard (Lord) Keynes. In a startling essay published in 1926 entitled "The End of Laissez-Faire," Keynes first debunks the orthodox claims of liberalism:

It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive "natural liberty" in their economic activities. There is no "compact" conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social
interest always coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.58

Given these negative results (and sous-entendu a growing awareness of them among wider and wider publics exercising the liberal voluntaristic rights accorded them by the open franchise and free associability), the agenda and nonagenda (as Keynes called it) of the state must be modified. Or, as he put it more bluntly in another essay, “In the future, the Government will have to take on many duties which it has avoided in the past.”59 The objective of this imperative policy expansion is to exercise “directive intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over the many intricacies of private business, yet . . . leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered.” More specifically, he noted the need for (1) “deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution,” (2) “dissemination on a great scale of data relating to the business situations,” (3) “coordinated act(s) of intelligent judgement . . . as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad . . . and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels” and, finally, (4) “a considered national policy about what size of Population . . . is most expedient.”60 For 1926, that was a prescient statement about the future role of the state in capitalist societies—even down to the itemized content and sequential ordering of the new policy agenda.

Despite the unorthodoxy of these suggestions for “improvements in the technique of modern capitalism,” Keynes wisely observed that “there is nothing in them which is seriously incompatible with what seems to me to be the essential characteristic of capitalism, namely the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive

58 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (London, 1952), p. 312. This essay was initially published as a separate pamphlet in 1926.
59 Ibid., p. 331. The title of this essay, a speech delivered in 1925, is “Am I a Liberal?” Keynes’s answer was, “Yes, faute de mieux.”
60 Ibid., pp. 317-19.
force of the economic machine."61 The reason for his confidence in their compatibility stems from the political instrumentality he advocated to bring about this policy revolution, namely, societal corporatism.

I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organization lies somewhere between the individual and the modern state. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the state—bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private advantage are excluded, though some place it may still be necessary to leave, until the ambit of men’s altruism grows wider, to the separate advantage of particular groups, classes, or faculties—bodies which in their ordinary course of affairs are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of democracy expressed through parliament. I propose a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies.62

While there is no evidence (that I know of) that Keynes’s slim pamphlet exerted a direct, blueprint-like, influence or even provoked a general intellectual awareness of the issues he raised, in or outside of Great Britain,63 the subsequent course of policy development in most developed Western nations confirmed his prognosis. The fundamental paradox involved has been excellently put by a Dutch scholar:

The more the private citizens succeed in organizing themselves into powerful combines and associations for the promoting of their manifold and often conflicting interests, the more they undermine the conditions that are essential to the actual functioning of the classical Liberalist concept of an automatically achieved equilibrium of freely competing societal forces. And the more this spontaneous harmonization proves to have little relation to reality, the more the government is impelled to interfere in order to secure a deliberately regulated and planned integration of interests.64

61 Ibid., p. 319.
62 Ibid., pp. 313-14 (my emphasis).
63 The much later discussion of these issues in the United States was, as might be expected, even more privatistic and antistatist than that of Keynes. For a critical evaluation of this literature, see Hal Draper “Neo-corporatists and neo-reformers,” New Politics (Fall, 1961), pp. 87-106.
64 Kraemer (fn. 34), p. 83.
To this I would simply add another: the more the modern state comes to serve as the indispensable and authoritative guarantor of capitalism by expanding its regulative and integrative tasks, the more it finds that it needs the professional expertise, specialized information, prior aggregation of opinion, contractual capability and deferred participatory legitimacy which only singular, hierarchically ordered, consensually led representative monopolies can provide. To obtain these, the state will agree to devolve upon or share with these associations much of its newly acquired decisional authority, subject, as Keynes noted, "in the last resort to the sovereignty of democracy expressed through Parliament."

This osmotic process whereby the modern state and modern interest associations seek each other out leads, on the one hand, to even further extensions of public guarantees and equilibrations and, on the other, to even further concentration and hierarchic control within these private governments. The modalities are varied and range from direct government subsidies for associations, to official recognition of bona fide interlocuteurs, to devolved responsibilities for such public tasks as unemployment or accident insurance, to permanent membership in specialized advisory councils, to positions of control in joint public-private corporations, to informal, quasi-cabinet status, and finally to direct participation in authoritative decision-making through national economic and social councils. The sequence by which societal corporatism has crept into the polity probably varies considerably case by case, but to the extent that the Dutch pattern is representative, it shows a peculiar circular trend. There it began with local and sectoral level, jointly managed social insurance schemes (1913); then moved to abortive attempts at establishing Conciliation Boards (1919, 1923); to sectoral consultative bodies (1933); to public extensions of cartel decisions (1935) and labor-management agreements (1937), obligatorily covering nonmembers and nonparticipants; to sectoral licensing boards on investment (1938); to the reestablishment of a nationally coordinated wage determination board (1945); to indicative national planning (1945); then back to the establishment of specialized Product and Industrial Boards, along with an overall co-

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65 A study which illustrates this particularly well in a nicely controlled cultural and developmental setting is Nils Evander, "Collective Bargaining and Incomes Policy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis" (Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Sept. 4-8, 1973).
ordinating agency, the Social and Economic Council (1950); then down to the establishment of consultative councils in each individual enterprise (1950) and, finally, to the creation of a national level, joint coordination council for social insurance (1959)—right back where they started in 1913. The resultant pattern evolved pragmatically and unevenly, not by the unfolding of some concerted, grand corporatist design. It moved up and down from enterprise to local to national level; back and forth from a concern with specific goods and services (insurance, health, apprenticeship), with specialized vertical production areas (metallurgy, electronics, chemicals, retail commerce) and with broad horizontal sectors (industry, commerce, agriculture); and sideways from one issue area to another (wages, prices, investment, indicative planning). While the Netherlands’ osmotic adaptation may be unique in many respects, I suspect that a sequential plotting of measures of creeping corporatism in other advanced capitalist societies would not be very different.

Thanks to the effort of Andrew Shonfield, it hardly seems necessary to pursue these speculations much further. In his magisterial, Modern Capitalism, he has demonstrated in great detail how, in order to correct inherent defects linked to processes of internal concentration and external competition, the modern “positive” state finds itself simultaneously attempting to foster full employment, promote economic growth, prevent inflation, smooth out business cycles, regulate working conditions, cover individual economic and social risks and resolve labor conflicts. This drastic modification of the governmental agenda/nonagenda has in turn led to (and is in part the product of) a major change in the relationship between interest associations and the public bureaucracy, as advocated and predicted by Lord Keynes. Shonfield unhesitatingly labels this formula as corporatist: “The major interest groups are brought together and encouraged to conclude a series of bargains about their

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66 The work from which this primitive sequential account is drawn [Kraemer (fn. 34), pp. 54-65] leaves off in 1958. No doubt further private-public interpenetration has occurred since then.

67 Not all treatments of the emergence of societal corporatism place as much emphasis as I do on the role of advanced capitalism and the imperative transformations it forces on the modern state. Huntford (fn. 22), pp. 87 ff., for example, places most of his explanatory emphasis on the traditional agricultural system of Sweden, the role of temperance societies and a particular type of industrial settlement (bruk). Thomas J. Anton bases his argument on a distinctive “Swedish policy-making style and elite culture” (fn. 11), pp. 92-99.
future behaviour, which will have the effect of moving economic events along the desired path. The plan indicates the general direction in which the interest groups, including the state in its various economic guises, have agreed that they want to go.68

In postwar Western Europe, Shonfield finds this approach competing or combining with two others: (1) intellectualized, technocratic "indicative" planning, and (2) reinforced, direct economic control and ownership by the state. In a series of thoroughly researched and well-constructed case studies, he explores the extent to which this societally corporate approach has crept differentially into European policy processes, alone or in combination with the other two. In specific instances, he emphasizes general historical-institutional-legal variables,69 ideological residues,70 prior levels of voluntary associational consolidation and decision-making style,71 seriousness of demographic pressures and economic reconstruction,72 well-entrenched conceptions of role on the part of organized interests,73 as all providing a greater incentive for corporatization.

68 Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York, 1965), p. 231. Shonfield goes on to remark: "It is curious how close this kind of thinking was to the corporatist theories of the earlier writers of Italian Fascism, who flourished in the 1920's. Corporatism got its bad name, which has stuck to it, essentially because of its association with the one-party state" (p. 233).

69 "The corporatist form of organization seems to be almost second nature to the Austrians. It is not that they are undemocratic; they nearly all belong to their business and professional associations, their trade unions, their religious and other groups, indeed membership in some of them is compulsory. And the Government is in turn under legal compulsion to consult these organizations before it takes legislative or administrative action of certain specified kinds" (Ibid., pp. 193-94).

70 "It is interesting to find the old corporatist ideal which was deeply embedded in Italian pre-war thinking—the ideal of a balanced and responsible economic group with quasi-sovereign powers administering itself—cropping up again in this new guise" (Ibid., p. 192).

71 "In Sweden there is a society in which interest groups are so strongly organized, their democratic basis so firm and their habit of bargaining with each one another independently of the government so well established ... (yet) the Swedish Government still manages to act in a decisive fashion when circumstances require it ... It just happens that it is the Swedish way to treat the process of government as being in large part an extended dialogue between experts drawn from a variety of bodies, official and unofficial, whose views are expected to be merely tinged rather than finally shaped by those who pay their salaries" (Ibid., pp. 199-200).

72 "The remarkable willingness of the trade unions to collaborate actively in this policy of wage restraint is to be explained by their anxiety about the future supply of jobs for Dutchmen" (Ibid., p. 212).

73 "The general point is that German Verbände have traditionally seen themselves as performing an important public role, as guardians of the long-term interests of the nation's industries, and they continue to do so. The
Even more fascinating are his explanations of why certain European countries have resisted, or better, not so quickly or thoroughly succumbed to this approach. For France, he stresses the role of specialized training and corporate self-consciousness on the part of higher civil servants;\textsuperscript{74} for the United Kingdom, he finds the answer in "the traditional British view of the proper relationship between public and private power (in which) the two . . . are thought of as utterly distinct from one another," as well as resistance by industrialists to compulsory membership and jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{75} In a brilliant discussion of the American paradox—"the Americans who, in the 1930's, acted as the precursors of the new capitalism, seemed to stall in their course just when the system was coming to fruition in the Western world—showing its full powers to provide the great gifts of economic growth, full employment, and social welfare"—Shonfield searches for the causes of this abortive attempt to encourage corporatist forms of policy-making during the early New Deal (1933-35). He finds them in the internally competitive, overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and state bureaucracies, the preferred leadership style of Roosevelt ("his penchant for the role of bargainer-in-chief, his evident delight in the exercise of a kind of administrative athleticism"), in the active, intrusive role of Congress in the administrative process, the juridical and legalistic imprint imposed on the American state by the special role which lawyers have played within it, and in the absence of a more professionalized, self-confident elite of civil servants.\textsuperscript{76} While Shonfield does carry his analysis into the mid-1960's, it is too bad that it stops before Lyndon Johnson and even more rapidly, Richard Nixon, who managed to transform this "arm's-length relationship with private enterprise" (as Shonfield describes it) into something more closely resembling the sort of "active huddle" which the NRA corporatists had advocated in the early thirties.\textsuperscript{77}

Modern Capitalism provides us with a veritable gold mine of interesting general hypotheses concerning the emergence of societal development one observes since the war is that the approach to problems of policy has become more consultative, with the emphasis on technical advice. Power and influence are still present; but the manner is different" (Ibid., p. 245).

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 122 ff.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 99; also pp. 231-33 for a more explicit contrast with the French tradition.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 298-329.
\textsuperscript{77} Mark Green and Peter Petkas, "Nixon's Industrial State," The New Republic, September 16, 1972, p. 18.
corporatism and specific, if somewhat *ad hoc*, subhypotheses explaining its differential role in contemporary Western polities and its emergent relations with other policy-mechanisms of advanced capitalist management. From my admittedly less knowledgeable vantage point, I would tend to emphasize a longer period of historical regress, for example, to include planning, rationing, mobilization and reconstruction measures taken during and following World War I and their impact upon subsequent "public policy paradigms."78 Add to these a more explicit discussion of certain political variables, such as degree of prior class consciousness and intensity of class antagonism, extent of prior party-interest association interpenetration (*lager*-type structures), ideological diffusion and international climate, plus prior rates of political mobilization and participation. Nevertheless, in our understanding of societal corporatism we are off to an impressive, if still speculative, start.

We are not so fortunately endowed at either the theoretico-deductive or the empirico-inductive level with respect to state corporatism. Of course, one reason is that there exists no companion volume to *Modern Capitalism* entitled *Dependent or Derived Capitalism*—not yet. But this lack of detailed comparative case studies or even good single country monographs is only part of the difficulty.

Theorists-apologists for state corporatism are usually not very helpful. This, not so much because they tended to be less perceptive and personally objective than, say, Lord Keynes, but because they were caught in a built-in contradiction between their subjective speculative task and the objective political function they were indirectly called upon to perform.

So, for example, there is scarcely a single state-corporatist theorist who does not proclaim his opposition to statism, his com-

78 Shonfield concentrates almost exclusively on the post-World War II period. Only in the case of the United States does he systematically probe further back. Is it just a coincidence that those European countries which were neutral in World War I moved more rapidly and thoroughly towards corporatization (except Austria), than the belligerents? Also worth exploring in greater detail are the diverse policy responses to the Great Depression—as our rapid sketch of the Netherlands illustrated.

mitment to decisional decentralization and his desire for eventual associational autonomy. Nevertheless, our theorist is aware that given the fragmented, ideologically charged and class-divided nature of the political system he is operating within, singular, non-conflictive, hierarchically ordered and functionally compartmentalized associations are not likely to be spontaneously forthcoming. He therefore advocates the temporary use of state authority to establish these compulsory structures—and to remove voluntaristic, competing ones—all, of course, in the name of national and/or public interest. Other than some vaguely specified reference to the eventual emergence of a "corporatist consciousness" (his equivalent to the New Soviet Man), our theorist conveniently forgets to specify the political mechanism by which the state's authoritarian presence can be made to "fade out," leaving those imagined self-governing agents of decentralized decision-making behind. Perhaps the most obvious case of this praxiological hypocrisy has been Portugal, if only because Oliveira Salazar so repeatedly and (apparently) sincerely expressed his fervent opposition to statism or even to any form of governmental economic intervention, while presiding over the creation of one of the most overbureaucratized, minutely regulated, centralized state apparatuses ever observed.

If such theorists can hardly be trusted with regard to the state, then neither can one expect them to be entirely candid about corporatism's relation to capitalism and specific class interests. One of their favorite themes—admittedly one which is today somewhat less loudly proclaimed—is that corporatism from above constitutes some sort of tertium genus between and distinct from either capitalism or socialism-communism. Hence, while they are often capable of decrying, in lurid and quite convincing terms, the inequitable and rachitic performance of existing capitalist institutions (and of conjuring up terrible visions of life under godless socialism), they are obviously not very concerned with revealing how the forceful implantation of corporatism acts as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating capitalism rather than replacing it. Given the unan-

79 A partial exception would have to be entered for the Fascists: Bottai, Bortolotto, Papi and Vito but not, for example, for Ugo Spirito who even went so far as to suggest that corporazione should replace both private individuals and the state as the basis for property and decision-making, thereby causing a minor scandal at the 1932 Ferrara Congress on Corporatism. Capitalismo e Corporatismo, 3rd ed. (Florence, 1934). Interestingly, Spirito's works have been recently reedited.
imous emphasis they place on functional interdependence and group harmony, we should hardly expect them to delve too deeply into the elements of class conflict, status antagonism and center-periphery tension that such an imposed system of interest representation is designed to suppress, if not overcome.

In short, as we attempt to put together speculatively some hypotheses as to the contexts in which this state corporatist response emerges and the possible range of variation and sequences of implantation it may encompass, we are not likely to get much help from its manifest theorists-apologists, as we did in the case of societal corporatism.

There is, fortunately, one interesting exception: Mihail Manoîlesco. Manoîlesco was a sort of Salazar manqué. A professor of political economy (although an engineer by training) and minister of commerce and industry for a short period in his native Rumania, he wrote *Le Siècle du Corporatisme* and its companion work, *Le Parti Unique*, after his political career had been cut short and published them in Paris. In the former he not only advanced his cosmic prediction about the ineluctable future of corporatism, but he supported his position with a complex, if schematic, argument—elements of which are strikingly modern.

First Manoîlesco asserts (other corporatist theorists to the contrary notwithstanding) that his conception of this system of interest representation—actually he presents it as a complete system of political domination—has nothing to do, institutionally or ideationally, with an imagined revival of Catholic or medieval practices. Not only does he doubt the existence of natural harmony in such anciens régimes, but he accepts as definitive and desirable the rupture performed by nineteenth-century liberalism and capitalist development. His argument, then, is rigorously secular and, in his view, both progressive and realistic, looking forward prospectively rather than backward nostalgically.

Second, Manoîlesco makes his case on materialist grounds. While convinced, like Durkheim, that properly constructed corpora-

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80 For a brief description of his role in relation to Rumanian politics, see Andrew Janos, "The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars" in S. Huntington and C. H. Moore, eds. (fn. 38), pp. 213-14.

81 In the following summary of his argument I will not cite specific page references, except in the case of direct quotes, since the elements of his position are frequently scattered rather widely and I have synthesized them freely. All quotes are from the 1936 edition (fn. 1).
tions would provide the answer to overcoming modern man's moral and spiritual malaise, integrating him into society through new communal bonds, the imperative forces leading to corporatization were to be found in the political economy of his time, in the nature of ownership, production and distribution of capitalism itself. In fact, at several reprises, Manoilesco approvingly cites Marx, although in general he regards him as a theorist of the past rather than the present century.

Third, Manoilesco denies that corporatism is merely a temporary defense mechanism for the mobilization and/or protection of class egoism which will somehow fade away when the conjunctural threat has passed. Rather, he presents it as a permanent institutional form, not intrinsically beholden to any social class or even to the maintenance of the status quo, capable of subduing particular interests to overriding national goals and eventually of transforming the capitalist basis of society itself.

In contemporary parlance, Manoilesco was a theorist of "external dependence." While he occasionally hints at essentially internal political conditions, for example, "premature" radicalization of the working class through ideological diffusion, fragmentation and loss of nerve on the part of the bourgeoisie, urban-rural tensions, decline of local and regional loyalties, that might contribute to provoking a corporatist response, its essential "reason for becoming" lies in the system of unequal international exchange.

Just as Marx's theory leads us to understand the social phenomena of the capitalist world and especially that of exploitation by classes, this theory of international exchange makes us understand the inequality between peoples and relations of exploiter and exploited that connect them.\(^\text{82}\)

Corporatism, as he understood and advocated it, is an institutional-political response to a particular process of transformation that the world political economy and its attendant system of international stratification is presently undergoing. Its "dominant cause" lies in the relations between peoples, rather than between classes within national units. In fact the latter are conditioned, if not determined, by the former. The entire spectrum of political forces has shifted: "The Nineteenth Century knew the economic solidarity of class.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 30.
The Twentieth will know the economic solidarity of nations.83

According to Manoïlesco, the dynamic element in this process of world economic transformation consists of a radical "national" demand for restructuring the international division of labor and its distribution of benefits. Peripheral capitalist nations are becoming increasingly aware of the disparity in returns generated by their exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs for the manufactured goods produced by the advanced, earlier developing economies and are beginning to implement new national economic policies, especially ones aiming at import-substituting industrialization and control of foreign trade. This diffusion of industrialization and policy techniques was greatly accelerated by World War I, but is an autonomous secular trend which can be expected to continue on throughout the century. In essence and embryo, Manoïlesco anticipated the general arguments and even many of the specific points of what twenty years later came to be known as the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations) doctrine or, even later, the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) position.

To this, he added a second, more static observation: the end of territorial expansion. The twentieth century, he felt, would see the exhaustion of both open internal frontiers and manifest external imperialism. While by no means could be credited with foreseeing the formal decolonialization of Africa and Asia (his perspective was strictly Eurocentric), he did see that the international system had in a physical sense filled out existing space. Borders and loyalties were becoming fixed; territoriality from being a variable had become a constant. Economic, social and political problems would have to be tackled and especially organized within constant, zero-sum parameters.

These compound changes in international relations—the collapse of the prewar liberal economic order, the rising demand for equality of benefit and status between nation-states, the definitive demarcation of territoriality — provided the materialistic (and speculative) foundations for Manoïlesco's ideology of defensive, nationalistic modernization from above. Each national unit, each state, must henceforth act exclusively as its own agent in its own interests and with its own resources, bargaining continually for survival and self-advantage in a dangerous and unstably equili-

83 Ibid., p. 35.
brated international system. Nineteenth-century assumptions about liberty and initiative in the pursuit of individual self-interest and the benevolent, self-corrective operation of free and competitive markets and political processes were no longer valid. As a consequence of these new tensions between central and peripheral capitalisms and between all autarkically minded nation-states, the twentieth century would impose new conceptions of justice and forms of political organization.

Corporatism, he argued, would be one of, if not the institutional response to these impératifs de l'époque. It alone would permit the state to fulfil the new functions which were being thrust upon public policy by external exigences. It would emerge first where those imperatives and tensions were the strongest, the southeastern and southern periphery of Europe, but once successful there, it would compel similar transformations in the organizational structure and policy practices of the earlier developing, liberal-pluralist systems.

But why corporatism? Why this particular set of sous-instruments de l'Etat as Manoîlesco unflinchingly called them? His arguments are multiple, if not equally convincing and consistent:

1) Such corporations would fill out a continuous hierarchy of authority, thereby providing the isolated and impotent individual with a set of well-defined intermediary ranks and loyalties “dragging him into society” à la Durkheim and offering the political system the means “to resolve from a unitary and logical point of view all the specialized problems posed by the complex relations between the individual and the state.” To do this, Manoîlesco noted, these new units of representation would have to be integral, not just cover economic interests as in Fascist Italy, but spiritual and moral ones as well.

2) The functional specialization of corporations would be “technologically self-determining” dividing the polity into vertical units of interest aggregation which in turn would enhance the role of technical expertise, depersonalize leadership and bring out naturally balanced interdependencies between issue areas. Most importantly and specifically, they would facilitate the expanding role of the state in national economic planning and international economic bargaining.

3) By devolving authority from the state to “neatly defined,”

84 Ibid., p. 74.
“never contradictory” and “preestablished” interest hierarchies, the state would be relieved of decisional and implementational responsibility over “nonessential” matters (welfare, health, etc.) and could then devote more attention and effort to such “essential” tasks as internal security, external defense, foreign affairs, and national propaganda. In addition,

The multiplication of economic, cultural, intellectual and social functions of the state and the plurality of sources of public power creates a new function (or gives greater scope to a function already existing in embryonic form) which is the function of arbitration and coordination of all national activities. . . . The imperatives of our time oblige the state to recognize these [conflicts of collective interests]; they even oblige it to solve them. And they make the state the most active and solicited of arbitrators . . . [Even more] the state must have [its own power of initiative]. It must anticipate these conflicts of interest; it must have the initiative over all general decisions facilitating the coordination of national activities. Initiative becomes a new function unknown by the individualist state and embracing all manifestations of national life.85

4) Corporatism through its compartmentalized vertical pillaring and internal hierarchy of authority would provide an antidote to the “spirit of class.” This latter, outmoded form of “horizontal consciousness” would be replaced by the new spirit of national solidarity and functionally interdependent organization.

Despite the fact that corporative consciousness is presently weak, it will always triumph in the end. Because in the limited world we are entering today, where solidarity and organization are imperatives for survival, there will be no place for artificial social differences. Or, differences of class are mostly artificial and temporary, linked to the exceptional circumstances of the nineteenth century.86

While Manoïlèsco implies that this “benevolent” ninety-degree switch in the polarities of group consciousness would begin in the periphery and come as the result of, rather than the prerequisite for, the forceful implantation of state corporatism, he hints that it will

85 Ibid., p. 131. This is the same author who thirty pages before had claimed: “Between the corporatist conception of the state and the pure individualistic one, there is a certain coincidence in outcomes. Both systems result (aboutissent) in a minimal state”!! (p. 101).
86 Ibid., p. 107-8.
be subsequently transmitted to the center where its adoption will be more spontaneous and voluntary:

In Western Europe, the owning class and the working class will draw together, impelled by the common danger they both face equally of witnessing the collapse of the industrial superiority from which they have both benefited.\(^87\)

Tactically speaking, Manoïlesco observes that in the short run "the best way to vanquish the actual antagonism of classes is to recognize it," that is, to incorporate "separate but equal" (paritaire) representations of owners and workers within the same corporation, but in the long run it will no longer be necessary to provide even such a simulated equilibrium, given the projected disappearance of class identification.\(^88\)

5) One reason Manoïlesco was able to soft-pedal the coercive, authoritarian aspects of the transition to state corporatism was his belief that the twentieth century would see a major change in "the scales of moral and social values" held by citizens and subjects. The past century's ideals of individual equality and liberty would be replaced by new collective goals of social justice, based on differential rights and obligations according to the functional importance of one's role in society; and the goal of organization would replace consensual restrictions on mutual activity in return for security and higher productivity. Both of these new idoles de l'époque would, of course, have to be made compatible with and subordinate to the highest ideal of all, that "indisputable criterion," which Manoïlesco exclaimed in a burst of totalitarian rhetoric to mean that: "All that conforms to the national interest is just; all that is contrary to that interest is unjust."\(^89\)

As complex and suggestive (if schematic and deformed by wishful thinking) as these hypotheses may be, Manoïlesco is much less explicit about the politics and the specific decisional sequence involved in the transition toward this new form of interest representation. Pure (read, societal) corporatism, he conceded three years later, can only be attained after the widespread development of "corporative consciousness" and such a high degree of national

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\(^87\) Ibid., p. 108, fn. 1.
\(^88\) Ibid., pp. 108-9.
\(^89\) Ibid., p. 110.
integration that "old" and "artificial" class and partisan loyalties had been eradicated or, at least, severely eroded. This, he admits, is a long way off and, in the meantime, those "imperatives of the epoch" demand action, especially in the periphery. There, subordinate corporatism is the only answer: "It is natural that the corporations must be held in tutelage. The indicated tutor . . . is the single party . . . for a transitory period."90

In the present absence of comparative case studies, it is not easy to evaluate the merits of Manoilesco's prototheory of the emergence of state corporatism, or to elaborate further upon it. In a very general way, there seems to be a correspondence between the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism; awareness of relative underdevelopment; resentment against inferior international status; desire for enhanced national economic and political autarky; extension of state control through regulatory policies, sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more professionalized and achievement-oriented *situs* of civil servants; and the forced corporatization of interest representation from above. Manoilesco's belated remarks on the specific instrumentality responsible for this change have been less well confirmed. In no case was the single ruling party the primary or exclusive tutelary agent. Rather, state executive and administrative bodies tended to act directly in both establishing and subsequently controlling these new *sous-instruments*. The implantation of state corporatism, in fact, was compatible with a wide range of party contexts—from the no-party systems of Brazil, Greece and Austria, to the weak, reigning but not ruling, single-party systems of Spain and Portugal, to the strong monopolistic party systems of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

On the surface, state corporatism was implanted much more dramatically, quickly, thoroughly and rationally than was the case with the hesitant, uneven, experimental, incremental, "creeping" pattern of its societal cousin. "Born at the stroke of the legislative baton," as one French critic put it,91 overnight immense organizational hierarchies with sonorous names were created, covering all interest sectors and all levels of the polity with impressive symmetry of representative and equality of access. Subsequently, these monu-

ments of political architecture persisted for years virtually without juridical or formal modification.

However, detailed analyses\textsuperscript{92} have not only revealed the fictitious physical existence of many of these sonorous organizations and their marginal influence over public policy, but have also unmasked their pretense of class symmetry and equality of access. Moving ruthlessly to suppress all preexisting worker associations and to fill the resulting organizational vacuum as quickly as possible with the maximum number and most widely dispersed set of new compliant worker \textit{sindicatos}, the state corporatists acted much more cautiously and "understandingly" with respect to producer and owner interests. Preexisting, voluntaristically supported associations were tolerated or incorporated with their leadership and functions intact; strategically placed elites were granted special organizational privileges and exemptions, for example, the right to form specialized national associations independent of the general sectoral hierarchies; rural landowners, except for those cultivating certain export crops, were left largely untouched, and associations for rural workers, where allowed to exist, were placed under their local control; no serious attempt was made to transform such pre-existent, premodern corporations as the Church and the universities; corporatization of civil servants was expressly prohibited, as well as other forms of associability for this \textit{situs}; finally, either no attempt was made to create "uniclass" peak associations of employers and workers (Brazil) or, where the attempt was belatedly made (Portugal), the resultant \textit{corporações} have been run by and for employers. In short, what appear at first sight to be architectonic monuments of great scope, foresight and symmetry turn out upon closer inspection to be just about as limited, improvised and lopsided as those of their societally corporatist relatives.

Some of Manoïlesco's prototheoretical assumptions about the political functions and policy consequences of state corporatism seem to have been confirmed by its subsequent praxis. It has been associated with the extension of state control over export commodities, sectoral policies of import substitution and attempts to exert greater influence in international economic negotiations. While by no means successful in eradicating horizontal (class)

\textsuperscript{92} This and the following generalizations about the praxis of state corporatism draw on my case studies of Brazil and Portugal (fns. 19 & 26). The Italian Fascist case, however, does not appear to differ markedly. See Roland Sarti, \textit{Fascism and Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940} (Berkeley, 1971).
forms of consciousness, its imposition of verticalized decisional hierarchies and fragmented interest categories has definitely undermined the cohesion and capacity to act of the proletariat and even of the bourgeoisie with respect to general policy issues. It has advanced *pari passu* with an expansion in the role of technocratic expertise and impersonal (if not to say faceless) leadership styles. Most importantly, it has greatly advanced and facilitated *verselbständigte Macht der Executivgewalt*, that “process whereby state executive power becomes progressively more independent” from accountability to organized social groups, that Marx so long ago suggested was the crucial element in modern authoritarian rule.  

Otherwise, Manoilesco’s specific functional hypotheses have not stood up so well. Horizontal consciousness shows no sign of disappearing no matter how suppressed. Class inequalities in access and benefit have not been erased; they have been institutionalized and augmented. The decision-making load on the state has not been lightened but burdened by the proliferation of dependent functional hierarchies; far from being freed to pursue bold and innovative national policies, the corporate state has been trapped in a fantastically complex network of fiscal prebends, sectoral exemptions and entrenched privileges which ties it closely to a stalemated status quo. Popular demands for individual freedom and equality have yet to give way to respect for organizational hierarchy and acceptance of differential justice. Most striking, however, is the total lack of confirmation in praxis of Manoilesco’s assertion of pious hope that corporatism from above would result in a secular decline in the rate of profit, a devaluation of the role of entrepreneurial risk-taking, a diminution of the power of private property and the emergence of a new social or collective mode of production. So far, state corporatism has produced the contrary and one rather suspects it was always intended to do so.

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“*Kuppo!*” said the Shah, shaking his head.

Khashdahr blushed, and translated uneasily, apologetically.

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93 The expression is from Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire*. For a further development of these ideas, see August Thalheimer “Über den Faschismus” in O. Bauer et al., *Faschismus und Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 19-38; H. C. F. Mansilla, *Faschismus und eindimensionale Gesellschaft* (Neuwied u. Berlin, 1971); and Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascisme et dictature* (Paris, 1970); also my “The Portugalization of Brazil?” (fn. 19).
“Shah says, ‘Communism.’”

“No, Kuppo!” said Halyard vehemently. “The government does not own the machines. They simply tax that part of industry’s income that once went into labor, and redistribute it. Industry is privately owned and managed, and co-ordinated—to prevent the waste of competition—by a committee of leaders from private industry, not politicians. By eliminating human error through machinery, and needless competition through organization, we’ve raised the standard of living of the average man immensely.”

Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,
Player Piano (p.28)

If we accept Manoïlesco’s belief in centennial longevity and my hunch that it all began during and immediately after World War I, then we are presently right smack in the middle of the century of corporatism and hence condemned to live with it for another fifty or so years. Kurt Vonnegut’s poetic imagination offers us the “comforting” thought that full corporatization will only come in the aftermath of a third major world war. Nevertheless, barring his vision of a future global conflagration precipitating further change, and adopting a more surprise-free scenario, we may question whether corporatism, state or societal, will manage to fill out its century.

State corporatism is everywhere revealing itself more and more costly to maintain through repressive measures and less and less capable of providing the accurate information, semivoluntaristic compliance and contractual complicity needed for managing the modern capitalist state. The obvious answer, an institutional shift from the imposed, exclusionist to the invited, inclusionist type of corporatism, has yet to be made peacefully and incrementally. But the transition to societal corporatism seems to depend very much on a liberal-pluralist past, involving the following: a history of autonomous organizational development; authenticity of representation; protracted encounters between classes and sectors which acquired distinct self-images and loyalties and, eventually, a measure of mutual respect; the presence of competitive party and parliamentary arenas to which wider appeals could be addressed; and, perhaps most importantly, on a previous pattern of relative noninterference by the state which only gradually came to expand its role—and then usually at the request of organized private interests.

Countries locked into state corporatism at an earlier stage of
development are likely to find it much more difficult to evolve toward such a consensual solution. There the established pattern is one of asymmetric dependence, unauthentic and fragmented representation, weak associational loyalties, suppressed or manipulated conflict, little mutual respect among groups, no effective means of appealing to wider publics and pervasive state bureaucratic control. Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine a politically continuous transformation toward societal corporatism; rather, one suspects that the state-corporatist system must first degenerate into openly conflictful, multifaceted, uncontrolled interest politics—pluralism in other words—as appears to be happening in contemporary Spain.

Established, societally corporatist systems are also facing new tensions which they, too, seem incapable of resolving. They are being bombarded with demands for more direct and authentic forms of participation, undermining both the stability of their established internal hierarchies of authority and their claims to democratic legitimacy. More importantly, they are being bypassed with increasing frequency by broad social movements on the one side and specific spontaneous protest actions on the other. The very values and assumptions about society upon which corporatism ultimately rests, functional specialization and hierarchical organization, security and prévision, “productivism” and efficiency, economic growth and mass consumption as ends in themselves, are being called into question by these movements and actions. Here, the prospective associational answer is certainly not further societal corporatization, nor a reversion to past pluralism, nor even less a regression to state corporatism, but may be some experimentation with the sort of dispersed, nonspecialized, nonhierarchic, “hived-off,” voluntaristic units, autonomously responsible for allocating their values and resolving their conflicts, an interest system which we earlier tentatively identified as syndicalist. Again, however, the

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94 These conclusions about the difficulties inherent in the transformation from one type of corporatism to the other are based on the study I have conducted on Portuguese corporatism and are discussed more fully therein; see “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal” (fn. 26).

peaceful and incremental route to such a systemic transformation has yet to be found.

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Marx once suggested that societies only recognized the problems they stood some chance of resolving. From this optimistic perspective, renewed awareness that we may still be in the century of corporatism should contribute to making it the shortest century on historical record.

The next century, that of syndicalism, already awaits its Lord Keynes or its Mihail Manolesco!

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ca. 1800-1950

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