Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy
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A political party may employ one of two basic strategies in its efforts to induce voters to support its candidates, contributors to give money to its cause, and activists to work for the party organization. It may distribute divisible benefits—patronage of various sorts—to the individuals who support the party. Alternatively, it may distribute collective benefits or appeal to a collective interest in an effort to elicit contributions of money, labor, or votes from its supporters.¹

Under what conditions are parties likely to pursue one or the other of these strategies? Over the past ten or fifteen years a number of social scientists have addressed themselves to this question, and though they have proposed many different answers to it, something of a scholarly consensus has emerged with respect to where such an answer is to be found. The theories of political patronage enjoying the greatest currency today are fundamentally sociological in approach. They all seek to account for variations among nations in the role patronage plays in political parties by searching for variations in social structure or political culture that can be correlated with these differences in party behavior. And they all tend to explain any correlations they find in a similar way—by arguing that voters who have the social characteristic in question are especially likely to demand

patronage in exchange for their votes. Thus scholars in recent years have variously argued that machine politics will prevail where the bulk of the electorate is in a transitional stage of social modernization, in societies that have cognatic kinship structures, among groups that have a private-regarding or individualist political ethos, in cities whose electorate is ethnically heterogeneous, among social classes whose orientations are more parochial than cosmopolitan, and so forth.  

These theories of patronage are deficient in a number of respects. In the first place, they are overly narrow in focus: they fail to recognize that the issue of patronage has a bearing upon the interests of groups besides ordinary voters and party politicians, and that these groups may be in a position to influence, or place constraints upon, the strategies parties adopt. In particular, the question whether political parties will be able to raid the bureaucracy in search of patronage raises several of the same issues that were involved in the struggles that occurred in many nations during the predemocratic era over the creation of a modern bureaucracy and a "reformed" civil service—conflicts that often took place before mass electorates and party politicians appeared on the scene. Furthermore, sociological theories of patronage are deficient to the extent that they are ahistorical. They generally fail to recognize that the interests various groups acquire and the alliances they form during conflicts over patronage in the predemocratic era can persist into the era of mass suffrage, and that the outcome of these earlier struggles can have enduring consequences for the strength of the contending forces in later struggles over party patronage. These consequences can endure, moreover, in the face of social changes of the sort—modernization, industrialization, assimilation, acculturation—that according to sociological theories of patronage lead to the rise or decline of patronage politics.

In this article I seek to construct a theory of patronage that avoids these shortcomings. I begin this task in the sections below by presenting some evidence that casts doubt upon the explanatory power of sociological theories of patronage. I then discuss some important conditions that influence whether political parties are...
likely to rely upon a patronage strategy—conditions that do not receive sufficient attention among current theories—and propose an alternative theory that takes these forces into account. Sections II, III, and IV provide evidence for this theory by showing how it is able to account for the role patronage plays in the party politics of Germany, Great Britain, and Italy—nations that illustrate three of the major historical alternatives specified by the theory I propose. The concluding section indicates how the theory outlined here can be reconciled with two cases, France and the United States, that appear on their face to contradict it.

The Neoclassical Theory of Patronage

It is possible to discern some common themes within the recent scholarly literature on patronage, themes that distinguish these writings from those of an earlier generation of scholars and that warrant one's speaking of a new wisdom with regard to how patronage and machine politics are to be understood. In the first place, these writings rely upon a common model of party behavior, one rather similar to the model of the firm in neoclassical economic theory. Political parties in open electoral systems, it is argued, are unable to use coercion to remain in power; rather they must respond to the demands of voters in order to win popular support, just as—or so the argument goes—business firms operating in free markets are compelled to respond to the tastes and preferences of consumers if they are to sell their products and reap a profit. In the second place, as noted above, these writings all assume that the demands and preferences of voters are determined by their social background and cultural heritage. And though their explanations as to why this is so differ widely, they generally agree that immigrants, displaced peasants, and the poor are especially likely to demand patronage in exchange for their votes, and that voters who belong to the middle class and to the industrial working class are most likely to respond favorably to parties that offer collective or programmatic benefits. From these common premises a common conclusion follows: political parties are most likely to be patronage oriented when they rely upon the support of voters of the former type, and they are most likely to stage collective or ideological appeals when they rely upon the support of voters of the latter type. This argument, implicit in the writings of James C. Scott, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, Leon Epstein, and numerous
other political scientists, can be termed the neoclassical theory of political patronage.3

The accompanying table enables us to subject this theory to a rough test by classifying parties according to the two attributes suggested by the neoclassical theory: whether they distribute individual or collective benefits to their supporters and whether they rely upon the votes of urban migrants and uprooted peasants, on one hand, or the middle class and industrial working class, on the other. The political parties listed in this table are cited merely as examples, but they do suggest that with little difficulty one can locate cases that are not consistent with the neoclassical theory, namely those grouped in the lower left and those grouped in the upper right.

### Classification of Political Parties

(According to Social Base of Supporters and Inducements Offered to Them)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY INDUCEMENTS</th>
<th>SOCIAL BASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants, Uprooted Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Philippines: Nacionalistas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(patronage)</td>
<td>Ghana: Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago, Philadelphia:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indiana, Ohio:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>Bologna: Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(public policies,</td>
<td>Republican Spain:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideology)</td>
<td>Socialist Party, An-archosyndicalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michigan, Wisconsin:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consider first the parties listed in the lower left: each of these is an ideological or issue-oriented party or relies heavily upon solidaristic appeals, yet each of these parties has a social base rather similar

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to that of the patronage-oriented parties listed in the upper left. In contemporary Bologna, for example, the Communist Party (PCI) relies heavily upon votes of recent migrants from the surrounding countryside, and since it controls the local government, it is in a position to raid the public treasury in a quest for patronage. Nevertheless the PCI has not degenerated into a patronage machine, and the city of Bologna is administered with less corruption and petty favoritism than are comparable Italian cities that are governed by the Christian Democrats (DC). More generally, as both Michael Paul Rogin and Sidney Tarrow have noted, in the industrializing cities of Europe in the late nineteenth century, socialist parties had a popular base quite similar to that of the political machines governing the industrializing cities of the United States at the same time: uprooted peasants who migrated to the cities of Europe—to Milan and Paris—were mobilized by parties that preached revolution and class solidarity, while their cousins who migrated to the cities of the United States—to Chicago and Philadelphia—were mobilized by conservative patronage machines. Similarly, in rural Europe earlier in this century one could find political parties that mobilized peasants against traditional patron-client structures, as well as parties that dealt with peasants through such structures: Republican Spain provides examples of each. Finally, to cite some examples from contemporary American politics, the Democratic parties in the states of the upper Middle West (e.g., Michigan, Wisconsin) are, to use John Fenton’s terminology, “issue-oriented,” while their counterparts in the lower Middle West (e.g., Indiana, Ohio) are “job-oriented,” although both rely upon the support of working-class voters of immigrant stock.

In a similar vein, it is possible to cite many examples of patronage-oriented parties that rely heavily upon the support of the middle classes, parties that would be located at the upper right of the table. A clear-cut case is the French Radical party of the Third and Fourth Republics—the classic middle-class party of small town notables and Parisian ministrables. Political parties in the United States from their

beginnings have fallen into this same mold. The spoils system of the Jacksonian Democrats was perfected before poverty-stricken peasants from Ireland and from southern and eastern Europe became a major element in the American population, when the United States was still predominantly a country of relatively prosperous, Protestant gentry and yeomanry. Patronage continues to this day to play an important role in the party politics of most states of the Northeast and lower Middle West, including in those parties (e.g., the Republican parties in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York) that draw much of their support from the middle classes. (Indeed, throughout most of this century one of the strongest county organizations in the Republican party of New York State has been the machine of G. Wilbur Doughty, J. Russel Sprague, and now Joseph Margiotta in heavily middle-class Nassau County.)9 Finally, one might cite the case of the Christian Democratic party in contemporary Italy, whose orientations toward patronage are attributed by Luigi Graziano and Alessandro Pizzorno to its efforts to win support within the middle classes.10

Taken together these examples suggest that the behavior of political parties is not strictly determined by the composition of their popular base: parties have managed to win the support of migrants and peasants in transitional societies both by working through "vertical" patron-client networks and by organizing them into "horizontal" associations; parties have been able to mobilize the middle and working classes in more modern social settings both by distributing patronage to individual members of those classes and by appealing to broader class and occupational loyalties among them.

**Constructing an Alternative Explanation**

If the neoclassical theory is not fully satisfactory, how can a superior theory be constructed? In order to begin this task it is useful to return to the model of the political party with which we began, a model that conceives of political parties seeking votes in open electoral systems as analogous to business firms seeking customers in a free market. This analogy is a helpful one, but in arguing that a


political party will be compelled to respond to the preferences of potential supporters if it is to receive their votes, the political scientists cited above introduce a questionable assumption. They assume that the political preferences of voters exist prior to, and apart from, the alternatives that are presented to them in the electoral arena. This assumption is the political equivalent of the notion of the autonomy of preferences (or exogenous preferences) in neoclassical economic theory—a notion that has been subject to telling criticism by economists, and that, as the examples cited above suggest, is equally dubious in the political realm.\(^\text{11}\) Evidently the political behavior of voters in both “transitional” and “modern” settings is far more variable and malleable than the neoclassical theorists assume. Political parties have found it possible to elicit support from voters in each of these settings by staging both individualistic and collective appeals.

If the strategies parties adopt are not totally constrained by the characteristics of the voters whose support they seek, one must turn elsewhere to account for their behavior. Again, the analogy to the business firm is helpful. To the extent that the behavior of a firm is not determined by the (autonomous) preferences of its customers, the chief executive of that firm, in deciding which products to produce and which marketing strategies to pursue, can respond to other considerations.\(^\text{12}\) The classic example, of course, is the commitment of the Big Three automotive companies during the two decades following World War II to the set of policies—the manufacture of large cars, the proliferation of models, annual restyling—that so outraged their critics and that eventually made them vulnerable to foreign competition. In order to explain the behavior of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, one must take into account three factors. First, there are the tastes and preferences of consumers: the American public indeed was prepared to buy such automobiles. But the production and marketing decisions of the auto manufacturers cannot be attributed solely to consumer demand. The automobile companies, after all, advertised extensively to cultivate and to reinforce this demand, and once foreign manufacturers began selling smaller and less stylish cars in the United States it was evident that a market existed for such automobiles, one that the Big Three were rather slow to cultivate. Second, at any moment it was simply more feasible for the American auto manufacturers to supply the market with large


cars than small ones. The resources available to them—their physical plant, their technologies, the skills of their employees, and their very organizational structure—all were geared to the production and marketing of large, stylish automobiles. Third, and most important of all, the production of large, stylish automobiles best enabled the top automotive executives to deal with their several "constituencies"—constituencies other than their customers, namely, their managers, creditors, shareholders, labor unions, subsidiaries, suppliers, and potential (American) competitors—in that the strategy they pursued enabled gross revenues, profits, wages, and entry costs to be maintained at a high level.\(^{13}\)

By the same token, at any moment there are three considerations that enter into the decisions party leaders make concerning whether to adopt or eschew a patronage strategy. First, there are the orientations and preferences of the voters to whom the party is appealing for support. Second, there are the resources available to the party. Third, there are the interests of the activists who staff the party apparatus and of the elites (if any) with whom the party is allied or who are capable of levying sanctions against it. If a party is to rely upon a patronage appeal, for example, the voters whose support it is seeking must value the particularistic benefits it distributes; the party must enjoy access to a pool of resources from which such benefits can be generated; and the party leadership must calculate that, considering the reactions of elites as well as voters, the gains to be realized exceed the losses the party might incur, including the opportunities it foregoes, if it uses these resources in this way.

**Voter Demands**

Now, as I already have suggested, the first of these factors—the orientations of the voters to whom the party is appealing for support—cannot be considered apart from, and prior to, the techniques parties actually have employed to win support among the voters in question. Except under one unusual set of circumstances, which need not be discussed at any length here,\(^{14}\) the social composition of the elec-

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\(^{14}\) If a party is to pursue a patronage strategy it must be able to offer to its supporters indulgences that exceed in value the benefits they can obtain from alternative sources. That is, whether a group will respond to a patronage appeal depends in the first instance not upon the characteristics of its members per se—every man, as Hobbes observed, has his price—but rather upon the relationship between the value of the benefits produced by the government, on one hand, and the opportunities available to individuals whose support the party is seeking, on the other. This condition for the existence of a patronage party is not very restrictive. Regimes as weak as those of Jacksonian America and Hanoverian England were capable of generating indulgences that could sustain patronage parties, because even these regimes, through the granting
torate does not uniquely determine party behavior. Rather, as I shall argue below, the way the members of a social group will react to electoral appeals of various sorts is a function of how that group initially was mobilized into the electorate. Thus the analysis here must begin by considering the factors, apart from voter preferences, that influence the strategic choices that parties make.

The Supply of Patronage

The next of the above-mentioned factors cannot be laid aside quite so quickly. Clearly, a party must enjoy access to a pool of resources out of which patronage can be generated if it is to distribute patronage to its supporters. Now at first glance it would appear that there are two conditions under which a party will not enjoy such access: (1) if the leaders of the party themselves neither occupy public office nor are allied with elites who control some source of patronage; (2) if governmental agencies are protected by civil service statutes and other general laws that specify how public benefits and burdens are to be distributed and that thereby prevent politicians from intervening in the administrative process on a case-by-case basis. The first of these conditions is, indeed, sufficient to explain why parties founded by outsiders—by leaders who do not occupy positions within the pre-existing regime—are compelled to rely upon ideological and solidary incentives before coming to power; it can explain why, for example, the major working-class parties of Europe relied upon inducements of this character in their early years. This condition itself, however, cannot explain why parties such as Labour in Great Britain, the Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany, or the Communists in Italy continue to eschew patronage appeals after they come to power, after they obtain access to the resources of the state. I will argue shortly that the circumstances of a party’s origins—whether or not it enjoyed access to patronage at the time it first undertook to mobilize a popular base—can crucially influence the party’s sub-

of offices and charters, were in a position to affect the important interests of a considerable portion of the political class. It is only when the jurisdiction of a regime is not commensurate in scope with the major interests of its inhabitants that the party controlling the regime would not be in a position to pursue a patronage strategy. The major example of such a setting is the upper income, bedroom suburb. The regulations from which a suburban politician can exempt a business firm, and the purchases that a suburban government makes, are of insignificant value to businessmen whose firms operate in metropolitan, national, or even international markets. And the jobs such politicians control pay salaries far lower than the ones that the upper-income residents of these communities can obtain from the private market. A classic fallacy of ecological reasoning thus is involved in the effort to draw inferences concerning the behavior of upper- and middle-class individuals from observations of the character of politics in upper- and middle-income communities such as Winnetka, Illinois, or Scarsdale, New York. See Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 140.
sequent behavior, but in order to construct such an argument it is necessary to proceed further down our list of explanations.

The second condition under which it would appear that parties will not enjoy access to patronage—if governmental agencies are protected by civil service laws—is suggested by Leon Epstein in *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. Epstein argues that patronage plays a lesser role in the party politics of European nations than it does in the United States because political parties emerged in Europe after the adoption of civil-service laws, while they emerged in the United States prior to the enactment of such laws. For this reason, Epstein suggests, politicians in Europe did not enjoy access to patronage during the era of party building, whereas their counterparts in the United States did enjoy such access and acquired a stake in the patronage system, a stake they were willing to defend by fighting rear-guard actions after civil-service laws were adopted. I shall argue below that the relative timing of these two events may be of crucial importance, but in order to see that Epstein's formulation is not entirely satisfactory, one need only note that many of the most prominent patronage-oriented parties in the world today were founded or acquired mass constituencies after the adoption of civil-service laws. One thinks, for example, of the Christian Democrats in post-war Italy, the Cermak-Kelly machine in Chicago, and, if one's universe of cases is broadened, the machine parties that emerged in newly independent Third World nations in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The mere enactment of a civil-service statute is not sufficient to stanch the flow of patronage because such laws are not self-enforcing. Rather, if a civil-service system (or any administrative arrangement providing for the allocation of public benefits and burdens according to general rules) is to resist the depredations of patronage-seeking politicians, the administrators or public officials who would defend it must be backed by a constituency that has a stake in the system and that is sufficiently powerful to prevail over competing forces. Only if it fears arousing the opposition of such a constituency will a governing party be constrained to forego the immediate gains it would realize by directing bureaucrats to reward the party's friends and to punish its enemies. The groups that oppose the patronage system, that insist that public benefits and burdens be allocated according to a set of general, universalistic, rules and procedures, and that seek to defend the autonomy of the bureaucracy from politicians who seek to intervene before it on a case-by-

case basis, might be termed a "constituency for universalism" or a "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy."

Who comprises such a constituency? Its members wish of course to overcome what they regard as the evils of patronage politics, and patronage politics, as Carl Landé notes, undermines the regulatory and extractive capacities of the state. Constituencies for bureaucratic autonomy characteristically are organized by leaders who wish to strengthen the state in these respects. But these leaders generally must enter into coalitions with other forces if they are to have any chance of overcoming those who benefit from the patronage system. At the same time, general rules allocating public benefits and burdens are by definition neutral between individuals, but they need not be neutral between social groups. Leaders of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy thus can broaden their basis of support by entering into a coalition with groups that seek through general rules to obtain privileged access to public offices and benefits.

Elites and Cadres

The concept of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy leads us to the third consideration I mentioned above. A party, I noted, will be compelled to eschew a patronage strategy if the losses it would incur by using the resources of the state to generate patronage exceed the benefits it would realize by so doing, and it will have an incentive to adopt a patronage strategy if the benefits of so doing exceed the costs. A party will be driven in one direction or the other depending upon which group it can least afford to alienate—the opponents of the patronage system (the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy) or its defenders. The latter grouping, to maintain terminological balance, can be labeled a "constituency for patronage," and its leading members, as Epstein notes, are the politicians—ward bosses, notables, caciques, and askari—who are dependent upon the continued flow of patronage to keep a hold on to their clients and followers. There are many resources that these two groupings may be able to mobilize to back up their claims—wealth, notability, expertise, the capacity to disrupt or overthrow the government—but in an electoral setting the balance can be tipped decisively to one side or the other if one or the other of them is backed by a mass base, and the more extensive and the more highly organized that popular base the more decisive will be the advantage enjoyed by that side. If the patronage-oriented politicians within the party enjoy such support—as they do, for example, in Chicago's Democratic party today—then "reform" will be the cause of only narrowly based elites, and

16. Landé, Networks and Groups, p. 118.
the party would ignore the claims of its constituency for patronage at the peril of losing its base of popular support. If, to the contrary, the claimants for patronage within a party do not enjoy such backing, then the party leadership can heed the demands of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy without fear that it thereby is courting disaster at the polls.

Whether a party will or will not be crucially dependent upon the distribution of patronage to maintain its hold upon its supporters is a function, in turn, of how the leadership of that party initially established a linkage with a popular base. If, for reasons I will discuss shortly, the party was not in a position to distribute particularistic benefits when it first undertook to mobilize mass support, its leaders will have been compelled to rely upon or to establish a network of mass organizations—labor unions, peasant leagues, churches, party sections—that did not need to be fueled by patronage. A party linked to a mass constituency through such an organizational structure will not, once it comes to power, be compelled to raid the public treasury in order to maintain its hold upon its supporters. On the other hand, a party that undertook to win popular support by distributing particularistic benefits through local notables or politicians will not have established such an organizational structure to bind voters directly to the party, and consequently such a party will only be able to maintain itself in office by heeding the demands of the patronage-seeking politicians who are affiliated with it.

**A “Critical Experience” Theory**

My argument, then, is this. Once a party does come to power, its tendency to adopt or eschew a patronage strategy is a function of the third of the above-mentioned considerations: whether it will gain more than it will lose if it intervenes within the administrative process on a partisan, case-by-case basis. Whether gains will exceed losses, or losses will exceed gains, depends upon the relative strengths of the elites and party cadre who have a stake in the patronage system, on one hand, and the elites and cadre whose interests are served by more universalistic systems of public administration, on the other hand. And the influence that these two constituencies will have in the inner councils of the party is a function, in turn, of how the party first undertook to mobilize popular support. In other words, the way in which a party initially acquires a popular base is a character-forming or “critical” experience, in the sense in which that term is used by Philip Selznick and by Ira Katznelson.17 Political

17. Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and
parties, as Samuel Huntington notes, are "formed by the organized linking of political faction to social force," and the way that linkage initially is established influences the character of the organization the party builds, what it subsequently must do to hold on to its social base, and consequently the bargaining strength within the party of practitioners of patronage politics and of their opponents.

Under what conditions will the founders of a political party use or not use patronage to establish a linkage with a mass base, that is, to acquire popular support? In order to answer this question, it is useful to recall a distinction that can be found in the literature on the origins of political parties, a distinction to which I have already alluded. Political parties, as Duvarger and Huntington have both observed, emerge in one of two circumstances. Parties have been founded by elites who occupy positions within the prevailing regime and who undertake to mobilize a popular following behind themselves in an effort either to gain control of the government or to secure their hold over it. Such parties might be termed "internally mobilized" parties. The Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists in the United States and the Liberals and Conservatives in Great Britain fall under this heading. Political parties also have been established by outsiders who did not hold positions within the prevailing regime and who organize a mass following either in an effort to gain entry into the political system for themselves and their supporters or in an effort to overthrow that system. Such parties might be termed "externally mobilized" parties. Socialist parties in Europe and nationalist parties in the Third World fall into this category.

Because they are established by outsiders, political parties in this second category—externally mobilized parties—do not enjoy access to state patronage at the time of their founding and perforce are compelled to rely upon other means to acquire a following. The situation with regard to internally mobilized parties is more complex. Parties founded by elites that occupy positions within the prevailing regime will be in a position to use the resources of the state to acquire a mass base and will have every incentive to make use of that advantage unless the party undertakes to mobilize a popular following after a constituency for universalism has


coalesced and become entrenched. The sequence in which these two events occur—the formation of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy and the mobilization of a mass electorate—thus has enduring consequences for internally mobilized parties.

One can identify two different constituencies for bureaucratic autonomy that historically have emerged in nations governed by internally mobilized parties—two different coalitions of elite groups that historically have sought to abolish patronage in the public service, to establish civil-service systems purportedly based upon merit-related standards of entry and promotion, and to defend thereafter the integrity of such systems. The first of these, which might be termed the "absolutist coalition," was led by monarchs who during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sought to increase the extractive and regulatory capacities of their regimes and to create an army so that they would be better able to meet foreign military and economic competition and to bring their opponents at home to heel. This entailed creating a modern, centralized, bureaucratic state to replace the decentralized, patrimonial standestaat of the earlier era. The way modernizing monarchs proceeded toward this end varied from place to place, but generally speaking they won some crucial political support for this program by filling positions in the reformed administrative system with members of the haute bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, that is, by creating a new administrative elite that was drawn in part from and had links to older elite groups. These groups continued in the democratic era to serve as the constituency for the reformed state apparatus. The second coalition might be termed the "progressive coalition" because the role played by absolute monarchs in the first coalition was played in the second by a rationalizing middle class, a middle class whose ideology was Benthamite in England, Positivist on the continent, and Progressive in the United States. Although the leading elements of the first and second coalitions differed, their remaining members were drawn from similar groups. In order for a rationalizing bourgeoisie to bring about administrative reforms and thereafter to be successful in providing political backing for a reformed civil service, it had to draw support from elements of the groups—be they aristocrats, patricians, or less exalted public servants—that held positions under the earlier regime.

The upshot of this analysis is that the circumstances under which a party first mobilizes a mass following has enduring implications for its subsequent behavior. To summarize: externally mobilized parties will tend to eschew the use of patronage (a tendency that will be stronger the greater the resistance the party must overcome in order to gain power) regardless of the social composition of their electoral base. Internally mobilized parties will tend to be patronage oriented unless they operate in a setting where either an absolutist or a progressive coalition became entrenched prior to the mobilization of the masses into politics. The circumstances of a party’s origins influence its subsequent behavior regardless of the social characteristics of the voters upon whose support the party relies because the formative experiences of a party have implications for the three factors that, as I noted earlier, determine whether a party will adopt or eschew a patronage strategy: (1) the demands and expectations of the party’s rank-and-file supporters; (2) the material and organizational resources available to the party; and (3) the orientations of the party’s leadership and its cadres and the interests of the elites who are allied with the party or who are capable of sanctioning it.

Externally Mobilized Parties

The relationship between party origins and subsequent behavior is quite straightforward in the case of externally mobilized parties: the more “external” the circumstances of the party’s origins—the fewer the allies it had within the pre-existing regime, the greater the social and ideological distance between the party’s founders and that regime, the greater the resistance the party is compelled to overcome in order to gain power—the less likely it is the party will decay into a patronage machine after it does come to power. This relationship is clear cut because the birth pangs of such a party, if they are severe, can permanently shape its character.

Consider the extreme case: parties whose founders have no significant allies among power holders or other elites. The leaders of such a party will not enjoy access to governmental or other sources of patronage and will find it necessary to rely upon other appeals to mobilize their supporters; it is precisely under these conditions, of course, that Puritanism emerged as the ideology of a politically excluded gentry (and Calvinism as the ideology of a politically excluded provincial nobility) in the seventeenth century, that liberalism emerged as the ideology of a politically excluded bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century, that socialism emerged as the ideology of a politically excluded working class in the nineteenth century, and that
anarchism emerged as the ideology of a politically excluded peasantry in the twentieth century. The fewer the allies such a party enjoys within the pre-existing regime, moreover, the more strongly is that regime likely to resist the party's claims, to the point of seeking to repress it. In this situation, rank-and-file members of the party will be compelled to endure considerable sacrifices in order to affiliate with the party; the party will find it necessary to construct a strong organization to link its members and leaders to one another; and, most important of all, the party will be compelled to mobilize an extensive mass base in order to attain power.

These early experiences have enduring implications for the party's standing along each of the three above-mentioned dimensions. First, voters who undertook major sacrifices to affiliate with a party prior to its coming to power are not likely to demand particularistic payoffs as a condition for their continued support after the party comes to power. Nor, once such voters are brought into the electorate, will they be available for bribery by machine politicians from other parties, for, as S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan have observed, the party that first brings a social group into the political system retains a privileged hold upon the members of that group for decades, and even generations, thereafter. Finally, if the party mobilized an extensive mass base prior to coming to power, it will not, in order to stay in office, find it necessary subsequently to seek additional support among groups of voters that did not share the experience of affiliating with the party when it was an opposition force, and whose devotion to the party, therefore, is not quite so strong. As for the second of the above-mentioned considerations—the material and organizational resources available to the party leadership—party leaders who construct a strong organization prior to gaining access to patronage (an organization that necessarily will be grounded upon ideological and solidary inducements) will not subsequently find it necessary to fuel that organization with patronage in order to keep it running and to maintain a linkage with their subordinates and followers. Moreover, a leader who commands such a strong party organization will not find it necessary to tolerate corruption and empire building on the part of his subordinates; he will be in a secure

enough position to discipline and even to fire officials who use public authority to build personal political followings. Third, and finally, the leaders and cadres of such a party themselves will comprise a constituency for universalism, and the party will not be beholden to any constituency for patronage. The leaders and cadres of an externally mobilized party, as I have suggested, are likely to be committed to an ideology—a vision of society—and once they come to power, they are not going to be willing to fritter away in patronage the authority they now have to remodel society, at least not if it was only with great difficulty that they got hold of that authority. And if these leaders acquired a mass following prior to gaining access to the resources of the state, and if the party did not rely upon the support of local elites and notables in order to acquire that following, it will not subsequently be dependent upon the support of patronage-oriented politicians in order to retain its popular base.

This set of considerations can explain why the European socialist parties listed in the table above—parties that acquired mass followings before they gained access to patronage—did not decay into political machines after winning control of municipal, or eventually national, governments. And this has been true of these parties regardless of the social composition of their electoral bases, even when their supporters were drawn from groups (uprooted peasants, recent urban migrants, Catholics, Latins) whose members in their private and social lives are said to have narrow, family-centered loyalties.

At the other extreme are those parties that did not find it necessary to overcome substantial resistance from the powers-that-be as a condition of coming to power, a category that includes the nationalist parties that took control of most Third World nations in the immediate postindependence period. These parties were not compelled to mobilize a substantial mass following or to build a strong party organization before they were handed the keys to the public treasury. Consequently, when they for the first time did find it necessary to mobilize popular support—in elections that were sponsored by the colonial power or that were held after independence was granted—these parties were an element of the prevailing regime and did enjoy access to the public bureaucracy. Having no alterna-

23. As Carl Landé notes, the leaders of weak regimes are unable to prevent subordinate officials from using their authority to generate patronage and to build personal followings for themselves, because such leaders are dependent upon the support of these officials and their followings to keep the regime in power. This phenomenon can explain why the Christian Democratic party in Italy has become increasingly factionalized and patronage ridden the longer it is in office. See Landé, Networks and Groups, pp. 126-27; Raphael Zariski, “Intra-Party Conflict in a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy,” Journal of Politics 27 (February 1965): 3-34.
tive means of reaching into the countryside (or even into the shantytowns around the capital city) it is not surprising that they would attempt to acquire a following by making use of the patronage at their disposal. In other words, at the moment when they first undertook to acquire a mass base, these parties for all intents and purposes stood in the same relationship to potential supporters as do internally mobilized parties. It is this consideration that explains why students of political development have found patronage to be so prevalent in the party politics of Third World countries, including those countries (the Philippines, Ghana) listed in the upper left of the table above.24 (By contrast, those Third World parties that were compelled to fight their way to power, for example, Tunisia's Neo-Destour, are less patronage oriented, even when they rely upon peasants or migrants for much of their popular support.)25

Internally Mobilized Parties

In a similar vein, the way in which an internally mobilized party initially establishes a linkage with its popular base has important consequences for its subsequent character. In order to specify the nature of this relationship one must divide the universe of internally mobilized parties into two subcategories: parties that undertake to acquire a popular following after the formation of an absolutist or a progressive coalition, and parties that mobilize a mass base before a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy of one or the other of these types coalesces. Parties in the former subcategory will tend thereafter to eschew patronage appeals, parties in the latter subcategory will tend thereafter to be patronage oriented. The relationship between party origins and subsequent behavior, however, is somewhat looser in the case of internally mobilized parties than it is with externally mobilized parties because the implications of the early experiences of the former for the subsequent orientations of the party's rank-and-file supporters and the subsequent character of the party's organizational structure are not quite so strong as they are with parties whose formative years were marked by the stuff out of which enduring loyalties and strong institutions are made: the shared experience of intense struggle and conflict. The formative experiences of an internally mobilized party do, however, strongly influence whether the party in subsequent years will be more beholden to a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy or

24. See, e.g., the account of the development of the CPP machine in Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 124-51.
a constituency for patronage, and for this reason in particular, internally mobilized parties falling into the first subcategory are less likely to be patronage oriented than those falling into the latter subcategory. In the remainder of this article I will seek to substantiate this proposition.

To anticipate, I shall argue that in nations where either an absolutist or a progressive coalition emerged prior to the mobilization of the masses into politics, internally mobilized parties will not have been in a position to use patronage in order to establish a linkage with a mass base but rather will have been compelled to rely upon other appeals (e.g., to patriotic or religious sentiment) and other forms of organization (e.g., churches, interest groupings). Because the party did not acquire a popular following by distributing patronage through a network of local politicians it will not thereafter be crucially dependent upon the support of such patronage-seeking politicians. And the very emergence of an absolutist or progressive coalition in the nation in question means that the agrarian and/or urban upper classes with whom internally mobilized parties are allied will have a stake in the rules and procedures that guarantee these groups control over the reformed bureaucracy and privileged access to positions within it. For these reasons the party leadership will have every incentive to avoid the use of patronage: they are allied with a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy and are not dependent upon the support of a constituency for patronage. These considerations explain why the European conservative parties listed in the table—Germany’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union and Britain’s Conservatives—today eschew the use of patronage (an absolutist coalition emerged in Germany and a progressive coalition in England before the creation of a mass electorate). More generally, I suspect (though I am not certain) that these considerations explain why patronage plays the smallest role today in the party politics of those European nations that, in Immanuel Wallerstein’s terminology, were governed by the “strong core states” of the sixteenth-century world-system.26 (I am prepared to argue, but will not do so here, that this consideration explains why patronage plays a relatively small role in the politics of cities in the South and West in the United States and why it plays a relatively small role in state politics in the American upper Middle West and trans-Mississippi West, even when the parties in question rely upon the votes of working class immigrant voters.)

On the other hand, in nations where neither an absolutist nor

a progressive coalition emerged prior to the extension of the franchise, internally mobilized parties will enjoy access to patronage at the moment when they first undertake to acquire a popular following, and, for the very reason that they are not confronted with a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy, they will have no incentive to avoid taking advantage of that access. Rather, they have every incentive to acquire popular support by distributing patronage to notables and politicians who have local followings. Such a strategy both follows the line of least resistance—it can be accomplished far more rapidly and with far less difficulty than building a party organization from scratch—and has the advantage of enabling the elites who are affiliated with the party to secure their hold over their clients and even to increase their power locally. These politicians and notables will become dependent upon the continued flow of patronage to maintain their power locally and within the party—they will develop into a constituency for patronage—and because the party is linked to its popular base through these politicians, the party will be dependent upon this constituency to maintain itself in power. A party whose political fate is so tied to the patronage system—one that requires patronage to hold its organization together and to maintain the support of its voters and its cadre—will not be in a position to respond favorably to a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy if and when such a constituency does subsequently emerge. These considerations, I would argue, explain the patronage orientation of the governing parties in southern Europe (the most notable being Italy's Christian Democrats) and they explain the significant role that patronage plays in the party politics of those states of the American East and lower Middle West (New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois) listed in the above table, and in the major cities in these states (New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago). In each of these cases, moreover, patronage plays a role in binding elements of the middle class, as well as other voters, to the party in question.

In the remainder of this article I will provide evidence for this argument concerning internally mobilized parties by analyzing three cases. The first, Germany, is a case where an absolutist coalition emerged prior to the creation of a mass electorate; the second, England, is a case where the formation of a progressive coalition preceded the full mobilization of the masses into politics; and the final one, Italy, is a case where neither of these coalitions emerged prior to the creation of a mass electorate. The order in which these events occurred, I shall argue, can explain the greater or lesser role that patronage plays in party politics in each of these nations today.
GERMANY

Germany stands as perhaps the paradigm case of a nation in which an absolutist constituency for bureaucratic autonomy coalesced and became entrenched in the predemocratic era, and it illustrates quite clearly the consequences of this development for the subsequent evolution of party politics. In the sections below I will discuss the emergence of an absolutist coalition in Brandenburg-Prussia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and I will argue that the ability of this coalition to survive the changes of regime Germany experienced subsequently, and to defend the autonomy of the bureaucracy, has been responsible for the limited role that patronage has played in the political parties of the Second Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the Federal Republic—including those parties that have relied upon the support of voters who supposedly are most responsive to patronage appeals.

The Emergence of an Absolutist Coalition

The attack upon a decentralized administrative structure staffed by aristocratic patronage dates in Germany from the aftermath of the Thirty Years War. Germany was devastated in that war and the Hohenzollern rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia, especially Frederick William (1640-88), King Frederick William I (1713-40), and King Frederick II (1740-86), attempted to recoup by creating a powerful standing army, an army that would defend the integrity of the Hohenzollern domains and lift Prussia into the ranks of the Great Powers. The Great Elector recognized, however, that the Estates of the Realm, which dominated the existing governmental structure, would refuse to tax themselves in order to finance a large standing army, especially one under the control of the king. Consequently, he created an administrative apparatus that would enable him to bypass the estates, to extend his control over his domains, and to generate the revenues necessary to finance his army.

In recruiting officials to serve in this bureaucracy the Hohenzollerns attempted to accomplish a number of things. First, they sought to find royal servants who would be personally loyal to the king and who would support the crown rather than the estates in the struggle for control over Prussia. Second, they wanted their officials to be competent, to be adept at performing the tasks they would be assigned. And finally, in making appointments the Hohenzollerns

sought to build a social base for their regime, to induce acquiescence among those whose support was necessary if their venture was to succeed. These goals had conflicting implications for the recruitment process. The best way to insure that civil servants would be loyal to the crown would be to appoint commoners and foreigners to the bureaucracy, for they would be utterly beholden to the king for whatever status and power they enjoyed; the preservation of their status would be contingent upon the triumph of the crown in its struggle with the estates; and they had fewer ties to the estates than did officials who were aristocratic by birth. An effort to maximize the competence of the bureaucracy had roughly similar implications, both because such an effort implies that one not give favor to candidates by virtue of their birth and because most university graduates in Prussia were of bourgeois, rather than noble, birth. On the other hand, the necessity the Hohenzollerns faced of maintaining support for their regime and for their efforts at state-building had different implications for the recruitment process. The aristocracy was the class the monarchy could least afford to alienate, because they possessed the means to forcibly resist anything they regarded as tyrannical and because they were the class from which the officer corps of the Prussian army was to be drawn. For these reasons the kings of Prussia had an incentive to appoint Junkers to positions in the state bureaucracy.

The Hohenzollerns pursued these several goals by recruiting civil servants from both the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. The relative standing of these two classes within the bureaucracy fluctuated as political conditions changed. In particular, Napoleon's victory over Prussia at the battle of Jena in 1806 discredited the army and the aristocracy and enabled a group of reformers led by Stein and Hardenburg and backed by the middle classes to come to power. The reformers of the Stein/Hardenburg era insisted that national regeneration could only be achieved if greater weight was accorded to the claims of talent and education than to those of birth. A system of examinations for entry into the bureaucracy

was devised to determine whether candidates for civil-service appointments possessed these traits, examinations that required young men who wished to pursue a career in the bureaucracy to acquire a classical and legal education. Such an education could only be obtained by attending a classical gymnasium and, then, a university. This requirement limited careers in the upper civil service to the wealthy, but it did not discriminate between those whose family wealth came from land and those whose wealth came from commerce. The ideology of talent and education, of Bildung, and the civil-service examination system through which it was institutionalized, thus enabled the bourgeoisie to solidify its claim upon positions within the bureaucracy. It enabled them to do so, however, without utterly alienating the aristocracy, for the civil-service examination system accorded the aristocracy representation within the bureaucracy far out of proportion to their numbers, and the ideology of Bildung provided a justification for the disproportionate power that, after Jena, they sorely needed. The civil-service examination system and the ideology of Bildung served a final purpose, a purpose that helps explain the political utility of these practices and principles to the groups that defended them. As Hans Rosenberg notes, these procedures and principles enhanced the autonomy and power of the bureaucracy, and hence the value of bureaucratic positions to those who could obtain them, because it gave the civil service control over its own recruitment and thereby prevented outsiders from influencing the bureaucracy through the hiring, firing, and promotion of civil servants.

It was through these processes, then, that the Junkers and elements of the upper middle class obtained privileged access to positions in the bureaucracy and acquired a stake both in the regulations that gave them that access, and in protecting the autonomy of that bureaucracy against "outside interference." In other words, these groups became a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy.

The Second Empire

This absolutist coalition retained its stake in the civil service under the Second Empire, as parliamentarians and party politicians became the major "outsiders" against whom the autonomy of the bureaucracy had to be defended. Otto von Bismark, the most talented representative of Prussian Junkerdom and the architect of German unification, was flexible in a number of respects, but he was intransigent on

34. Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, chap. 9. The social function of the gymnasiums and universities in Germany and of the ideology of Bildung is discussed in Armstrong, European Administrative Elites, pp. 139 ff., 165 ff.
this point. Bismarck was prepared to make various concessions as circumstances dictated to industrialists, Catholics, and even the working class, but he was not prepared to concede to any of these groups, or to the politicians who spoke for them, the slightest control over the army or the civil bureaucracy. The constitution of the Second Empire provided that the chancellor and the cabinet were to be responsible to the Kaiser alone and, correlatively, that the Reichstag would have no control over the ministry and the bureaucracy.

Practice did not deviate from constitutional precept during the Second Empire. Parliamentary politicians were scarcely accorded any access to the very top level of government let alone to the intermediate and lower levels of the bureaucracy: the majority of all cabinet ministers were recruited from the civil bureaucracy and the army rather than from the Reichstag. Large numbers of bureaucrats obtained seats in the parliament, while it was not possible for parliamentary and party politicians to obtain positions for themselves or their supporters within the bureaucracy. Under the Second Empire, then, Germany was ruled by what Otto Kircheimer has termed a “military-bureaucratic complex” and the social groups linked to this complex would not countenance any interference in what they regarded as their private preserve from the politicians who were their agents in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, let alone from politicians who belonged to opposition parties. The parties allied with the Junkers and/or the upper middle class and enjoying the closest ties to the government—the German Conservative party, the Reichspartei or Free Conservatives, the National Liberals—for this reason made no effort to use what power the Reichstag did possess under the constitution—its budgetary and legislative powers—to extend parliamentary and party control over the bureaucracy. Rather than attempting to use patronage to appeal to the working classes and the peasantry, the Conservatives instead sought to win such support by allying first with Adolf Stoecker's anti-Semitic Christian Social movement and then with the Farmer's League. As for the nonregime parties of the Second Empire—the Social Democrats,


the Catholic Center, and the Progressives—they simply were not in a position to raid the bureaucracy and obtain patronage even if their leaders had cared to do so.

**Weimar**

Germany’s defeat in the First World War led to the collapse of the monarchy and to the destruction of the institutions that had denied political parties any influence over the bureaucracy and that had prevented the members of all but the highest social classes from gaining entry into the upper reaches of the civil service. During the early months of the revolution of 1918 the political parties sought to take full advantage of this new situation: they attempted to penetrate and gain control over the administrative apparatus of the old regime and to use whatever influence they managed to obtain within it to strengthen their organizations. The revolution of 1918, however, was aborted. In order to crush a wave of left-wing insurrectionary activity, the early socialist governments of Weimar found it necessary to turn to military units from the old regime, and in order to carry on routine tasks of administration the government was compelled to rely upon the administrative apparatus and the bureaucrats it had inherited from the Reich. The military-bureaucratic complex that had governed the empire thus was able to survive into the new era. And because the German revolution was unfinished—because the economic and the political power bases of the Junkers and of the upper bourgeoisie had not been destroyed—the class coalition that defended the autonomy of this complex continued to be a potent political force during the Weimar period.

The desire of the Republican parties to make peace with these political forces was sufficiently strong that they did not attempt to change in any fundamental way the structure, recruitment procedures, and social composition of the civil service. Indeed, in Ralf Dahrendorf’s judgment, the influence of administrative officials relative to other political actors was greater in the Weimar period than it had been under the previous regime. Unregenerate opponents of the Republic were so firmly entrenched in Weimar’s administrative apparatus that adventurers such as Adolph Hitler were able

to conspire against the regime, as in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch, without being seriously punished by the Weimar judiciary. 42

The survival of Germany’s absolutist coalition into the Republican era had a number of important and ultimately fatal consequences for political life in Weimar, two of which are of concern to us here. In the first place, this constituency for bureaucratic autonomy was allied with parties of the Right—especially with the German National People’s party (DNVP) and the German People’s party—and it thereby exercised an internal constraint upon whatever tendency these parties might have had to raid the bureaucracy in search of patronage. This constraint was particularly notable with respect to the DNVP, which sought to mobilize support among the peasantry and which therefore might have been expected to rely upon a patronage strategy, but which relied instead upon nationalist and anti-Semitic appeals. 43 It was, rather, the Center party, which did not have ties to the absolutist coalition, that appears to have been the most inclined of the parties of the Weimar period to use its positions within the government to influence bureaucratic appointments, in an effort to increase the representation of Catholics in the bureaucracy. This endeavor, however, met with only limited success. 44

The survival of Germany’s absolutist coalition into the Republican era exercised an external constraint upon all of Weimar’s parties as well as an internal constraint upon the parties with which it was allied. Republican politicians dared not overturn practices and procedures that protected the autonomy of the bureaucracy and that gave the upper classes privileged access to high positions in it for fear that if they attempted to do so, the social groups that were linked to the bureaucracy would turn openly against the Republic. For this reason the parties of the Weimar coalition—the Socialists, the Democrats, and the Centrists—decided against purging the bureaucracy of anti-Republican elements in the wake of the Kapp Putsch in 1920. 45 It is true that after the assassination of Walter Rathenau in 1922 a law was passed that increased the number of administrative positions that were subject to political appointment, and the Republican parties sought to “democratize” the civil service by appointing

43. Hertzman, DNVP, chap. 5; Charles Frye, “Parties and Interest Groups in Weimar and Bonn,” World Politics 17 (July 1965): 641.
their adherents to these positions, but these parties hesitated to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the 1922 law for fear of provoking the regime's opponents. The proof of how discrete the Weimar parties had been came after the Nazi seizure of power. The Nazis in April 1933 promulgated the Law on the Reestablishment of the Career Civil Service, which provided for the removal from the bureaucracy of Jews, Communists, and "party-made" officials, that is, officials who had been brought into the civil service since 1918 without filling the normal requirements of the positions they held. But very few civil servants turned out to be liable for dismissal under the terms of this law.

The existence of these severe internal and/or external constraints upon the freedom of action of political parties in Weimar Germany can explain why these parties were not, in the judgment of contemporaneous political scientists, especially patronage oriented.

The Third Reich

The Nazi revolution did not destroy the autonomy of the German civil service or sever the links between the bureaucracy and its traditional social base any more than had the revolution of 1918. Indeed, to the extent that the Nazis did purge from the bureaucracy elements that had entered it since 1918, the initial consequence of Hitler's coming to power was more restorative than revolutionary. However, after the limited purges of 1933, Nazism exerted surprisingly little impact upon the civil service, as David Schoenbaum's study indicates.

The civil service was so successful in maintaining its autonomy because the vast majority of all civil servants inherited by the Third Reich conscientiously served the new regime and were loyal to it. The regime thus had little incentive to disrupt established bureaucratic routines or to insist that party considerations be accorded priority over technical proficiency in the appointment process. For this reason, as Schoenbaum notes, "despite the ostensible merger of State and Party, the outstanding loser in the struggle for survival was the Party. Advantages to Alte Kampfer [Nazis who had joined the Party before 1933] were kept to a minimum; direct party inter-

ference in the traditional civil service sectors was eliminated almost immediately. The files of the Ministry of the Interior could be read as a series of jurisdictional conflicts in which, almost without exception, the civil service won and the party lost."}

Because the Third Reich had pretty much left the German civil service alone and did not substantially alter its social composition, the heirs of Germany's absolutist coalition were able to defend the autonomy of the bureaucracy when an open political system was restored in the Federal Republic after the Second World War.

The Federal Republic

The civil service of the Federal Republic is the lineal descendent of the bureaucracy that served earlier German regimes—the Third Reich, the Weimar Republic, the Wilhelmian Reich, and ultimately, Hohenzollern Prussia—both in law and in fact. As for juridical continuity, a federal law of May 1951 passed pursuant to Article 131 of the Bonn constitution granted all regular civil servants, including those dismissed after 1945 for their Nazi connections and those expelled by the East German regime, a right to reinstatement by the Federal Republic. And more than ten years after the collapse of the Nazi regime 60 percent of the individuals who occupied top civil-service positions in the Federal Republic had held comparable positions in the administrative structure of the Third Reich. In fact, the proportion of civil servants who survived the regime change in 1945 was identical to the proportion who survived the transitions from the Wilhelmian Reich to Weimar in 1918 and from Weimar to the Third Reich in 1933.

I stated above that the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy in the Federal Republic today in the heir of Germany's absolutist coalition, rather than that it is identical to the coalition that defended bureaucratic autonomy in earlier regimes, because I would not deny that German society has changed in many important respects in the past several decades. The combined impact of industrialization, wartime decimation, and postwar partition destroyed the Junkers as a social class. But the two centuries of bureaucratic absolutism that preceded (and brought on) many of these changes have had their effect. The creation of an absolutist coalition implied not only the militarization of the Prussian aristocracy but also the "feudalization" of the Prussian bourgeoisie—the emergence of a bourgeoisie d'état.

50. Ibid., p. 221.
that aspired to assimilate into the aristocracy, that adopted its etatist values, and that has carried on this tradition even though the class that had previously exercised moral hegemony over them has passed from the scene. It is this class (and those who now aspire to enter it), with its orientation to public careers, its high level of corporate consciousness, and its conviction that it stands "above politics," that has defended the autonomy of the civil service in the Federal Republic.  

This constituency for bureaucratic autonomy has been an enormous power in West German politics. The ability of the civil service to survive the collapse of the Third Reich and the Allied military occupation with only minimal changes in personnel and structure is a reflection of that political strength. Upon assuming control of Germany the occupation authorities, especially the Americans, intended to bring about the "denazification" and the "democratization" of the civil service; that is, they intended to purge and to reorganize the bureaucracy. The responsibility for carrying out these reforms, however, was left to the German authorities, and politicians in postwar Germany found it politically impossible to resist the pressure of defenders of the bureaucratic status quo. The Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB), the major spokesmen for the higher civil servants, was particularly insistent in demanding that the "vested rights" of the Beamte be honored. One measure of its success is that only one thousand of the fifty-three thousand civil servants who were initially removed in denazification proceedings were in the end permanently excluded from the bureaucracy, and ultimately the Federal Republic passed the law of May 1951, which I described above. The power of Germany's constituency for bureaucratic autonomy is such that, as Taylor Cole has observed, the civil service was the public institution in Germany that passed through the occupation with the fewest changes.

The political power of Germany's constituency for bureaucratic autonomy in the postwar era has rested upon a number of foundations. First, as the Socialists learned in 1918, as the American, British, and French occupation forces rediscovered in 1945, and as politicians in West Germany have recognized to this day, any regime that is not prepared to countenance a sustained period of disruption must delegate the task of administering the routine functions of government

to the civil servants it inherits from the previous regime. The critical position that it occupies gives Germany's traditional bureaucratic elite enormous bargaining power.56 Second, civil servants in Germany are well organized and rely upon pressure-group activity to assert their claims and to defend their position in the politics of the Federal Republic.57 Third, the civil service is closely linked with other institutions in German society, most notably with the legal profession and the universities.58

A fourth and final practice that strengthens the defenders of bureaucratic autonomy in Germany is one that might be termed "reverse colonization." Political parties are prevented by law from placing their agents in the career civil service; career civil servants, however, have colonized the parties and the public institutions—especially the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the Landtag—of the Federal Republic. This practice has its roots in the nineteenth century, and the DBB fought hard during the occupation, ultimately with success, against the Allies' proposal that a law be passed, akin to America's Hatch Act, that would severely restrict the political activities of civil servants. The DBB recognized that the practice of reverse colonization enabled the civil service to gain representation for its corporate interests in the inner councils of the Federal Republic.59

Because the defenders of bureaucratic autonomy have links to so many important institutions in German society, any party that expects to govern the nation finds it necessary to come to terms with this constituency—unless, as was true of the SED in the East, it is prepared to sponsor a social revolution. This is doubly true of a party such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that is allied with the social groups that are advantaged by the traditional recruitment procedures of the German civil service. The relationship between these groups and the CDU goes a long way toward explaining its behavior toward civil-service reform and toward patronage in the postwar era.

The stance of the CDU toward the civil-service reform proposals of the Allies was, as Karl Hochswender puts it, "moderately conservative."60 Adenauer and the other top leaders of the party rejected the idea of totally overhauling the civil service and insisted that the public personnel system of the Federal Republic be built upon the

57. Herz, Government of Germany, p. 128.
58. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, chap. 15.
60. Ibid., p. 154.
German Career Officials Act of 1937. As leaders of the ruling party in the Republic, they were, however, interested in increasing the control that supervisors were able to exercise over their subordinates within the bureaucracy and in increasing the technical proficiency of the civil service. Hence they supported reforms that would enable supervisors to deny regular salary increments to and to demote officials who failed to perform their duties satisfactorily and that would provide “open competition” for civil service positions, that is, would permit individuals who were not career officials to compete for appointments in the upper reaches of the civil service. These proposals, however, encountered enormous resistance among spokesmen for the Beamte within the CDU, especially among the CDU members of the Bundestag’s Civil Service Committee. The committee defeated the first, and the provision for open competition was able to pass only when some CDU members broke with a majority of their colleagues and voted with the SPD delegation in favor of it.

The CDU’s alliance with Germany’s constituency for bureaucratic autonomy also can account for the fairly limited role that patronage played within the party during the decade and a half when it dominated the government of the Federal Republic. The CDU during this period was not totally indifferent to the identity of upper level bureaucrats, but as Hochswender notes (citing Theodor Eschenburg’s study of the scope of patronage in the politics of the Federal Republic) the concern of the CDU leaders in these matters was limited to two issues.61 First, in order to hold together the coalition governments that they led, the leadership of the CDU took care to see that the individuals appointed to upper level positions within the bureaucracy—the “politische Beamte”—as well as those appointed to the cabinet itself reflect the political composition of the government. Thus ambassadorships were allocated among the CDU’s coalition partners. Second, as a quasi-confessional party, the CDU pays heed to the religious affiliations of civil servants, especially those in sensitive positions. Thus the position of chief of the Cultural Division of the Foreign Ministry is reserved for a Catholic while the chief of the Cultural Division of the Ministry of the Interior invariably is a Protestant, and religious elements within the CDU have argued that in Catholic areas chief gynecologists in public hospitals and teachers in public schools should be Catholics. These appear to be the only arenas, however, in which the defenders of the traditional recruitment practices of the German civil service have been compelled to make concessions to partisan and electoral pressures.

An attack upon the patronage system may be spearheaded by a rationalizing bourgeoisie as well as by the forces of absolutism, and a coalition between such a grouping and older political and social elites—a progressive coalition—may thereafter serve as a nation's constituency for bureaucratic autonomy. Parties will eschew patronage strategies in political systems where such a coalition emerges prior to the mobilization of a mass electorate. Great Britain was the first country where this occurred, and thus I will illustrate this proposition by discussing the British case.

The Emergence of a Progressive Coalition

For reasons that need not be discussed here, a centralized bureaucratic state, headed by an absolute monarch and supported by a class of officials drawn from the aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie, was not established in England in the seventeenth century as it was in many nations on the continent. The English Civil War prevented such a development and confirmed that public administration would remain decentralized in Great Britain in the era prior to the extension of the franchise. The major offices of domestic administration—most importantly, the justices of the peace—and the major programs of domestic policy—the maintenance of public order, the administration of local justice, and poor relief—were controlled by local gentry and their dependents. Those public functions administered centrally were controlled by a parliament that itself was a "committee of landlords." And appointments to these administrative positions were made in a manner calculated to cement the parliamentary majority of the incumbent ministry: the eighteenth century was the classic era of patronage in British politics. The governing classes of England, then, were not tied to a bureaucratic regime. In the absence of any such constituency for bureaucratic autonomy, party politics, or at least the politics of parliamentary parties, was patronage ridden.

65. This is not true of extraparliamentary groupings such as the Yorkshire Association in the late eighteenth century or the Chartists in the early nineteenth. These formations were the prototypes of what I have termed "externally mobilized parties." On the former, see Ian R. Christie, "The Yorkshire Association, 1780-4: A Study in Political Organization," The Historical Journal 3 (1960): 144-61. On the latter, see Asa Briggs, Chartist Studies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959).
The leadership in the fight against the patronage system was assumed by elements of Britain's professional upper middle classes, by a group that can appropriately be labeled a "rationalizing bourgeoisie." Those who sought to reform the home civil service by ending patronage appointments and by introducing competitive examinations were part of a more general movement to rationalize and renovate the major public and quasi-public institutions in Britain—the universities, secondary schools, the administration of India, municipal administration, the system of poor relief, and so on. Within this broader group, however, one can distinguish two subgroups. The first of these was oriented toward the concerns of the older, more established segment of Britain's middle classes. They sought to rationalize the nation's traditional institutions—the ancient universities, the elite secondary schools, the imperial administration—so that these institutions would be more attuned to the interests of England's liberally educated professional elite. Part and parcel of this effort was the proposal, embodied in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854, that admission into the highest grade of the civil service be determined by an examination geared to a literary education such as could be obtained only at Oxford and Cambridge. This proposal would have limited access to upper-level positions in the civil service to the classes that sent their sons to these two universities, namely the aristocracy, the gentry, and established members of the liberal professions.

The second group of reformers was oriented more toward the concerns of the emerging entrepreneurial class. They attempted to rationalize the way in which the government dealt with the industrial sector of society. In particular, the leaders of this second stream pressed the government to assume the burdens of establishing the social preconditions for industrialization and of dealing with the externalities of industrialization. Men such as Edwin Chadwick, Horace Mann, and John Stuart Mill sought to socialize the costs both of educating, disciplining, and maintaining the health of the industrial labor force and of dealing with the "human exhaust of capitalism," the poor, the criminal, the dispossessed.

This second group of reformers, like the first, sought to change the way in which civil servants were recruited, but since the goals they sought to accomplish differed, their proposals differed accordingly. Edwin Chadwick, John Stuart Mill, and the Administrative

Reform Association (which was organized by a group of businessmen) proposed that civil-service examinations be instituted that would favor individuals who possessed technical skills, not those who were liberally educated. An examination system of this character they argued would increase the technical proficiency of government agencies, and it would loosen the grip of the upper classes upon the civil service, a grip that the Trevelyan-Northcote proposals would tighten.

The Trevelyan-Northcote proposals of 1854 were defeated because they failed to win the support of the entrepreneurial classes and the aristocracy. When a plan was fashioned in 1870 that was backed by these two classes, civil-service reform was adopted with absolutely no controversy. The 1870 reform plan divided the civil service into three grades—administrative, executive, and clerical. Examinations for the administrative class were to be keyed to a liberal education, while examination for the executive class were to be keyed to an "English education," that is, an education in the English language and in modern subjects, as opposed to one in ancient languages and classical texts. In other words, the 1870 program embodied the proposals both of the reformers who were oriented toward the established professional class and those who were oriented toward the entrepreneurial class, and consequently both segments of the bourgeoisie could unite behind it. As for the landed classes, their support for civil-service reform in 1870 can be attributed to the suffrage extension of 1867. Once the franchise had been extended to householders and rent payers, the aristocracy and gentry no longer could assume that the patronage system would continue to provide them with preferential access to the civil service; its tendency, rather, would be to open public employment to the most numerous class of voters, to democratize the civil service. The reform of 1870, however, by restricting appointments in the administrative class to those with a liberal education, would preserve the preferential access to the higher civil service traditionally enjoyed by the landed classes, for they could afford to give their sons such an impractical education.

To be sure, an examination system for entry into higher civil service would exclude the indolent, and it would reward only those members of the aristocracy who had acquired habits of concentrated work and who had attached themselves to the service ideal. But under the prodding of schoolmasters such as Thomas Arnold and Oxbridge dons such as Benjamin Jowett, the British aristocracy in the nineteenth century did make these adjustments to bourgeois values and

did adopt the ideology of service, an ideology that justified their retaining their privileges and power in the industrial era.\textsuperscript{70} These concessions staved off far greater losses.

The Party Response: The Conservatives

Patronage in the civil service finally was restricted in Britain, then, and a system of competitive examinations was instituted, when a reform plan was fashioned that could be supported by the landed and entrepreneurial classes as well as by professional elites. As such a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy emerged, the parties that depended upon the support of these classes were compelled to adjust their behavior accordingly. This adjustment was bound up with the response of these parties to the suffrage extensions and kindred reforms\textsuperscript{71} that occurred at the same time—a conjunction of events that, as I have already suggested, was not in the least coincidental. The major parties in Britain did not adjust to these reforms without internal conflicts and difficulties. But they responded far more smoothly, and far more completely, than has been the case in nations where a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy only coalesced after the masses had been fully mobilized into the political system. In the paragraphs below I will provide evidence for my argument by discussing the case of the Conservative party.

As late as 1868, the Conservatives in most constituencies did not command a party apparatus that had an existence apart from the patron-client chains that linked Tory squires to their tenants and dependents.\textsuperscript{72} Elections in the countryside were managed by landlords, and in the borough constituencies they were run by those figures from the underside of Victorian politics: wire-pullers, publicans, official treaters, paid messengers. The central affairs of the party were administered by the whips—the chief whip was simultaneously patronage secretary of the Treasury—and by a principal agent, who was the party leader's personal attorney, and who was happy to involve himself in party business because it brought a large number of lucrative election cases to his law firm. The principal agent and the whips got candidates who were looking for constituencies and constituencies that were looking for candidates in contact with one another;

\textsuperscript{70} I owe this insight to a discussion with Martin Bernal.


\textsuperscript{72} James Comford, "The Transformation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century," Victorian Studies 7 (September 1963): 41 f.
they raised money from the party's *grands seigneurs* and funneled it into constituencies; and they distributed patronage, both civil and ecclesiastical, to the party's supporters.\textsuperscript{73}

A movement to create a different kind of party organization was initiated in the late 1860s and early 1870s and is closely associated with the career of John E. Gorst.\textsuperscript{74} Gorst chaired the meeting in 1868 that established the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, an organization whose founders recognized that the future of Conservatism lay in mass party organization. In 1870 Gorst was appointed principal agent of the Conservative party by Disraeli, and he immediately set about to accomplish this goal by contacting prominent Conservatives in each constituency and encouraging them to organize a Conservative committee and to select local candidates. This nascent mass party organization ran the Conservative campaign in the election of 1874 and in large measure was responsible for the Conservative victory that year.

After the 1974 victory, however, serious tensions arose between the leaders and cadres associated with this new party apparatus, on one hand, and the party's Old Guard, those elements of the party whom Gorst termed "the old identity," on the other hand.\textsuperscript{75} Gorst complained that once the party got into office, the leaders of the "old identity," the whips, undermined the new structure by intervening in local constituencies apart from the network of Conservative committees and associations whose creation Gorst had supported: the whips backed candidates without consulting the local Conservative leadership; they distributed patronage to their local friends and allies; they financed corrupt electoral practices. This demoralized the cadres who had been attracted into party work in the early 1870s, and the structure Gorst had built up began to crumble. Gorst complained bitterly to Disraeli that the practice of "managing elections at the Treasury" would be fatal to the party, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{76} He resigned as principal agent in 1877.

Unable to reform traditional party practices from within, Gorst joined an attack upon them from without.\textsuperscript{77} In the late 1870s the aggrieved party cadres began voicing their complaints at the annual meetings of the National Union. The conflicts between the proponents


\textsuperscript{75} Comford, "Transformation," p. 49.


\textsuperscript{77} Comford, "Transformation," p. 44.
of the new and the old styles of party politics reached its peak after the Conservatives were defeated in the election of 1880. Lord Randolph Churchill and his allies in the so-called Fourth party—one of whom was Gorst—took up the complaints of the dissidents, gained control of the National Union, and attempted to use it as a springboard for vaulting Churchill into the leadership of the party. The Fourth party episode ended in a compromise, "a sudden reconciliation which," according to E. J. Feuchtwanger, "never has been quite satisfactorily explained." In a broader perspective, however, this reconciliation is not difficult to understand: it was but another episode in the establishment of a modus vivendi between Britain's landed and urban upper classes—an earlier episode of which was the civil-service reform of 1870—another step toward the formation of a coalition that it was very much in the interests of each side to enter.

The top leaders of the Conservative party, Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote, were compelled by the Conservative defeat in the election of 1880 to recognize that they could not afford to alienate the opponents of the patronage system within the party. These opponents—chiefly, but not entirely, drawn from the provincial bourgeoisie—for their own reasons were extremely anxious to come to terms with the groups that comprised the traditional base of the Conservative party. As James Comford notes, the major reason why the cadres of the provincial Conservative and Constitutional associations were willing to undertake the burdens of party work was that it gave them the opportunity to interact with the Tory aristocracy and gentry as collaborators in a common endeavor. That incentive would only continue to be available if the two sides could come to terms with one another.

In the course of the 1880s an accommodation was hammered out with which both sides could live. The traditional governing classes maintained their privileged access to the cabinet. Moreover, as both R. T. McKenzie and Samuel Beer stress, control over public policy continued to be vested in the government and the parliamentary party: in the realm of public policy-making, conservative governments do not profess to listen to the constituency party.

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On the other side, a uniform network of Conservative associations was extended throughout the country, the control of these associations over the conduct of elections was acknowledged, and the executive committee of the National Union was reorganized so that it could serve as the spokesmen for the cadres who manned these associations in the inner councils of the party. The Corrupt Practices Act 1883 outlawed many of the traditional techniques the whips had employed to influence local elections, and the Reform Act of 1884 reapportioned the shires and boroughs in which yet older forms of electoral control were practiced. Most relevant of all to us here, in the 1880s the Conservatives came increasingly to respect the autonomy and integrity of the civil service. Harold Hanham reports that in the 1870s virtually all high level appointments that Disraeli made in the Treasury were handed out as partisan rewards; by contrast appointments to these positions were granted in two-thirds of all cases as promotions to civil servants from within the Treasury by both Conservative and Liberal governments in the 1880s. As the political costs of violating the autonomy of the bureaucracy increased, both of Britain’s major parties turned increasingly instead to the distribution of honorific positions, especially positions as magistrates, to their major local supporters. In the 1880s the Conservatives began to grant titles of nobility to merchants and manufacturers who made substantial contributions to the central party fund or who played major roles in the Conservative party organization, a practice that quite literally led to the fusion of Britain’s aristocracy and bourgeoisie. By these means the Conservatives could reward party luminaries without meddling in the allocation of civil-service positions and thereby alienating the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy upon whose support the party was becoming increasingly dependent.

This set of accommodations proved to be remarkably stable. The pattern of party organization established by the Conservatives in 1885 has endured, as McKenzie notes, down to the present day. After a discrete and conflict-ridden transitional period, then,
the Conservative party in Great Britain abandoned the practice of patronage politics. The constituency for bureaucratic autonomy within the party was able to prevail, and older practices were abandoned leaving surprisingly few residues, because it was supported by a large popular following. One strongly suspects that had universal suffrage been adopted in England prior to the formation of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy the outcome of the struggle between the practitioners and opponents of patronage politics would have been quite different. In that event Britain would have recapitulated the experience of the United States during the Jacksonian Era. The wire-pullers within the Conservative party would then have been free to use patronage to acquire a genuinely mass following and their bargaining power vis-à-vis Salisbury and Northcote would have been as great as the leverage of the Fourth party and the National Union proved to be.

The imaginative exercise, however, requires one to introduce so many counterfactual assumptions that it is not fruitful to pursue it further. In order to understand the conditions that enable patronage to survive into the contemporary period, it is more useful to analyze a case where the creation of a mass electorate did antedate the formation of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy. Italy is such a case.

ITALY

The "Blocco Storico"

Neither a progressive nor an absolutist coalition assumed control of the newly unified nation of Italy during the predemocratic era. It is not difficult to account for the absence of the former. Italy was simply too backward economically to follow the British path during the nineteenth century. It requires a somewhat lengthier explanation to account for the failure of Italy to follow the German precedent. On the surface, at least, there were some striking similarities between the Italy and Germany of, say, 1850. Both nations were politically fragmented; in both nations there was one state (Prussia in the case of Germany, Piedmont in the case of Italy) in which centralized bureaucratic institutions had taken root in the early modern period; and in both cases the process of unification involved the extension of that state's institutions over the rest of the nation. There were, however, some crucial differences between the two cases. In Germany prior to unification the region that was economically and socially most backward (East Elbia) was governed by the state whose institutions were extended over the newly unified nation. This meant, as I have argued above, that the most important segment
of Germany's landed classes had been integrated into, and had acquired a stake in the integrity of, the nation's administrative apparatus. In Italy the region that in the midnineteenth century was economically and socially most backward (the Mezzogiorno) was governed not by the state that led the drive for unification, but rather by a regime (the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) that was destroyed in the process. For this reason the landed classes of the south (which in the 1860s included members of the middle class who had seized land from the aristocracy, the Church, and the peasantry) had no stake in the integrity of the bureaucracy that now governed them.

There was a second and related difference between the German and Italian cases. The forces of Prussian absolutism had to make very few concessions in order to absorb the other German states into the empire and to control the newly unified state thereafter. Under the constitution of the empire, Prussia dominated the upper house of the imperial legislature, the king of Prussia became the emperor of Germany, and the chancellor, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy were responsible to the emperor rather than the Reichstag. In this way the forces of Prussian absolutism were able to maintain their control over the entire executive apparatus. In order to build a majority in the Reichstag, one of the few major concessions Bismarck and his successors as chancellor had to make was to approve a tariff on industrial goods. This concession won them the support of the Rhenish industrialists and cemented the famous "coalition of iron and rye." The forces of Piedmontese absolutism, by contrast, lost control of the government and bureaucracy of the new state fifteen years after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy.

Nonetheless the interests of northern elites were more than adequately served by the new regime, and a strong basis existed for a coalition between them and the gentry of the south—the coalition Antonio Gramsci termed the blocco storico. What these elites wanted above all was to defend themselves against their Republican opponents and to control the new nation's economic policies. The southern gentry sought protection for their landholdings against the threat of peasant insurrection, and in light of the depressed state of the southern economy, they also welcomed any employment opportunities the new regime could provide. The "programs" of the

northern and southern elites were fully compatible, and served as the basis for the alliance between them. The central government policed the south, putting down "brigandage" and "banditry," and it provided the gentry, who dominated southern representation in the legislature, with patronage, which they could use to maintain their control over their inferiors. In return for this assistance the southern gentry rallied to the government, and its deputies supported ministries whose commercial, financial, and industrial policies were oriented chiefly to the interests of northern capital. This logrolling arrangement underlay and was implemented through the practice of trasformismo, the process by which deputies who were elected as opponents of the government were "transformed" into its allies once they were granted patronage. The institution of trasformismo was perfected by the Liberal government of Depretis, which came to power in 1876 and was kept in office with the votes of southern deputies. Upon assuming office, Depretis removed those prefects whose loyalty he could not count upon and replaced them with individuals whom he could trust to use their power to sustain the government. The techniques perfected by Depretis were used by the governments that ruled Italy for the next forty years.90

Party and Patronage: The Christian Democrats

A constituency for bureaucratic autonomy did not emerge in Italy, then, prior to the democratic era; to the contrary, the nation was governed by a coalition—the blocco storico—that depended upon patronage in order to hold itself together. This coalition has remained the dominant political configuration in Italy to the present day, and terms of trade outlined above have remained the fundamental basis of accommodation between the two major partners in this coalition.91 This is not to say, however, that the present-day structure of Italian politics is identical to what it was in the era of Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti. With the introduction of universal suffrage in 1913 and with the removal by the Church of its ban upon the participation of Catholics in Italian politics, two new actors have moved onto the political stage: the working classes, organized chiefly through the Socialist and then the Communist parties, and the Catholics, organized chiefly through the Popular party and then the Christian Democrats. Italy's older political classes attempted initially to exclude these new actors from effective power; the ultimate consequence

90. Mack Smith, Italy, chap. 15.
of this endeavor was Fascism. After the collapse of Fascism, however, Italy’s landed and industrial elites found it necessary to throw their support behind the Church and to work through the Christian Democratic party in order to continue to exclude from power the groups that constituted the greater threat to their hegemony. The fears of northern industrialists and southern landowners in the troubled years of the 1940s, then, were the same as the fears of their predecessors in the troubled years of the 1860s—revolution in the north and peasant insurrection in the south.

The solutions adopted in the 1860s and 1940s were fundamentally similar—an alliance among the upper and middle classes of the two regions. Although the DC in this sense served the same function for these classes as did the parties of the Liberal era, it was more than simply one of these old parties in new dress, more than simply the Sinistra in a cassock and clerical collar. La Democrazia Christiana, after all, was the successor to Don Luigi Sturzo’s progressive Partito Popolare; it was allied with the Catholic trade-union movement in the north and it supported land reform in the south; and if it were to govern a nation whose electorate now exceeded twenty-five million, and do so without the votes of deputies from the working-class parties, it would need to establish a broad base of popular support.

To acquire such support the DC mobilizes its constituency not through the old clientele structure but rather through an extensive network of party sections and affiliated organizations—a youth movement, a women’s movement, an organization of farmers, and a trade union federation. Although the mechanism through which the DC appeals to its supporters is that of a modern mass party, the substance of its appeal, at least in the south, is the traditional one of Italian politics. The DC has taken advantage of its control over the bureaucracy to place hordes of well-paid ushers and janitors on the public payroll. It provides subsidies to marginal businesses, to firms that could not survive in the absence of state support and whose owners and owners and

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92. With the signing of the Lateran Pacts in 1929, of course, Mussolini reached an accommodation with the Church. This presaged and made possible the political configuration that was to emerge after World War II. See Richard A. Webster, The Cross and the Fasces (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), chap. 7.


95. Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), chap. 5.

employees therefore become dependent upon the party for their continued prosperity and employment. Christian Democratic deputies and party functionaries, rather than lawyers and landowners, now write letters of recommendation on behalf of candidates for admission to state schools. Sidney Tarrow summarizes this development by speaking of a movement from "clientelismo of the notable to clientelismo of the bureaucracy" and "from vertical to horizontal clienteles." 

But how was this development possible? Why did the northern industrialists, who through the Confindustria financed the DC in the postwar period, tolerate the patronage, the corruption, the governmental inefficiency that was implicit in this method of operation? A possible answer to these questions is suggested by P. A. Allum. Allum notes that the Italian economic miracle of the postwar era was grounded upon two things: the ability of Italian industry to pay low wages in the period before 1963 and the monetary and credit policies embodied in the "Einaudi line." Neither of these policies demanded much in the way of efficiency or effectiveness from the bureaucracy or were adversely affected by the patronage practices of the DC. The exclusion of the working-class parties from the government was a requisite for the first of these, and this was accomplished in 1948, partly in response to American pressure. The monetary and credit policies of Einaudi were administered through the Bank of Italy, an august institution outside the pale of the DC's patronage.

During the fifteen-year period following the second World War, then, the industrialists who were allied with the DC and who might have been expected to object strongly to the party's patronage practices and to have fought for administrative reforms and greater governmental efficiency—who might have been expected, in other words, to lead a progressive coalition—did not have a strong incentive to do so. For this reason the DC was able to develop along the lines indicated above without fear of alienating this important set of allies. In the early 1960s, however, this state of affairs began to change. The extraordinary rate of economic growth that Italy had enjoyed as a result of the government's monetary policies and industry's ability to pay low wages slowed considerably by 1963. Labor became more restive and less compliant than it had been previously, and the leaders of Italy's largest firms, who could afford to do so, were

97. Pizzorno, "I ceti medi nel meccanismi del consenso."
100. Ibid., pp. 29-32.
prepared to make economic concessions and to press for governmental reforms. Increasingly, the incompetence of Italy's patronage-ridden bureaucracy, and the cost of sustaining that huge bureaucracy, has come to be regarded as a major source of the "Italian crisis" and its reform has come to be regarded as a prerequisite for pulling the nation out of that crisis.  

By the time these tendencies began to manifest themselves, however, the constituency for patronage within the DC had become sufficiently powerful to block any would-be reformers. The very freedom the party enjoyed in the postwar period to use patronage to mobilize popular support enabled the practitioners of patronage politics within the party to build a mass base for themselves. For this reason, Raphael Zariski notes, the DC has become the more factionalized the longer it has remained in office.  

And the patronage-oriented factions within the party are not prepared to see reforms implemented that would deprive them of the fruits of power. As Sidney Tarrow observes, "because state agencies have been used by party and factional groupings to service their electorates, no government has been able to undertake a reform of the state without threatening their political livelihood." Were a DC government to propose reforms that alienated this constituency for patronage it would risk splitting the party and losing much of its mass base.  

The success of the DC's constituency for patronage contrasts markedly with the failure, described above, of its counterpart within the British Conservative party. In order to find parallels to the DC one must, rather, turn to other parties that mobilized and organized an extensive popular following before the opponents of the patronage system coalesced. The American party system provides many parallel cases, and the factional struggles within the Christian Democratic party resemble in substance and outcome nothing so much as the conflicts between regular and reform factions within the Democratic parties of Illinois or New York.  

CONCLUSION  

By way of conclusion I will very briefly discuss two cases, France and the United States, which would appear to stand as counterexamples to the argument presented in this article, and I will suggest

101. Luigi Graziano, "Clientelism and the Political System: The Sources of the Italian Crisis" (mimeo, 1975), pp. 5-7 and sources cited therein.  
how their deviations from the patterns outlined above can be explained.

Over the course of the past two centuries France appears to have deviated in both possible directions from the patterns outlined above. An absolutist coalition emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, well before the creation of a mass electorate, and yet patronage came to play a major role in the parliamentary and party politics of France during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.\textsuperscript{104} Another change of direction occurred after the Second World War. Patronage played a less prominent role in the political life of the Fourth Republic than it had in the Third, and it has moved yet further into the background in the Fifth Republic.\textsuperscript{105} As for the United States, the creation of a mass electorate in the Jacksonian period preceded by half a century the emergence of America's constituency for bureaucratic autonomy during the Progressive era, and yet the Progressives triumphed and managed to put an end to the practice of patronage politics in many states and cities in the United States. How can these cases be reconciled with the argument spelled out above?

In arguing that internally mobilized parties will avoid the use of patronage in nations where either an absolutist or a progressive coalition emerged prior to the mobilization of the masses into politics, and that such parties will be patronage oriented where the mobilization of the masses into politics antedated the formation of either one of these coalitions, I do not mean to suggest that the order in which these two events occurs utterly predetermines the subsequent character of a nation's party politics. My claim, rather, is more modest: the relative timing of these two developments weights the dice toward one outcome or the other. The "expected" outcome can be reversed, but any effort to reverse it engenders a crisis of the regime and requires the total reorientation of the nation's politics—perhaps even a revolution—to succeed. If and when such a crisis occurs, the challengers to the old order and the defenders of that order mobilize their forces and the outcome of the struggle depends upon the breadth of the popular support and the character of the institutional backing enjoyed by each side. Germany, as I argued at some length above, experienced a number of such crises—for example, in 1848 and 1918—but the forces of absolutism were able to prevail


\textsuperscript{105} See Sidney Tarrow, \textit{Integration at the Periphery: Grassroots Politics in Italy and France} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), for a striking picture of differences between present-day France and Italy on this score.
in each instance. In France and the United States the challengers to the pre-existing regime fared somewhat better.

France

It should be noted, however, that it required a series of revolutions and the toppling of a succession of regimes—three monarchies, two empires, and four republics—to bring about the changes in France mentioned above, and even then it is possible to see the residues of Bourbon absolutism in the France of today. The Revolution of 1789 neither destroyed the centralized state that Louis XIV created, as Tocqueville long ago argued, nor did it dislodge the forces of absolutism from positions in that structure, as the career of the most prominent representative of those forces, Tallyrand, illustrates; Napoleon, rather, built upon the foundations laid by the Bourbons.106 It was only after the Revolution of 1830 that the old families of the noblesse de robe were driven from the prefectural corps,107 but even the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the rise and fall of the Second Empire, and the creation of the Third Republic together were not sufficient to destroy the absolutist coalition or to drive its members entirely from the citadels of power in France. As Theodore Zeldin notes in his study of politics in the Third Republic, Republican parliamentary politicians did indeed regard themselves as opponents of the state and of the classes who were identified with it, and these politicians used the institutions of the Republic, namely, the Chamber of Deputies, to gain control over and to colonize those governmental agencies (Interior, Ponts et Chaussées, Education, or more generally, the field administration of the state) that most closely concerned the classes they represented, the provincial middle classes.108

Republican ministerial politicians—that small group (e. g., Sarraut, Briand, Freycinet) that monopolized cabinet positions in the Republic—however, found the overhead agencies of the central administration (especially the Conseil d'État and the Inspection des Finances) so useful for assuring their control over the regime that they did not undermine them.109 There was a tacit arrangement between the government and the old forces of absolutism to exclude parliamentary politicians from influence over these agencies, as well as over the foreign, colonial, and military services, and recruitment into them was

restricted to young men who had passed through the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques.\textsuperscript{110} This institution and these departments remained the preserve of the absolutist coalition and were hotbeds of anti-Republican sentiment, as the events of 1940 were to demonstrate. In other words, under the Third Republic the state in France was divided along functional lines, and each half was grounded upon a different social base. The patronage system of the Third Republic fed upon that half of the state from which the absolutist coalition had been driven by the revolutions of the nineteenth century.

With the creation of the Fourth Republic the defenders of bureaucratic autonomy were able to erect a more extensive barrier between the bureaucracy and party politicians than had existed under the Third Republic by entering into an alliance with lower level officials—an arrangement negotiated by Michel Debre and Maurice Thorez!\textsuperscript{111} As the base of support for a politically autonomous bureaucracy was extended in this way, party politicians in the Fourth Republic found it more difficult to acquire patronage than had their counterparts in the Third Republic. And the weakening of parliament in the Fifth Republic has made it more difficult for them still.

I recount this history in order to underline two points. First, I would call attention to the severity of the political disruptions that were required to bring about changes in the role that patronage played in French politics and the magnitude of the realignments in the entire structure of national politics that these changes entailed. Second, I would note that despite this succession of revolutions and changes of regime, the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy that coalesced in the predemocratic era in France was able at all times to retain at least a foothold in the state administration and to emerge triumphant again in the contemporary period after it broadened its base of support.

The United States

If in France under the Third Republic the state was divided along functional lines between a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy and a constituency for patronage, in the United States in the twentieth century it has been divided along geographic lines: the practitioners of patronage politics have been able to hold their own in most states to the east of the Mississippi and their opponents have had the upper hand in most states to the west. The situation in the eastern

\textsuperscript{111} Suleiman, Bureaucracy in France, p. 46 f.
states accords with the predictions of the theory outlined above: the enactment of white manhood suffrage in the United States antedated the formation of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy (the former occurred in the Age of Jackson, the latter in the Progressive era); the major parties in the United States thus were free to use patronage when they undertook to mobilize mass support; consequently, the forces that had a stake in the patronage system enjoyed broad popular backing; and thus these forces were able to offer substantial resistance to the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy that coalesced under the banner of progressivism in the early decades of the twentieth century. By contrast, the opponents of the patronage system enjoyed considerable success in the western states, and this appears to contradict the theory outlined above.

This variation in the character of present-day party politics among the major regions of the United States can, however, be explained in terms consistent with the analysis offered in this essay. The sources of this difference does not lie in the social composition of the electorate, as Raymond Wolfinger has argued. Nor does it lie in differences in the social composition of the forces that led the attack upon the patronage system. The leadership of America's constituency for bureaucratic autonomy is drawn from roughly similar groups in all regions of the nation—from the professional upper-middle classes and from those elements of the local notability and business community that do not enjoy privileged access to the locally dominant party—and it resembles in broad outline the social composition of the progressive coalition in Great Britain—if one considers the descendants of the New England patriciate to be the American equivalent of the English aristocracy. The source of this variation lies, rather, along the other dimension I have emphasized: the extent to which party politicians had mobilized a broad popular base prior to the emergence of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy.

Party organizations in all regions of the United States in the nineteenth century were patronage oriented, but in the states of America's

112. Wolfinger, "Political Machines."
114. To be sure, the political cliques that dominated southern politics prior to the Progressive era were even more narrowly based than their counterparts in the western states, and yet patronage still plays a significant role in state politics in the South. The survival of patronage in the South is to be explained more by the weakness of progressivism in that overwhelmingly rural region than by the breadth of support enjoyed by their opponents. In the urban enclaves of the South progressivism was quite successful. See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 388 ff.
“periphery” these organizations were less tightly organized and less broadly based than the political machines that governed the older states of the northeastern “metropole”: the politicians who were the agents of “foreign corporations” (most commonly railroads) in the “colonial” regions of the United States, by virtue of the vast magnitude of the resources at their disposal relative to those possessed by other political actors, were able to dominate state politics without mobilizing widespread popular support. William Herren’s Southern Pacific machine in California, for example, was not a mass party in the same sense as was the Democratic machine in New York.\(^\text{115}\) The Progressives in the western states, I would hypothesize, were able to ride to power by winning support among the voters who had not been mobilized by the pre-existing party system. What I am suggesting, in other words, is that although manhood suffrage existed throughout the United States at the time the forces of progressivism coalesced, the electorate in the peripheral regions of the United States had not been fully mobilized by a well organized mass party, and consequently the constituency for patronage in these states was not so broadly based as it was in the states of the Northeast. This can explain why the Progressives in the West were able quite convincingly to picture themselves as spokesmen for “the people” against “the interests,” whereas in the East the electorate was more inclined to regard reform as the cause of a narrow elite and to view machine politicians as representatives of the popular cause.\(^\text{116}\) An analysis of these conflicts, however, and a more detailed comparison of the American and European cases is beyond the scope of this article.


\(^{116}\) Glazer and Moynihan phrase it this way:

The Catholic ascendary in New York had been based first on numbers, but second on a reasonably well grounded assumption that they normally, as Democrats, would best look after the interests of ordinary people, and would be especially concerned with the least well off, being themselves only recently emerged from that condition. The Protestant elite of the city had always challenged that assumption, asserting instead that the Tammany bosses were boodlers, pure and simple, or in a slightly different formulation such as that of Lincoln Steffens, were merely paid lackeys of the really Big Boodlers. Either way the charge was that they did not truly represent the people as they claimed to do. In three elections out of four the masses would choose to believe Charlie Murphy’s version rather than that of the New York Times. [Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. lxiii]