ther, the author ignores the basic question of costs and fails to ask if such indigenous production is efficient. But perhaps such comments are too "neoconventional"?

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This study may well become a landmark in comparative political research, since it constitutes an exemplary fusion of careful theory building and rigorous methodology in the service of theory testing. The work builds on Verba and Nie's Political Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) which observed that despite the lifting of legal barriers to participation, the composition of the participant population was not representative of the U.S. population-at-large. Having noted in the concluding chapters of their earlier study that a similar phenomenon characterized India and Yugoslavia but not other democracies, the authors again ask: "Why should there be this variation in the relation between status and activity? And why should three nations as different as the United States, India, and Yugoslavia appear so similar in this respect" (p. 18)?

The current volume seeks to answer this question. To do so, the authors and cooperating teams of foreign researchers collected by means of sample surveys—over a ten-year period—data on participation in seven nations where universal suffrage prevailed. The sample nations are Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United States, and Yugoslavia—all of which were designated as "democracies."

The answer to the question—formulated first as a hypothesis—is that "an individual-based process of political mobilization in which citizens convert individual resources based on income and education into political activity would lead to a uniformly strong relationship between our socioeconomic resources scale and political activity across nations were it not for the differential intervening effect of group-based processes in the various nations" (p. 64).

Testing this hypothesis is what the book is all about. After a very perceptive and clearly written chapter on comparative methodology (making a valiant case for hypothesis testing under conditions of maximum difference), the authors proceed to develop the theory from which the above hypothesis is derived. They go about this in much the same way as they did in 1972, initially sketching a very general, simplified model and carefully refining it by the gradual addition of other variables. This way they come to gain a firm grip on their understanding of the ways in which individuals convert or fail to convert their own resources into political activity.

What they find is that all other things being equal, individuals with more socioeconomic resources are more active and better able to convert these resources into political ones. All other things, however, are not always equal. Political institutions, especially parties, can dilute (as well as add to) the impact of these resources. Where parties manage to at-
tract individuals from the lower ranks of the status hierarchy and to wield them into a cohesive unit, such individuals can compensate for their lower personal resources; but where parties attract mainly those from the upper strata, the less resourceful citizens are doubly penalized. Parties, voluntary organizations, and other affiliations thus can serve as equalizers. This seems to be the case in nations where there are strong parties that differ significantly from each other in the composition of their memberships; Austria, for example, fits this model well with its strongly blue-collar-based Socialist party and its rural and business-dominated conservative party. Here workers and farmers participate more than one would anticipate on the basis of social status alone. The parties' ability to mobilize the less well endowed, however, does not cut uniformly across all modes of participation but is mainly effective in the realm of voting. Where institutions play a particularly important role, the unaffiliated tend to become "locked out" irrespective of their individual resources.

Perhaps the most interesting and ingenious part of the stratification analysis is the documentation that within parties of this type inequalities nonetheless persist. Even in parties based on lower-strata membership, those with more socioeconomic resources tend to dominate, be it in participation or in leadership. Equalization of resources apparently goes just so far. This observation applies to parties of the Right as well as the Left and thus "both contribute equally to the dissolution of the relationship between SERL [socioeconomic resources] and voting" (p. 152).

One of the most innovative chapters concerns the impact of parties and organizations that are based on cleavages other than the customary class cleavage. The authors show that "If particular social groups are in an unambiguous cleavage position and are well institutionalized, they ought to overparticipate—that is, participate more than one would predict on the basis of individual resources or motivation of their members. They will do so because of group-specific motivation and institutional mobilization" (p. 169).

The chapter on women demonstrates that, with the exception of the United States, women have not succeeded in converting resources into participation. Could it perhaps be because they lack the "unambiguous cleavage position" that could serve as the foundation for a strong organization? The authors do not check this possibility but instead test two competing hypotheses with somewhat inconclusive results.

As with any pioneering work, Participation and Political Equality is not free of shortcomings and flaws. One of these surely must be the modes of participation singled out for investigation (voting, campaigning, communal activities, and particularized contacting). Here, as in their earlier volume, the authors deliberately exclude what they call activities "outside of the system," such as demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of legal behavior that have come into increasingly wide use in the last decade or two and now are part of the standard participation repertoire. Nor have they made adequate provisions for individual and group lobbying activities on a national scale. Many of the consumer, environmental, as well as business, labor, and religious "contacting" acts cannot be accommodated under their category "community contacting." It may well be that in some nations the unaffiliated are "locked out" from voting and campaigning, but what if they channel their superior resources into attempts to affect policy decisions? Admittedly, formulating questions about such endeavors which could be utilized in seven so diverse nations might pose problems but so does ignoring alternate modes.
Another drawback is the sample itself. True, a maximum-difference design is the most challenging. In this instance, however, it required dropping two nations (Nigeria and Yugoslavia) from many of the major analyses. This perfectly understandable strategy does raise some questions about the generalizability of the model. And even in instances where the full complement of nations is examined, some doubts remain unresolved. For example, in Yugoslavia we notice a strong relationship between SERL and participation. In that nation, however, party membership frequently is the necessary precondition for obtaining these very resources (such as education). Is it really comparable to the U.S. pattern if such resource-rich individuals predominate in party affairs? Unless we are certain that the same modes really have the same significance for participants across the nations, we can never completely dismiss the suspicion that we might be comparing the proverbial apples and oranges.

One reason why it is so difficult to make that determination has to do with the research design. Although no copy of the complete interview schedule can be found in the Appendix, the items reproduced in it suggest that most of the questions were highly structured and of the closed-ended variety. Apparently this was the most practical (if not actually the only feasible) research strategy, but it does not offer us the insight into the meaning and significance of some behaviors that a less structured format would have offered. Other shortcomings are of the type against which investigators in the field frequently are unable to protect themselves, such as the revolution in Nigeria, or inability to get access to certain regions of the country (India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia). Each can potentially detract from the findings, but the authors were probably right in deciding to keep these nations in the sample.

Far more important than the shortcomings is the contribution the authors have made with their novel way of explaining the persistence of inequality in political systems that are “in principle equalitarian” (p. 1). While it undoubtedly is not and will not be the last, definitive explanation, it has broadened our understanding of participation much as *The Civic Culture* did in its day.

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The publication of John V. Granger's book could not have been more timely: important events in 1979 included a United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, which capped a three-year effort to create programs for harnessing science and technology to promote Third World development; the debate on ratification of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); and the third intergovernmental conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which continued its efforts to secure agreement on an international code of conduct to govern technology transfer.

The purpose of Mr. Granger's book is to show how these types of international issues