

# Punishment and Politicization in the International Human Rights Regime

## Supplementary Materials

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# 1 Action/Severity Codes

UPR Info hand-labeled each recommendation with an *Action* code based on the first verb and the overall action contained in the recommendation. The categories are as follows:

1. Recommendation directed at non-SuR states, or calling upon the SuR to request technical assistance or to share information (Example of verbs: call on, seek, share).
2. Recommendation emphasizing continuity (Example of verbs: continue, maintain, persevere, persist, pursue).
3. Recommendation to consider change (Example of verbs: analyze, consider, envisage, envision, examine, explore, reflect upon, revise, review, study).
4. Recommendation of action that contains a general element (Example of verbs: accelerate, address, encourage, engage with, ensure, guarantee, intensify, promote, speed up, strengthen, take action, take measures or steps towards).
5. Recommendation of specific action (Example of verbs: conduct, develop, eliminate, establish, investigate, undertake; as well as legal verbs: abolish, accede, adopt, amend, implement, enforce, ratify).

We recoded this variable as an ordinal measure that ranks from 1 (minimal action and most likely accepted) to 3 (most specific and least likely to be accepted) and renamed it *Severity*, as follows:

Table A1: Action and Severity Codes

Action Code	N	Percent Accepted	Severity Code
1	662	95.92	1
2	9191	95.42	1
3	4516	56.91	3
4	22549	84.63	2
5	20769	54.27	3

## 2 Issue Codes

Table A2: Issue Codes and Frequency

Asylum-seekers - refugees	1047	International humanitarian law	712
Civil society	947	International instruments	12714
Corruption	1081	Justice	4337
Counter-terrorism	307	Labor	2827
CP rights - general	207	Migrants	2681
Death penalty	2541	Minorities	2610
Detention conditions	3624	National plan of action	628
Development	1076	NHRI	2142
Disabilities	2177	Other	1607
Elections	1846	Poverty	1119
Enforced disappearances	343	Public security	379
Environment	1250	Racial discrimination	2434
ESC rights - general	283	Right to education	2935
Extrajudicial executions	314	Right to food	357
Freedom of association and peaceful assembly	1053	Right to health	1814
Freedom of movement	118	Right to housing	311
Freedom of opinion and expression	1683	Right to land	231
Freedom of religion and belief	1350	Right to water	246
Freedom of the press	1301	Rights of the Child	10104
General	953	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity	1462
HIV - Aids	337	Special procedures	1917
Human rights defenders	837	Technical assistance	1374
Human rights education and training	2209	Torture and other CID treatment	4530
Human rights violations by state agents	848	Trafficking	2029
Impunity	478	Treaty bodies	1541
Indigenous peoples	992	UPR process	814
Internally displaced persons	237	Women's rights	10705

*Note: Value on the right indicates total number of recommendations about a given issue in the dataset.*

### 3 Issue Frequency per Review-Target Dyad

Table A3 presents the number of reviewer-target dyads that exchanged at least one recommendation about a given issue. For example, there are 8,460 cases in which a reviewing state issued at least one recommendation about Women’s Rights to the state under review, but only 295 cases where a given reviewer issues at least one recommendation about Counter-terrorism.

Table A3: Number of Reviewer Dyads Issuing  
At Least One Recommendation about a Given Issue

Asylum-seekers - refugees	920	International humanitarian law	626
Civil society	914	International instruments	8405
Corruption	1014	Justice	3742
Counter-terrorism	295	Labor	2528
CP rights - general	201	Migrants	2295
Death penalty	2238	Minorities	2179
Detention conditions	3083	National plan of action	599
Development	1002	NHRI	2093
Disabilities	2013	Other	1411
Elections	1775	Poverty	1065
Enforced disappearances	323	Public security	361
Environment	1210	Racial discrimination	2080
ESC rights - general	269	Right to education	2699
Extrajudicial executions	291	Right to food	337
Freedom of association and peaceful assembly	938	Right to health	1677
Freedom of movement	102	Right to housing	298
Freedom of opinion and expression	1519	Right to land	213
Freedom of religion and belief	1156	Right to water	232
Freedom of the press	1192	Rights of the Child	7653
General	894	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity	1343
HIV - Aids	323	Special procedures	1787
Human rights defenders	764	Technical assistance	1246
Human rights education and training	2053	Torture and other CID treatment	3875
Human rights violations by state agents	796	Trafficking	1869
Impunity	467	Treaty bodies	1406
Indigenous peoples	838	UPR process	774
Internally displaced persons	221	Women's rights	8460

## 4 Thematic Clusters

To better summarize our findings, we grouped the 54 individual issues into seven thematic clusters: (1) Civil-Political Rights, (2) Governance and Public Services, (3) Migration, (4) Physical Integrity Rights, (5) Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Minorities, (6) Socio-Economic Rights, and (7) Protection of Vulnerable Populations (Table A4). Each recommendation was then assigned one or multiple of these broader themes according to its associated issue(s). For example, a recommendation addressing Civil Society and Racial Discrimination (specific issues) would be coded as Civil-Political Rights and Racial, Ethnic and Religious Minorities (thematic categories).

Table A4: Thematic Issue Clusters

Thematic Category	Issues
Civil-Political Rights	Civil Political Rights; Civil Society; Elections; Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly; Freedom of Opinion and Expression; Freedom of the Press; Human Rights Defenders
Governance and Public Services	Corruption; Public Security; Human Rights Education and Training; Counter-terrorism
Migration and Migrant Labor	Asylum Seekers and Refugees; Freedom of Movement; Labor; Migrants; Internally Displaced Persons
Physical Integrity Rights	Justice; Death Penalty; Detention; Enforced Disappearances; Extrajudicial Executions; Human Rights Violations by State Agents; Impunity; Torture and Other CID Treatment
Racial, Ethnic and Religious Minorities	Freedom of Religion and Belief; Minorities; Racial Discrimination; Indigenous Peoples
Socio-Economic Rights	Environment; Right to Land; Right to Water; Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Development; Poverty; Right to Education; Right to Food; Right to Health; Right to Housing
Protection of Vulnerable Populations	Disabilities; HIV / AIDS; Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity; Rights of the Child; Trafficking; Women's Rights

These categories build off of existing typologies in the human rights and democracy-promotion literatures.<sup>1</sup> For example, the cluster on Physical Integrity Rights corresponds strongly with U.S. State Department categories. A few issues were ambiguous

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<sup>1</sup> Baekkwon Park, Kevin Greene, and Michael Colaresi, "Human Rights Are (Increasingly) Plural: Learning the Changing Taxonomy of Human Rights from Large-Scale Text Reveals Information Effects," *American Political Science Review*, 2020, 1–23.

with regards to their broader theme. In such cases, we used two methods to make a descriptive inference. First, we examined how the issue in question correlated with other topics at the recommendation level. Second, we read recommendations addressing the issue, while blinding ourselves to information about reviewer and target. Based on these procedures, we chose to combine Migrants and Labor because they correlate very strongly with one another.

To emphasize, these 54 issue categories are broad and overlapping. For example, the Women's Rights category encompasses everything from domestic violence and female genital mutilation to workplace discrimination and abortion. Different recommendations will stress different aspects of women's rights. However, recommendations coded as Women's Rights may also contain labels for Torture or Economic Rights, allowing us to account for systematic variation within issue codes.

## 5 Determinants of Participation

As reported in the manuscript, participation in the UPR is voluntary for reviewers. All UN states can provide feedback in every review (except their own), but many chose not to. What determines reviewer participation in the UPR?

Table A5 summarizes a model examining the likelihood of participating in a given review. The sample includes all dyads between a state under review and a *potential* reviewer (i.e., all UN member states), totaling 74,112 observations. The outcome is *Participation*, a binary variable indicating whether a potential reviewer offered at least one recommendation to the target (true in 27% of cases). The model includes the same explanatory variables described in Section 5 of the main manuscript: *Geopolitical Affinity* between reviewer and target, *Physical Integrity Rights* protections of both reviewer and target, whether the reviewer and target belong to the *Same Region*, and whether the reviewing state was itself undergoing a review during the same UPR session (*Reviewer UPR*). In addition, we include an indicator of whether the reviewing state was a member of the Human Rights Council at the time of the review. The logit model includes *Year*, *Reviewer*, and *Target* fixed effects.

As reported in Table A5, states are more likely to participate when reviewing a state in their region, a pattern widely recognized by observers.<sup>2</sup> In addition, participation is more common among members of the Human Rights Council, as well as states undergoing their own review in the same session. In both cases, states typically send human rights delegations to Geneva, where they may otherwise forgo representation. States with better records of physical integrity rights are more likely to participate. Finally, *Geopolitical Affinity* between reviewer and target displays a small but statistically significant

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<sup>2</sup> FIACAT, "UPR: An Ambivalent Exercise" (The International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (FIACAT), December 2009), [http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/-fiacat\\_ambivalent\\_exercise\\_2009\\_e.pdf](http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/-fiacat_ambivalent_exercise_2009_e.pdf).

positive effect, suggesting that—all else equal—states are more likely to review their geopolitical friends over adversaries. These findings replicate those of Terman and Voeten (2018), who employ a Heckman model for similar purposes.

Table A5: Determinants of UPR Participation

	<b>Participation</b>
Geopolitical Affinity	0.043* (0.024)
Physical Integrity Rights (Reviewer)	0.197** (0.080)
Physical Integrity Rights (Target)	-0.017 (0.103)
Same Region	1.233*** (0.035)
Reviewer UPR	0.162*** (0.052)
HRC Member (Reviewer)	0.616*** (0.041)
N	57,491

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*  $p < .1$

*Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.*

## 6 Regression Tables for Figure 2

Table A6: Effect of Geopolitical Affinity on Recommendation Counts, by Issue

	Number of Recommendations								
	Asylum Seekers & Refugees	Civil Political Rights	Civil Society	Corruption	Counter-terrorism	Death Penalty	Detention	Development	Disabilities
Geopolitical Affinity	0.002 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.004)
Total Recs	0.020*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.046*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)
Mean Severity	0.004 (0.004)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.007)	-0.026*** (0.004)	0.0004 (0.005)
Physical Integrity Rights (Reviewer)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.029* (0.017)	-0.023 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.017)
Physical Integrity Rights (Target)	0.00003 (0.015)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.0002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.032 (0.029)	0.032** (0.016)	0.003 (0.022)
Same Region	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.001 (0.007)
UPR Review (Reviewer)	-0.007 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.006 (0.034)
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.

	Number of Recommendations								
	Economic, Social & Cultural Rights	Elections	Enforced Disappearances	Environment	Extrajudicial Executions	Freedom of Association & Peaceful Assembly	Freedom of Movement	Freedom of Opinion & Expression	Freedom of Religion & Belief
Geopolitical Affinity	0.015*** (0.004)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.060*** (0.004)	-0.042*** (0.004)
Total Recs	0.027*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)
Mean Severity	0.017*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.028*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Physical Integrity Rights (Reviewer)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.041*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.032** (0.015)	0.012 (0.014)
Physical Integrity Rights (Target)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.011* (0.006)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.018)
Same Region	0.001 (0.006)	-0.0004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.003* (0.002)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
UPR Review (Reviewer)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.

Number of Recommendations									
	Freedom of the Press	General	HIV / AIDS	Human Rights Defenders	Human Rights Education & Training	Human Rights Violations by State Agents	Impunity	Indigenous Peoples	Internally Displaced Persons
Geopolitical	-0.031***	0.007**	0.005***	-0.016***	0.016***	-0.013***	-0.007***	0.006	-0.0001
Affinity	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Total Recs	0.025***	0.009***	0.003***	0.014***	0.030***	0.020***	0.010***	0.019***	0.004***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Mean Severity	-0.005	-0.035***	-0.007***	-0.006	-0.010*	0.004	-0.010***	0.002	-0.006***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Physical Integrity	0.031**	0.017	-0.013*	0.006	-0.063***	0.012	0.018**	-0.003	-0.001
Rights (Reviewer)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.006)
Physical Integrity	0.015	-0.010	-0.010	-0.016	0.001	0.009	-0.002	0.002	-0.019**
Rights (Target)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Same Region	0.020***	0.00004	-0.006**	0.003	0.010	0.006	0.002	0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)
UPR Review	-0.002	0.010	0.002	-0.011	-0.001	-0.002	-0.007	-0.009	0.001
(Reviewer)	-0.031***	0.007**	0.005***	-0.016***	0.016***	-0.013***	-0.007***	0.006	-0.0001
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.

Number of Recommendations									
	International Humanitarian Law	International Instruments	Justice	Labor	Migrants	Minorities	National Plan of Action	NHRI	Other
Geopolitical	-0.011***	-0.003	-0.010	-0.037***	-0.050***	-0.004	0.009***	0.011**	0.002
Affinity	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Total Recs	0.018***	0.243***	0.080***	0.041***	0.042***	0.050***	0.007***	0.033***	0.028***
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mean Severity	0.003	0.340***	0.009	0.050***	0.042***	-0.018***	0.015***	0.029***	-0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Physical Integrity	0.001	0.037	0.046*	0.009	0.024	-0.014	-0.008	0.016	-0.032**
Rights (Reviewer)	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Physical Integrity	-0.055***	-0.039	-0.050	-0.005	-0.008	-0.054**	0.017	0.033	0.014
Rights (Target)	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Same Region	0.001	-0.048***	0.020**	-0.024***	-0.008	0.001	-0.005	-0.003	0.030***
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
UPR Review	-0.004	-0.004	-0.013	0.006	0.022**	-0.0003	0.003	-0.002	-0.001
(Reviewer)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

	Number of Recommendations								
	Poverty	Public Security	Racial Discrimination	Right to Education	Right to Food	Right to Health	Right to Housing	Right to Land	Right to Water
Geopolitical	0.024***	0.002	-0.052***	0.047***	0.004**	0.038***	0.003	-0.003**	0.003
Affinity	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Recs	0.011***	0.008***	0.045***	0.035***	0.005***	0.021***	0.005***	0.006***	0.002***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mean Severity	-0.030***	-0.003	0.014***	-0.057***	-0.005**	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Physical Integrity	0.011	-0.015**	0.007	-0.019	-0.003	0.024	-0.005	0.006	0.013**
Rights (Reviewer)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Physical Integrity	0.004	-0.030***	0.049**	0.032	0.009	-0.011	0.001	0.0003	0.006
Rights (Target)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Same Region	-0.001	0.007**	-0.018***	-0.015*	-0.005	-0.024***	-0.002	0.004*	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
UPR Review	0.002	0.0002	-0.008	0.031***	0.009**	0.004	0.003	-0.002	-0.0002
(Reviewer)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.

	Number of Recommendations								
	Rights of the Child	Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity	Special Procedures	Technical Assistance & Cooperation	Torture & Other CID Treatment	Trafficking	Treaty Bodies	UPR Process	Women's Rights
Geopolitical	0.028***	0.015***	-0.026***	0.010***	-0.015**	0.008*	0.001	0.008***	0.041***
Affinity	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.009)
Total Recs	0.149***	0.019***	0.041***	0.009***	0.095***	0.030***	0.027***	0.015***	0.151***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Mean Severity	-0.020*	0.005	0.046***	-0.058***	0.072***	0.001	0.006	-0.013***	-0.055***
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.011)
Physical Integrity	-0.082**	-0.012	0.0002	0.024	-0.011	-0.024	0.019	-0.059***	-0.066*
Rights (Reviewer)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.034)
Physical Integrity	0.045	-0.021	0.005	-0.032*	-0.007	-0.0002	0.028	0.015	0.074*
Rights (Target)	(0.046)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.044)
Same Region	-0.052***	0.006	0.006	0.021***	-0.015*	0.011*	-0.003	0.002	-0.083***
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)
UPR Review	0.006	-0.012	-0.005	-0.005	-0.038***	0.006	0.002	-0.003	0.025
(Reviewer)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.021)
N	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reviewer, Target, and Year fixed effects are omitted from the table. Standard errors in parentheses.

## 7 Robustness Tests for Figure 2

### 7.1 Individual Robustness Tests

For the main analysis presented in Section 5, we restricted the sample to *participating* dyads—that is, all directed dyads where a reviewer issued at least one recommendation to the state under review, totaling 20,130 observations. Here, we replicate the analysis using a larger sample encompassing all dyads between a state under review and a *potential* reviewer (i.e., all UN member states), totaling 74,112 observations. Our main outcome of interest is the number of recommendations made about a particular issue  $x$ —a count measure with an oversupply of zeros. There are two reasons why a state would issue zero recommendations about issue  $x$ . Either it did not participate in that review at all, or it participated but chose to speak on issues other than  $x$ .

We use a zero-inflated Poisson model to analyze this process. The zero-inflated Poisson model contains two components: one to model additional zeros—i.e., from not participating in a review—and then a Poisson model for the level of engagement on a particular issue. Our model for additional zeros (from non-participation) draws from our analysis in Appendix 5 on reviewer participation. We selected the variables that showed a significant effect on participation and used those as the regressors for the zero-inflation component. The count component used the same explanatory variables as the main analysis in Section 5. The only difference is that we omit *Year*, *Sender*, and *Target* fixed effects in order to avoid overfitting possibility of overfitting—where the results are driven by a small number of observations with requisite variation—as well as for computational tractability. Figure A1 reports coefficients from the count components, visualizing the effect of *Geopolitical Affinity* on the number of recommendations made about a given issue.

Figure A1: Zero-Inflated Poisson: Count Coefficients for *Geopolitical Affinity*, by Issue




Figure A2 replicates Figure 2 with a subsample of reviewing states sitting on the Human Rights Council at the time of the review, totaling 19,736 observations. Otherwise, the procedure is identical to that described for Figure 2.

Figure A2: Effect of Geopolitical Affinity on Recommendation Counts, by Issue (HRC Members Only)




Figure A3 replicates Figure 2 after removing recommendations with *Severity* levels 1 or 2. Note that models omit *Severity* as a control due to the lack of variance. Otherwise, the procedure is identical to that described for Figure 2.

Figure A3: Effect of Geopolitical Affinity on Recommendation Counts, by Issue (Severity Level 3 Only)





Figure A4 replicates Figure 2 using formal alliance as an alternative measure of *Geopolitical Hostility*. The data come from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance (version 4.1), indicating whether or not a formal alliance exists between reviewer and target.<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, the procedure is identical to that described for Figure 2. Due to data availability, these models feature significantly less power and precision.

Figure A4: Effect of Geopolitical Affinity on Recommendation Counts, by Issue (Formal Alliance)



<sup>3</sup> Douglas M. Gibler, "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3 (2008): 426–54.

Figure A5 replicates Figure 2 using hurdle count models. A hurdle count model contains two components, one for zero counts and another for positive counts. Unlike zero-inflated models, which assumes two sources of zeros, hurdle models only estimate a count model for positive (i.e., non-zero) outcomes. The underlying assumption is that positive counts only occur once a “hurdle” is cleared. In this way, we can model two distinct choices: (1) whether to offer a recommendation about a given issue, and if so, (2) how many recommendations to offer. The hurdle component uses a binomial logit model, and the positive count component employs a truncated Poisson regression. Both components were fitted using the same sample and explanatory variables as the main analysis in Section 5. Again, we omit *Year*, *Sender*, and *Target* fixed effects in order to avoid overfitting as well as for computational tractability.

Figure FA5.1 reports the coefficients of *Geopolitical Affinity* for the hurdle component (the likelihood of offering at least one recommendation about a given issue). Here, the findings overlap extensively with those in F2 of the main manuscript. This suggests that *Geopolitical Affinity* influences a reviewer’s decision on whether to speak on a given issue. Figure FA5.2 reports the coefficients of *Geopolitical Affinity* on count component (the positive count of recommendations about a given issue). The results here are much less clear, with numerous null findings. This is not too surprising given the distributions of the outcome measures, which are overwhelmingly zeros or ones. In other words, it is relatively rare for a reviewer to offer two or more recommendations about a given issue during the same review. For example, there were 1,014 cases in which a reviewer offered at least one recommendation about Civil Society, but only 57 of these (5.6%) featured two or more recommendations. Conditional on offering at least one recommendation, the average number of recommendations exchanged on a given issue ranges from 1.01 (Right to Housing) to International Instruments (1.5). Thus, we lack the requisite variation in the dependent variable to make strong claims about the effect of *Geopolitical Affinity* on positive recommendations counts. Overall, insofar as *Geopolitical Affinity* affects reviewers’ behavior, it appears to influence their decision *whether* to speak on a given issue, and less so on *how much* to speak on that issue.

Figure A5.1: Zero Hurdle Model Coefficients for *Geopolitical Affinity*, by Issue





Figure A6.2: Positive Count Model Coefficients for *Geopolitical Affinity*, by Issue



## 7.2 Summary of Robustness Tests

Table A7 summarizes the results from the main analysis (Figure 2) and robustness tests (Figures A1, A2, A3, and A4). The issues are ordered identically to Figure 2, i.e., by coefficient value from the main analysis. Cells in red indicate a significant and negative marginal effect of *Geopolitical Affinity* on number of recommendations. Cells in blue indicate a significant and positive marginal effect of *Geopolitical Affinity* on number of recommendations. Cells in gray indicate an insignificant marginal effect of *Geopolitical Affinity* on number of recommendations. Some models feature less power and precision because they use subsets of the main data (FA2, FA3) or use alternative measures with less data coverage (FA4). As a result, they report more insignificant results. Overall, however, the findings are *consistent* in the sense that we find no significant evidence contradicting the main results reported in the manuscript for most issues.

Three categories constitute exceptions and display inconsistency across models. One is the “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” category, for which *Geopolitical Affinity* has a significant and positive effect in F2 of the paper, but significant and negative effect in FA1. The other anomaly is “Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment.” Here, *Geopolitical Affinity* exerts a negative effect in the main analysis but a positive effect in FA1 and FA5.1. Finally, the model for “Minorities” display inconsistent results across robustness tests (FA1 and FA4), although not with the main analysis in F2. These inconsistencies suggest that our results do not justify strong claims regarding these three issues. It should be emphasized, however, that both FA1 and FA5 excluded year, reviewer, and target fixed effects (see above). One possibility is that these issues are highly determined by a few reviewer and target states. Overall, however, the point remains that our findings on the relationship between *Geopolitical Affinity* and the likelihood of norm enforcement in the UPR is remarkably robust across different model specifications.

Table A7: Summary of Robustness Tests

Issues	F2	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5.1
Freedom of Opinion and Expression	Red	Red	Red	Red	Grey	Red
Racial Discrimination	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Migrants	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Freedom of Religion and Belief	Red	Red	Red	Red	Grey	Red
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Labor	Red	Red	Red	Red	Grey	Red
Death Penalty	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Red	Grey
Freedom of the Press	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Special Procedures	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Grey	Grey
Detention	Red	Red	Red	Grey	Grey	Red
Human Rights Defenders	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Red	Grey
Torture and Other CID Treatment	Red	Blue	Grey	Red	Red	Blue
Human Rights Violations by State Agents	Red	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Red
Extrajudicial Executions	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
International Humanitarian Law	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Justice	Grey	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Civil Society	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Impunity	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Red	Red
Freedom of Movement	Red	Red	Grey	Red	Red	Red
Civil Political Rights	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Counter-terrorism	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Elections	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Minorities	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
International Instruments	Red	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Land	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Environment	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Internally Displaced Persons	Red	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Blue
Treaty Bodies	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Public Security	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Other	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Corruption	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Asylum Seekers and Refugees	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Water	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Housing	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Food	Blue	Red	Red	Blue	Red	Red
HIV / AIDS	Blue	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Blue
Indigenous Peoples	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
General	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Trafficking	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Enforced Disappearances	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
UPR Process	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
National Plan of Action	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Technical Assistance and Cooperation	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
NHRI	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Human Rights Education and Training	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Development	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Poverty	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Rights of the Child	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Disabilities	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Health	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Women's Rights	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Right to Education	Blue	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red

## 8 Reciprocity

To what extent do states engage in reciprocity or tit-for-tat behavior? We lack the requisite longitudinal data to make strong conclusions about this. However, we do note two observations that make us skeptical of a strong reciprocity or tit-for-tat mechanism. Both look to the effect of *Reviewer UPR*, which indicates whether a reviewer state is undergoing its own review during the same session as the target. Given the fact that the timing of UPR reviews is random, and the models include fixed effects for reviewer and target, any effects of this term could be interpreted as causal.

First, Terman & Voeten (2018) found that countries that are undergoing a review in the same session are more likely to participate, probably because they already have delegations in Geneva. However, there is no evidence that countries undergoing a UPR review are more lenient in their recommendations on average.

Second, looking at the regression tables (Appendix 6), we observe very few significant effects for *UPR (Reviewer)* on the number of recommendations per issue. For 5 issues (out of 54), this term is statistically significant: (1) negative for Counter-terrorism, (2) positive for Migrants, (3) positive for Rights to Education, (4) positive for Right to Food, and (5) negative for Torture & Other CID Treatment. However, given the number of comparisons we are making, some “significant” effects are expected as random artifacts, even if the true effect is null.

## 9 Praising

We explored “praising” in reviews by looking at recommendations coded as level 1 on *Severity*. As detailed in Appendix 1, these recommendations emphasized continuity (using language such as “continue,” “maintain,” “persevere,” “persist,” “pursue”), were directed at parties other than the state under review, or called on the state under review to share information. Over 95% of these recommendations were accepted by the state under review, indicating that they focused more on praising improved practices than shaming violations.

Of the 57,867 recommendations in our dataset, only 9,630 were coded as 1 on *Severity*. Unfortunately, this means we lacked the requisite power to test whether states were more likely to praise their geopolitical partners on each of the 54 substantive issues. Instead, we estimated a simpler model testing whether states were more likely to praise their geopolitical partners overall. Here, the unit of analysis is the reviewer-dyad (same as Section 5, Figure 2 of the manuscript), but the dependent variable is the number of “praising” recommendations across all issues.

Table A8 provides a summary of the regression results. As reported, *Geopolitical Affinity* is positive and significant. With one standard deviation increase in *Geopolitical Affinity*, a particular reviewer issues on average around 0.05 more praising recommendations to the state under review.

To illustrate further, Table A9 lists the reviewer dyads exchanging the highest amount of “praise” in the dataset. Not surprisingly, Cuba-to-Venezuela ties for first, with Cuba offering Venezuela 7 “praising” recommendations. Venezuela returned the favor two years later, offering Cuba 6 “praising” recommendations during its review.

Table A8: Effect of Geopolitical Affinity on Number of Praising Recommendations (Severity Level 1)

	Number of “Praising” Recommendations
Geopolitical Affinity	0.049*** (0.017)
Reviewer UPR	-0.056* (0.033)
Same Region	0.035* (0.021)
Physical Integrity Rights (Reviewer)	-0.100* (0.053)
Physical Integrity Rights (Target)	0.082 (0.072)
N	5,075

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

*Fixed SuR, Reviewer State, Year, and Issue Effects Omitted from the Table. Standard errors in parentheses.*

Table A9: Reviewing Dyads Exchanging the Highest Amount of Praise

From	To	Review Year	Number of “Praising” Recommendations
Syria	Uganda	2016	7
Cuba	Venezuela	2011	7
Venezuela	Cuba	2013	6
Algeria	Viet Nam	2009	6
Belarus	Cuba	2013	5
Bolivia	Cuba	2013	5
Dominican Republic	Cuba	2013	5
Myanmar	Cuba	2013	5
Syria	Cuba	2013	5
Tajikistan	Iran	2010	5
Mexico	Solomon Islands	2016	5
Bolivia	Syria	2011	5
Algeria	Vanuatu	2009	5
Dominican Republic	Venezuela	2016	5

## 10 Anomalous Issues

Our theory predicts that, on average, states are more likely to enforce safe norms with their allies and sensitive norms with their adversaries. While the results generally match our predictions, we should expect some issues to fall “off the diagonal” due to specific circumstances or dynamics that fall outside the scope of our theory. We find two such anomalies: (1) Racial Discrimination, which is more likely to be addressed by adversaries, but also more likely to be supported by target states; and (2) Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, which is more likely to be raised by allies, but also more sensitive / intolerable to the target. Also notable is the Death Penalty, which falls in the direction predicted by the theory, but is anomalous with regards to magnitude. Recommendations addressing the death penalty are by far the least tolerable to target states—36 percentage points less likely to be accepted than the default.

The fact that we find some anomalous issues—Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Racial Discrimination, and (to some degree) the Death Penalty—should not raise serious doubts about our basic argument. As with all theories, ours imposes a number of simplifying assumptions in order to retain explanatory power, while bracketing a multitude of factors that potentially influence state decision-making. In some cases, these particular factors override our theorized mechanisms. Below, we offer some (admittedly post-hoc) interpretation of these anomalous issues.

### 10.1 Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

As a human rights issue, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) is unusual in multiple respects. First, SOGI is a hotly contested topic in the United Nations, and its status changed significantly over the relatively short time period of our analysis (2008–2016). During this time, SOGI rights moved from the relative fringes to broad, mainstream support across the international system. In addition to several UN declarations and resolutions, the Council of Europe passed “Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5” in 2010 to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. Second, not only did support for SOGI rights increase overall, but the supporting coalition cut across geopolitical alliances. Countries that otherwise rarely cooperate—from the Netherlands and Brazil to Vietnam and Venezuela—have voiced their support for SOGI rights in United Nations fora. Moreover, several countries that were previously opposed to SOGI rights, including Rwanda and Sierra Leone, switched their position during this time period.

One implication of these trends is that some leaders may have held particularly strong preferences about promoting SOGI norms and diffusing them across the international system. When such preferences are sufficiently strong, countries may be compelled to shame their allies despite the geopolitical risks. This could explain why we see

reviewing states issue SOGI recommendations to their friends and allies in the UPR, even if target states were generally reluctant to support them.

## 10.2 Racial Discrimination

Racial Discrimination is more likely to be addressed by adversaries, but also more likely to be supported by target states. There are two plausible explanations. First, racial discrimination is a broad category that can encompass more or less sensitive accusations. Some recommendations addressing racial discrimination are akin to those addressing women's rights, with violations occurring in the private sphere and positioning the state as protector of vulnerable groups. Others are more overtly "political" in the sense that they condemn government actors for racial discrimination under the law or other forms of state-sponsored racism. These latter recommendations will obviously register as more threatening and sensitive to the target state. Given these differences, it could be that Racial Discrimination is too heterogenous to produce consistent results.

Another possibility (which does not contradict the first) is that target states may want to support recommendations concerning racial discrimination for reasons that are independent of sensitivity. In the manuscript, we argued that the target state's support or rejection of a given recommendation is a helpful *proxy* for the sensitivity of that recommendation. But the two are not coterminous and do not always perfectly align. Generally speaking, delegations are more likely to reject sensitive recommendations on average, but they may choose to support them under particular circumstances. For example, a newly elected leader may promise to improve race relations as part of their political agenda. If so, supporting recommendations on racial discrimination may provide additional opportunities for authorities to initiate their preferred reforms.

## 10.3 Death Penalty

Recommendations addressing the death penalty fall in the directions predicted by our theory: all else equal, reviewing states are more likely to address the death penalty with their adversaries, while target states are more likely to reject such recommendations (regardless of sender). However, the Death Penalty is anomalous with regards to sensitivity: target states overwhelmingly reject recommendations involving the death penalty, more than any other issue.

As a human rights issue, the death penalty features some unusual properties. For one, it is a highly narrow category. Unlike Women's Rights or Freedom of Speech or Detention, each encompassing a variety of topics or practices, the Death Penalty refers to one practice in particular: capital punishment. Recommendations coded as Death Penalty overwhelmingly call for the target to abolish capital punishment or consider doing so.

As a result, reviewer states have fewer degrees of freedom when addressing the death penalty in the UPR. Put differently, a given reviewer state can plausibly address violations of women's rights, or even freedom of speech, to practically any target state.

This is not so for the death penalty. Recommendations about the death penalty are only issued to the relatively few countries that retain capital punishment (48, according to Amnesty International).<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, with rare exceptions, such recommendations are issued strictly by the 142 countries that have themselves abolished the death penalty in law or practice. Thus, more than any other issue, recommendations addressing the death penalty are patterned by clear fault lines corresponding to the retention of a particular practice, with fewer degrees of freedom on both the reviewer and target ends.

Moreover, of the countries that still practice capital punishment, most are fiercely protective of the institution.<sup>5</sup> This is not surprising, given that such states have bucked the historical trend of global abolition, with over two-thirds of all countries having abolished the death penalty. Clearly the hold-outs are particularly obstinate against calls to abolish the practice. Moreover, many of these states are amongst the most powerful in the world, including the United States, China, and India, which are unlikely to be swayed by global pressure. All this probably accounts for the fact that target states so often reject recommendations involving the death penalty.

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<sup>4</sup> Amnesty International, "Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (as of July 2018)," July 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5066652017ENGLISH.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> This defensiveness is often rooted in public opinion, with "vengeful populations" supporting capital punishment. Rachel M. Stein, "War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 03 (August 2015): 556–73, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000301>.